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Abstract 
Microfinance programs are largely focused on income-generation for the poor as 
well as the creation of social capital. Like many countries in the developing world where 
poverty is prevalent, Pakistan has adopted microfinance as a major means of poverty 
alleviation. Microfinance achieved enormous success in Bangladesh and led to the 
awarding of the Nobel Peace Prize to Muhammad Yunus in 2006 for microfinance projects. 
However, unlike in Bangladesh where it has succeeded, the viability and usefulness of 
microfinance for poverty alleviation in Pakistan remain unclear. The main objective of this 
study is to investigate the limits and prospects of conventional and Islamic microfinance 
for poverty alleviation in Pakistan. To address this objective, the study undertakes a 
multipronged analysis. First, it assesses the performance of conventional microfinance in 
terms of financial sustainability and social outreach. Second, it examines the perceived 
differences between conventional and Islamic microfinance, based on a sample survey. 
Third, it proposes a mosque-based Islamic microfinance model to overcome the 
shortcomings of existing microfinance. Lastly, it tests the successful implementation of 
Islamic microfinance model through Linear Probability Model (Binary Dependent Model).   
 
The study found that conventional microfinance has some limitations and it has not 
been able to achieve the “double-bottom line” objectives of financial sustainability and 
social outreach. The performance evaluation of the microfinance showed that some MFIs 
are financially sound and efficient but less efficient at social development, while others 
have social efficiency but lack financial self-sufficiency. A number of cultural and socio-
political factors, e.g. domestic violence, terrorism, unfriendly business circumstances, and 
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strict religiosity, can account for the underserving of conventional microfinance. From the 
financial performance view, microfinance in Pakistan performed below the par value of 
microfinance in South Asia. The average for the depth of outreach is 11.97% which shows 
that on average, the percentage of serving the poorest is around 12% in the gross loan 
portfolio. The results thus support our hypothesis that conventional microfinance is skewed 
towards financial commercialization rather than social value creation.  
 
The survey of peoples’ perceptions regarding conventional and Islamic 
microfinance revealed that a majority of people in Pakistan understand the fundamental 
differences between these two types of microfinance. Also, the respondents expressed 
disagreement with the overly emphasized claims of conventional microfinance, i.e. 
empowering the poor (57% disagree), serving the poorest of the poor (94% disagree), and 
lifting the poor out of the poverty abyss (62% disagree). A majority of respondents (76%) 
choose Islamic microfinance as a source of potential borrowing in future because it works 
within the Shariah boundaries and charges no interest on loans. Islamic microfinance is 
considered a better tool for poverty alleviation because of its Welfarist genre as it works 
within the boundaries of Islamic Shariah. In sum, Islamic microfinance is positively 
perceived by the people of Pakistan. According to peoples’ perception, Islamic 
microfinance could be used effectively in poverty alleviation efforts if it is aligned with 
modern financial environment.  
 
The study also investigated whether or not Islamic microfinance can be used as a 
replacement of existing microfinance given the significant concomitant growth of Islamic 
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banking and finance throughout the world. It proposed a new model of Islamic 
microfinance based on religious principles with the inclusion of the mosque (the Muslims’ 
prayer place). A mosque-based system integrates financial services with religious practice 
and addresses a number of existing issues of conventional microfinance. It is elaborated 
that the Islamic microfinance model can break the vicious circle of poverty with the 
injection of funds through entrepreneurial loans and consumption loans. Finally, the study 
tested the probability of successful implementation of Islamic microfinance in Pakistan by 
using the binary probability model (Probit) after recoding the peoples’ responses into 
dummy variables. The analysis showed some significantly positive probabilities for the 
implementation of Islamic microfinance in Pakistan for poverty alleviation.  Based on these 
findings, the study provides several recommendations for policy and further research. 
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CHAPTER 1 
INTRODUCTION 
 
“In poverty and other misfortunes of life, true friends are a sure refuge. The 
young they keep out of mischief; to the old they are a comfort and aid in their 
weakness, and those in the prime of life they incite to noble deeds” (Aristotle). 
1.1 General Background 
Poverty is a universal phenomenon that defines material deprivation, income 
inequality and the lack of available economic resources in the society. In the current era of 
globalization and technological advancement a number of tools are being used to fight 
poverty. Microfinance is one such tool that is considered an effective way to eradicate 
poverty. Its role and significance was universally acknowledged when an economics 
professor Muhammad Yunus achieved the Nobel Peace Prize in 2006 for his project of 
providing small loans to rural agricultural farmers in Bangladesh. This particular event 
triggered a wave among development practitioners to replicate the Grameen bank 
microfinance model that was initiated by Muhammad Yunus. Beatriz and Jonathan (2005, 
p. 12) pointed out that the replication of the Grameen model was evident in thirty countries 
from East Timor to Bosnia, and in thirty states of the United States of America.  
 
The term “microfinance” evolved from microcredits and became popular only in 
the last four to five decades (Mago, 2013; Helms, 2006; Qudrat-I and Lutfor, 2006; Henry 
et al, 2003). Initially, it included only microloans but over time it enhanced to the full range 
of modern financial services. The practice of extending small credit to the poor prevails in 
various countries. For example, some of the famous small credit groups are ‘chit fund’ in 
5 
 
India, ‘susus’ in Ghana, ‘tandas’ in Mexico, ‘arisan’ in Indonesia, ‘cheetu’ in Sri Lanka, 
‘tontines’ in West Africa, ‘pasanaku’ in Bolivia (CGAP, 2006 April 14; Mushuku and 
Mayisa, 2014), ‘BeeSee or Committee’ in Pakistan and Bangladesh, and ‘Chimbadzo’ in 
Zimbabwe (Mago, 2013). The existing forms of microfinance depend not only on small 
loans but a range of micro products including micro-loans, micro-savings and recently 
added micro-insurance (Beatriz and Jonathan, 2005, p.14). The emergence of microfinance 
in the poverty alleviation toolkit is considered a welcome move in contemporary 
development strategies (Hiatt and Woodword, 2006; Johnson and Rogaly, 1997, Khandker, 
2005).  
 
 The concept of microfinance is associated with the concept of poverty alleviation 
in general. Initially, microfinance was regarded as ‘microcredits’ only and it was not the 
part of the formal financial system, but in later stages when finance deeply rooted in the 
economy, it became necessary for the formal financial system to integrate microfinance 
with other financial services. The growing involvement of finance in the process of 
economic growth strengthens its position to capture all spheres of finance including 
microfinance. The development of microfinance is mainly based on the banking system as 
it considered a subset of the formal financial system. During the inception of microfinance, 
its scope was limited to developing countries only but after some successful achievements, 
its horizon had broadened to developed countries as well. Now, the accessibility of 
microfinance products is shared not only by poor populations but by various less-poor 
entrepreneurs as well in different parts of the world.  
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The main objective of microfinance is to provide financial services to excluded 
groups of society to fight against poverty. A majority of the world’s poor are financially 
excluded. It is estimated that roughly half of the all adults in the world do not have bank 
accounts (The Economist, April 20th, 2012). In the West, 89% of adults have bank accounts 
while in developing countries only 41% of the adult population enjoy banking facilities. 
The difference is bigger in credit card usage as half of the western world have credit cards 
while only 7% in the developing world use credit cards (The Economist, ibid). The 
financial exclusion of the poor is highly prevalent in developing countries than in 
developed countries. That is why microfinance mainly targets poor countries and it is 
significant in the developing world. Microfinance creates a bridge between the poor and 
the financial sector. It’s a win-win situation for both because financial inclusion provides 
more customers to the finance sector while providing the poor some shelter against 
economic shocks. Financial services safeguard them from exogenous shocks such as 
catastrophes, accidents, injuries and illness etc., and the microfinance services are utilized 
to improve the living standard of poor people throughout the world. The initial stance taken 
by the development banks after the World War-II was quite similar to existing 
microfinance. The development banks were established to provide financial assistance to 
poor people for rehabilitation in war-torn economies. Although the objective was quite 
noble, the lack of financial discipline and a continuous interference by the states deterred 
the role of development banks. The emergence of microfinance during the mid-1970s was 
the time when development banks had lost their glitter in poverty alleviation and economic 
growth. The Grameen bank which launched the microfinance services in Bangladesh in 
1976 was undoubtedly considered the first microfinance institution designated to provide 
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microfinance products to the poor masses of Bangladesh. Over a period of four decades, 
microfinance intensified its viability and importance in poverty alleviation throughout the 
world. Nevertheless, microfinance patterns have shifted in the last couple of decades. In its 
infancy period, the visionary approach of microfinance was mainly focused on borrowers 
or the buyers of microfinance loans, while in its transitory phase, the focus shifted towards 
credit providers or the sellers of microfinance loans. At present, the main focus of attention 
is the working environment or the markets where buyers and sellers of microfinance loans 
interact with each other. The broader spectrum of microfinance coerces the modern 
financial system to integrate and reconsider microfinance as an integral part of the formal 
financial system because microfinance largely covers the poor customers who were 
otherwise considered as non-customers. The integration of microfinance with the formal 
financial system enhances its capability to provide financial services to the poor and 
unbanked customers and allows microfinance to bring the poor customers into the financial 
net. Such financial inclusion is beneficial for both microfinance and the poor as well. In 
fact, it is more beneficial to the poor because now they can enjoy financial products at low 
cost and they are able to solve their financial matters with the help of financial experts 
through microfinance. The poor face a lot of problems without financial inclusion such as 
opening bank accounts, getting insurance cover (personal or home), insolvency, and the 
lack of knowledge about the usage of savings etc. (Breckland Council, 2012).  
 
Pakistan, a neighboring country of Bangladesh, has also initiated the microfinance 
projects to curb the long standing issues of poverty in the country. In Pakistan, microcredit 
projects were started during the early 80s by the efforts of late Akhter Hameed Khan. 
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Initially, small loans were provided in rural areas to support poor farmers as an extension 
of pre-partition institutional credits of ‘Taccavi’ and cooperative societies’ loans. The 
government-administered loans (‘Taccavi’) were managed by the then provincial 
governments under the regulations of Land Improvement Loans Act (1883) and 
Agriculturists’ Loan Act (1884)i. With the passage of time such kind of loans lost their 
effectiveness and completely packed-off in 1993-94 (Iqbal, Ahmad and Abbas, 2003). In 
contrast, loans provided by cooperative societies and banks, fall under the regulation of 
Cooperative Credit Societies Act (1904) have continued to operate (The Punjab 
Agriculturists’ Loan Act, 1958).  The Orangi Pilot project is considered the beginning of 
modern microfinance in Pakistan. The multidimensional project was launched in the urban 
periphery of Karachi to cover the main social sectors like health, housing, technology, and 
education support etc. (Orangi Pilot Project, 1995). After a couple of years, the Aga Khan 
Foundation had started a similar project in Northern areas of Pakistan to help out poor 
people through small credits. Despite these efforts, microfinance in Pakistan is not as 
effective as it supposed to be. Suzuki and Miah (2015, p. 470) noted that “taking into 
account the magnitude of 45 million poor households, the level of microfinance deepening 
is still low.” This situation is probably because the underprivileged or underserved are not 
availing of microfinance due to some religious reasons -- an element of interest is strictly 
forbidden in an Islamic country like Pakistan or because the existing form of microfinance 
is more oriented towards financial commercialization than poverty alleviation.  
  
Microfinance is considered an effective tool for poverty alleviation and it can be 
used to break the Vicious Circle of Poverty (VCP) which was initially defined by Regnar 
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Nurkse in 1953 in his famous ‘Balanced growth theory’ (Bass, 2009). It explains that poor 
are poor because of the fact they born poor and societies are poor because they destined to 
be poor. The ‘Vicious Circle of Poverty’ (VCP) implies that poverty generates more 
poverty because the limited abilities of the poor prevent them from generating and saving 
funds, thus keeping them in a continuous cycle of poverty.  The circular flow of low real 
income leads to low savings and low savings means less capital available for investment. 
The production possibilities remain low due to low investments that generate low real 
income. Figure 1.1 shows the cyclic flow of poverty in the VCP. 
                    
SUPPLY SIDE     DEMAND SIDE  
 
Figure1.1: Vicious Circle of Poverty (Source: Author’s representation) 
 
The vicious circle of poverty implies that a majority of poor remain poor due to a 
cyclic binding between their income and expenditures with the absence of savings.  
 
The funds could be injected in VCP through microfinance to increase the level of 
savings in poor’s lives that could be used to generate extra income and to lift the poor out 
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of the poverty trap. By injecting funds through microfinance, poverty can be alleviated 
because an increase in real income has domino effects on each segment of the VCP. With 
higher real income, the demand for goods and services will be increased so as the 
opportunities for investment. The production activities will be triggered through a higher 
level of investment and the rotations of economic growth will be started. However, the 
insertion of funds in VCP through microfinance demands financial self-sufficiency and 
social value creation that can be achieved through community capacity building and 
financial inclusion of poor into financial net. Financial self-sufficiency requires operational 
and financial efficiency while social value creation can be achieved through an increase in 
outreach.  
 
1.2 Statement of the Problem 
The existing state of microfinance in Pakistan shows that the current outreach of 
2.8 million borrowers just covers 7% of potential borrowers (SBP, 2011). It seems that the 
existing microfinance efforts (hereafter referred to as “conventional microfinance”) are not 
efficient on both financial and social dimensions. This dilemma encourages me to 
thoroughly investigate whether or not microfinance is efficient on both fronts. Also I try to 
find out the causal connection between underutilization of conventional microfinance and 
strict religiosity in Pakistan. It is argued that the people of Pakistan did not avail themselves 
of conventional microfinance due to some strict religiosity. Conventional microfinance is 
unpopular due to the element of interest which is completely forbidden in Islamic Shariah 
(Islamic Jurisprudence), and the belief that involvement in interest-bearing transactions is 
a biggest sin in Islamic culture. It is further argued that the Islamic version of microfinance 
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can be used as a replacement of existing microfinance in order to expand the outreach of 
microfinance for poverty alleviation. The possible chances of Islamic microfinance being 
successfully implemented in Pakistan needs to be explored. 
 
1.3 Research Questions and Hypotheses 
 The study examines the following research questions: 
i) How efficiently has conventional microfinance in Pakistan achieved the 
goal of financial sustainability?  
ii) How efficiently has conventional microfinance in Pakistan achieved the 
goal of social development in terms of social outreach?  
iii) How do the people of Pakistan perceive conventional microfinance and 
Islamic microfinance?  
iv) Can Islamic microfinance be used as a replacement of conventional 
microfinance in Pakistan? 
v) What is the probability of Islamic microfinance being successfully 
implemented in Pakistan? 
The following corresponding hypotheses are thus investigated: 
i)  Conventional microfinance is skewed towards financial sustainability 
rather than poverty alleviation in Pakistan; 
ii) Conventional microfinance in Pakistan has failed to achieve the double 
bottom line objectives; 
iii)   Islamic microfinance is preferred over conventional microfinance in 
Pakistan due to the country’s Muslim majority; 
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iv)   Islamic microfinance can be used as a replacement of existing 
microfinance to achieve the long-term goals of poverty alleviation in 
Pakistan; 
v)   The probability of Islamic microfinance’s successful implementation in 
Pakistan is high. 
  
1.4 Key objectives of the Study 
This study investigates the limits and prospects of conventional and Islamic 
microfinance for poverty alleviation in Pakistan. To address this objective, the study 
undertakes a multipronged analysis. First, it assesses the performance of conventional 
microfinance in terms of financial sustainability and social outreach1. Second, it examines 
the perceived differences between conventional and Islamic microfinance, based on a 
sample survey. Third, it proposes a mosque-based Islamic microfinance model to overcome 
the shortcomings of existing microfinance. Last, the successful implementation of Islamic 
microfinance model is tested through Linear Probability Model (Binary Dependent 
Model). 
 
 
 
1.5 Analytical and Methodological Framework 
                                                 
1 The way of providing credit facilities to the extremely poor and deprived through microfinance (Ambe Shu and Oney, 
2014; CGAP, 2007). 
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The performance evaluation of conventional microfinance is conducted by using 
financial performance indicators and social performance indicators. The main reason 
behind the evaluation of both financial and social performance is that microfinance is 
intended to achieve the double bottom line objectives (Tulchin, n.d.; Brau and Woller, 
2004; Lewis, 2008; Gutiérrez-Nieto, Serrano-Cinca, and Molinero, 2009). The double 
bottom line encompasses the concerns for both social and financial performance (CGAP, 
2007). Although microfinance institutions share some common characteristics with 
traditional banks, they are slightly different from the conventional banking institutions in 
terms of social services they provide to the society; therefore, it is generally expected that 
microfinance should perform well on both fronts. Traditionally, financial performance is 
measured through financial sustainability and financial self-sufficiency, while social 
performance is measured through social outreach (Yaron, 1994; Dunford, 2002; Navajas, 
Schreiner, Meyer, Gonz´alez-Vega and Rodr´ıguez, 2000). Although social outreach is 
measured though proxy variables, no uniform criteria are established yet to determine 
social performance (Zeller, Sharma, Henry and Lapenu, 2006). ‘Data Envelopment 
Analysis’ (DEA) has extensively been applied in the literature to assess the performance 
of banking institutions. Some of the studies that used DEA for the performance of banking 
and microfinance institutions are Yeh (1996); Miller and Noulas (1996); Brockett, Charnes, 
Cooper, Huang, and Sun (1997); Cook, Hababou, and Tuenter (2000); Berger, DeYoung, 
Genay and Udell (2000); Grigorian and Manole (2002); Manandhar, and Tang (2002); 
Mercan, Reisman, Yolalan and Emel (2003); Cooper, Seiford, and  Zhu. (2004); and more 
recently, Gutiérrez-Nieto, Serrano-Cinca and Molinero (2009).  
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This study extends the DEA model to investigate the performance (both financial 
and social performance) of MFIs in Pakistan for the period 2007 to 2011 with the 
availability of data. In addition, a financial ratio analysis is also carried out to check the 
robustness of our empirical findings and to get a financial comparison with other south 
Asian countries. The dataset is constructed by compiling the data for 354 MFIs located in 
six countries in South Asia for the period 2003~2011. The dataset comprises the statistics 
of 13 MFIs from Afghanistan, 74 MFIs from Bangladesh, 178 MFIs from India, 41 from 
Nepal, 27 MFIs from Pakistan, and 21 from Sri Lanka. The data are collected from 
‘microfinance information exchange’ (MIX) which is a U.S based data service provider. 
The cross-country comparison of financial performance of conventional microfinance 
institutions is based on four broad categories of financial performance measures following 
the guiding principles provided by microfinance information exchange (MIX). The 
financial performance categories include (i) Serving the poor; (ii) Financial Sustainability; 
(iii) Efficiency; and (vi) Competition. The financial performance sub-categories are as 
below;  
i). Serving the poor has three financial measures; 
a) Depth of Microfinance. 
b) Breadth of Microfinance. 
c) Quality of Portfolio. 
ii). Financial Sustainability has two measures;  
a) Returns on Assets (ROA) 
b) Returns on Equity (ROE). 
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iii). Efficiency has three commonly used measures;  
a) Operating Expenses Ratio (OER). 
b) Operational Self-Sufficiency (OSS), and cost per loan. 
c) Capital Adequacy Ratio (CAR). 
iv). Competition is measured by  
a) The Panzar-and-Rosse Model. 
b) The Boone Indicator. 
 
The perceived differences between conventional microfinance and Islamic 
microfinance are determined through primary survey data. The study also offers a new 
hypothetical model of Islamic microfinance for poverty alleviation in Pakistan.  The last 
part of this study assessed the feasibility of Islamic microfinance implementation in 
Pakistan. For this purpose, an empirical investigation is conducted by using the survey data 
in Linear Probability Model. 
 
1.6 Definitions and Terms  
 
Double Bottom Line It includes the financial bottom line and a second bottom line 
that provides the net results of social elements (Tulchin, n.d.; 
Brau and Woller, 2004; Lewis, 2008; Gutiérrez-Nieto, 
Serrano-Cinca, and Molinero, 2009). The double bottom line 
encompasses the concerns for both social and financial 
performance (CGAP, 2007). 
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Double Dipping It refers the ability of the borrowers to borrow from multiple 
sources (Ahmed, 2002). 
 
Financial Sustainability It refers the ability to cover the administrative costs and 
prioritize activities to accomplish the mission (Leon, 2001, 
p. 7). Financial capacity of the organization to grasp the 
opportunities and react to unexpected threats while 
maintaining the general operations of the organization 
(Bowman, 2011 refer in Sontag-Padilla, Staplefoote, and 
Gonzalez Morganti, 2012, p.2). 
 
Group Lending The method of microfinance credits to a group of borrowers 
rather than a single borrower (CGAP, 2007). 
 
Mission Drift The behaviour of microfinance institutions regarding 
lending to relatively well-off borrowers rather than the 
poorest of the poor (Mersland, and Strøm, 2010; 
Armendáriz, and Szafarz, 2009; Copestake, 2007). 
 
Shariah The system of religious laws that Muslims follow (Oxford); 
the religious laws based on the Quran that Muslims follow 
(Merriam-Webster); Shariah is nothing more than a 
consideration and extrapolation of Quran and Sunnah 
(Kamali, 2008, p. 14; Warner, 2015, p. 6).   
 
Silver Bullet Something that very quickly and easily solves a serious 
problem (Merriam-Webster); a bullet made of silver, 
supposedly the only weapon that could kill a werewolf 
(Oxford Learners); a magical solution of all problems of 
poor (Kernani, 2007; Financial Times, 16 December 2010; 
Holingworth, 2014). 
 
Social Outreach The way of providing credit facilities to extremely poor and 
deprived through microfinance (Ambe Shu and Oney, 2014; 
CGAP, 2007).  
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Welfarist The approach which emphasizes on direct poverty 
alleviation through microfinance, in contrast Institutionalist 
is the approach which is more focused on institution’s 
stability rather than poverty alleviation (Woller, Dunford, 
and Woodworth, 1999). 
 
1.7 Significance of the Study 
This study has practical implications that make it relatively unique. This research 
highlights the grey areas of conventional microfinance by evaluating their financial and 
social performance. This timely effort can be used not only to enhance the social and 
finance efficiencies of conventional microfinance but also to pave the way for an 
alternative system of microfinance in the form of Islamic Microfinance. With an efficient 
microfinance, poverty alleviation efforts will be accelerated in Pakistan. The study explores 
the possible implementation of Islamic microfinance which is yet to be employed in 
Pakistan despite having a Muslim-dominated country. It may increase the outreach of 
microfinance in Pakistan that is currently being underutilized or underserved.  
 
1.8 Outline of the Research 
  Chapter 1 (Introduction) sets the basic premises of this research which starts with 
explaining the evolution of microfinance and its shiny period after the award of Nobel 
Peace Prize 2006 to Muhammad Yunus of Bangladesh. Such a golden period of 
microfinance had led to its being considered a “silver bullet”2in development discourse. 
                                                 
2 A magical solution for all the problems of the poor (Kernani, 2007; Financial Times, 16 December 2010; Holingworth, 
2014). 
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The effectiveness of microfinance is highly acknowledged throughout the world but the 
fruitful outcomes couldn’t be reaped in Pakistan. It also explains how microfinance can be 
used to break the VCP for poverty alleviation. The problem statement section defines the 
underutilization of microfinance in Pakistan; the conventional microfinance covers only 
7% of potential borrowers while the Islamic microfinance is yet to be implemented in 
Pakistan. The research questions and hypotheses are designed to investigate the role of 
conventional microfinance through the prism of financial and social efficiencies, and the 
scope of Islamic microfinance as an alternative system of microfinance in Pakistan. The 
analytical and methodological framework section explains the econometric tools and 
methods used in this study. The definitions and terms section describes some of the 
technical terms used in this study. The next three sections clarify the significance of the 
study, the organization of the dissertation, and the study’s scope and limitations 
respectively. Chapter 2 discusses poverty and poverty alleviation in Pakistan. Section one 
of this chapter gives an overview of Pakistan from its inception to the current state of 
economy, section two exhibits the trend of rural and urban poverty, the trend of economic 
growth and poverty headcount ratio measures, the bifurcation of poverty across provinces, 
and the measurement of HDI, section three explains the determinants of poverty in 
Pakistan, and section four highlights the poverty alleviation strategies in Pakistan such as 
Land Reforms, rural development programs, social development programs, social safety 
nets and microfinance, and section five defines the current state of microfinance in 
Pakistan. Chapter 3 covers the existing literature on microfinance and poverty alleviation. 
Section one discusses the role of conventional microfinance in poverty alleviation while 
section two defines the poverty alleviation through Islamic microfinance, section three 
19 
 
discusses the previous literature on Islamic microfinance, section four sheds light on 
applicability of linear probability model, and section five sums up the entire chapter . It is 
pertinent to note that this chapter first draws the previous studies that favor the positive 
role of microfinance in poverty alleviation, and then it discusses the studies that show 
otherwise. Chapter 4 describes the methodological framework of this study and it is divided 
into four components. The first component shows the methodology used to evaluate the 
performance of conventional microfinance through efficiency scores that were collected 
through DEA. Component two defines the performance evaluation of conventional 
microfinance through Financial Ratios Analysis (FRA). In component three, data 
projection method is used on primary survey data that were collected through survey 
questionnaire to get the perceptions of people about conventional and Islamic microfinance 
in Pakistan. Component four defines the methodology of linear probability model to get 
the probability of successful implementation of Islamic Microfinance in Pakistan. Chapter 
5 shows the empirical results of this study which are presented according to the order of 
investigation explained in the earlier chapters. The final chapter (Chapter 6) presents the 
conclusions based on the empirical results, a number of policy recommendations, and 
hypothetical models for poverty alleviation through microfinance.  
 
1.9 Research Significance, Limitations, and Future Research 
Directions 
 This study does not directly evaluate the impacts of microfinance on poverty 
alleviation but assesses the performance of conventional microfinance and explores the 
prospects of establishing the Islamic version of microfinance in Pakistan. Inasmuch as 
20 
 
poverty has different faces and different meanings to different people in different 
circumstances, its estimation and eradication demand an analytical perspective aligned 
with country-specific characteristics including the sociocultural values. Although a number 
of countries have continuously been trying for decades to combat poverty through different 
tools and strategies, the replication of models which are successful in one country does not 
guarantee the same success in another country. By the same token, the replication of the 
Grameen bank’s model of microfinance doesn’t guarantee the same success in Pakistan 
because of characteristically different socioeconomic conditions. The interest-attached 
microfinance used by the Grameen bank in Bangladesh could not get the mass-attention in 
Pakistan where majority of the people strictly adhere to Shariah principles which consider 
interest-attached transactions as a biggest sin. In such a sociocultural setting, proposing a 
model aligned with Islamic jurisprudence ensures its significance and gains prospect as an 
important addition in the existing body of knowledge. Furthermore, the model considers 
an important religious obligation of Zakat which is obligatory (Fardh) on every Muslim 
who has at least 88.12 grams (approx.) of gold or 578 grams (approx.) of silver for a year. 
In Pakistan where almost 95% of the people practice Islam, a model that integrates Zakat 
and uses other charities for entrepreneurial loans enhances its financial sustainability and 
increases its social outreach. Further research can examine the possible replication of the 
proposed model in other Muslim countries where the probability of collecting funds 
through Zakat is high. Other studies can also test the model’s external validity by having a 
larger sample.  More importantly, anthropological research can shed light on the factors 
that influence the successful implementation of the proposed model at the micro level. 
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CHAPTER 2 
POVERTY AND POVERTY ALLEVIATION IN PAKISTAN 
 
This chapter briefly introduces the Islamic Republic of Pakistan and discusses the 
state of poverty and poverty alleviation efforts in the country. It also highlights the context 
where microfinance efforts for poverty eradication are performed. The socioeconomic 
condition of Pakistani society is important to understand because it plays an important role 
in microfinance functioning. The modern microfinance products are designed to cater the 
needs of poor people according to the characteristics of the society. The current practice of 
conventional microfinance in Pakistan clearly contradicts the characteristics of Pakistani 
society that is vastly dominated by Islamic jurisprudence called the Shariah.  
 
2.1 Pakistan:  An Overview 
The Islamic Republic of Pakistan came into existence on August 14, 1947. It is the 
only country in the world that got its independence in the name of religion (Islam) from 
the British Rule in formerly colonized India. The partition of the sub-continent took place 
under the two-nation theory of Mr. Muhammad Ali Jinnah, the founder of Pakistan and 
popularly known as the Quaid-e-Azam. The two-nation theory was the result of constant 
manhandling of Muslims in British-ruled India by other religious identities specially the 
Hindus. A separate country for the Muslim majority was the doctrine first proposed by the 
great poet of the East, Allama Muhammad Iqbal who raised this thought in his speech as 
the president of All India Muslim League in December, 1930 (Giorgio, 2007). 
Consequently, it became the root cause for the creation of a new sovereign state, presently 
known as the Islamic Republic of Pakistan.  
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Pakistan has a total land area of 310,527 square miles. According to the U.S. 
Department of State, 95 percent of Pakistan’s 174 million population practice Islam and 
the rest of the five percent have other religions like Sikhism, Hinduism, Christianity, 
Buddhism etc. (US Department of State, 2010). 
 
 
Figure2.1: The map of West Pakistan and East Pakistan with India in the middle 
Source: Short (2014, December 20) 
 
It is the 6th most populous country in the world where population has recently 
reached about 184 million (Population Census Organization of Pakistan, July 2013 
estimates). In terms of purchasing power parity of ‘gross domestic products’ (GDP), the 
World Bank (2014) ranks Pakistan at 23rd in 25 largest economies in the world. It is an 
agrarian country where agricultural share is more than 20 percent in output and more than 
40 percent in employment. Being an agrarian country, the split between rural and urban is 
66% to 34% (Nation Masters, 2013).  The main export commodity is textile but it has a 
narrow exports base, limited to a few exporting partners like the United States, China, 
Afghanistan, Germany and the United Kingdom. The exports of the country are highly 
concentrated around textile products, cotton, rice and refined petroleum (OEC, 2015). In 
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terms of production characteristics, Pakistan’s rank is 90 according to the Economic 
Complexity Index (2014 estimates) with -0.752 ECI value (The Atlas of Economic 
Complexity, 2014). Pakistan has been facing the issues of severe unemployment for 
decades. The reported figure of unemployment in 2013 was 6.6% but the actual 
unemployment was much higher than reported. Food inflation is quite mercurial and 
recently peaked, causing poverty to rise in the country while the balance of payments 
remained negative due to the instability of domestic currency and a sharp decline in Pak 
Rupees. Foreign investment is not high due to law-and-order problems and unfriendly 
business conditions. The country has been suffering from terrorism activities, mainly 
operated from the Northern areas of Pakistan and the border areas of Afghanistan. To 
uproot terrorism in Pakistan and Afghanistan, after 9/11, Pakistan became an ally of the 
US forces in war-on-terror which seriously endangered its own sustainability. The country 
has faced serious repercussions of that decision such as some brutal terrorist attacks in 
various parts of the country. Tens of thousands innocent human lives and infrastructure 
have been destroyed due to internal terrorism activities. The business environment has 
become drastically affected, discouraging foreign investments. Nevertheless, despite 
economic deterioration, the inflow of foreign remittances had increased and reached to an 
average US$1 billion per month. The country’s economic growth is significantly low, at 
3.5% per year in the last five years. Political destabilization and low level of foreign 
investments are the main causes of economic slowdown (CIA World Fact Book, 2014). 
 
 
 
24 
 
2.2 Poverty in Pakistan 
There are various definitions of poverty as poverty measurement scales are vastly 
dispersed from marginalization of basic necessities to exclusion of electoral process. 
However, a frequently used measure is income threshold that specifically describes poverty 
as the lack of monetary resources to get basic necessities. In addition, the repudiation of 
resources and opportunities describe poverty which is closely linked to income inequality. 
As per UNDP estimates, about 80 percent of population in the world lives in countries 
where income differentials are wider. Only 5 percent of the total income belongs to 40 
percent of the poor, while 75 percent of all income belongs to the richest 20 percent in the 
world (Aslam, 2009). One of the renowned developmental economists Sen (1976) defines 
poverty as a capabilities shortfall resulting from the deprivation of opportunities. The poor 
lack resource opportunities that make them unable to participate actively in society (Noland 
and Whelan, 1996).  The stance taken by Townsend (1979: 31) is objectively oriented on 
relative deprivation. To him, poverty is the level of resourcefulness that makes them 
excluded from the society, less than the averages, for both individuals and groups of people. 
Although he objectively sees poverty, he did not deny the frequently debated link between 
poverty and income inequality. The negative repercussions of social deprivation bring the 
unequal distribution of resources that often lead to increase social inequality. Orshansky 
(1969) sees poverty from a policy perspective. In her subjective approach, poverty is like 
beauty which lies in the eyes of the beholder. To her, no preconceive notion is enough to 
explain poverty because it is based on value judgment so people can subjectively differ in 
their measurement of poverty. It seems unnecessary to measure poverty without having 
some plans for its eradication. In Orshansky’s words “There is no particular reason to count 
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the poor unless you are going to do something about them.”  Any concept intended to 
influence public thinking must have some sociopolitical credibility. However, Townsend 
(1979:38) criticizes her selective approach by asserting that reliance on political acceptance 
or imagination for socioeconomic measures is not sufficient and must instead rest on 
verifiable social conditions. Although poverty is a value judgment, it can still be defined 
objectively. The preceding review allows us to conclude that the narrow and old-age 
concepts of both absolute and relative poverty do not portray the real picture. The concept 
of capability deprivation and social exclusion based on inequality and injustice in society 
is more appropriate to define poverty. Definitely, it is not to say that the definitions of 
poverty from absolute or relative measures are invalid but the demarcation of sociopolitical 
rights and wisdom necessary to participate in society is just as essential as the definition of 
poverty. In Pakistan, the present state of poverty is as high as it was in the early 1990s (Arif 
and Farooq, 2012). A recent study shows that approximately 37% people live below 
extreme poverty line, 15% of the households are ultra-poor and 11% are poor (Malik, 
Chaudhry and Hanif, 2012). In the last decade of the 20th century, the trends of poverty in 
the country show a gradual increase from 26.8% in 1992-93 to 30.6% in 1998-99. The 
increase in poverty is accompanied by six percentage point increase in rural poverty and 
the increasing trend continued till the first couple of years in the 21st century (Arif and 
Farooq, 2012). The long term trend shows that the agricultural GDP growth per capita 
during 1999 to 2005 was just 0.3% per annum and the rural poverty rates in 2004-05 were 
as high as in the 1990s. The social development indicators in Pakistan remained lower than 
its other counterparts in South Asia. The incidence of poverty is higher in rural than in 
urban areas due to a number of factors including the backwardness of the rural areas in 
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Pakistan (ADB, 2002; World Bank, 2005). The proportion of rural poor (living below 
national poverty line) declined to 18% in 1989 from 33% in 1978 (14 million in constant 
numbers), but the beginning of the 21st century witnessed a sharp increase in poverty when 
it jumped to 38 million (39%) in 2002 (Arif and Farooq, 2012). The higher incidence of 
rural and urban poverty is defined through the headcount ratio as shown in Table 2.1: 
 
Table 2.1: Rural and Urban poverty (in %) (Headcount ratio measure) 
Year Rural Urban Overall 
1992-3 24.60 28.30 26.80 
1996-7 22.60 33.10 29.80 
2000-1 20.90 34.70 30.60 
2004-5 22.70 39.30 34.50 
2005-6 14.90 28.10 23.90 
2007-8 13.10 27.00 22.30 
2008-9 - - 29.90 
Source: Reproduced from Arif and Farooq (2012) 
 
The growth-employment-poverty nexus shows that higher growth significantly 
affects the standard of living of the people and reduces poverty. Economic growth plays an 
important role in poverty eradication (Adams and Page, 2005; Ravallion, 2001). The 
positive impact of economic growth on poverty is evident as GDP growth significantly 
decreased from 2.55% in 1998 to 1.98% in 2001, while the poverty headcount ratio had 
increased from 57.90 to 64.30. The trend shows that higher economic growth is 
accompanied by poverty reduction until 2005 (see Table-2.2). 
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 Table 2.2: Economic Growth and Poverty Headcount Ratio in Pakistan 
Year 
GDP growth 
(annual %) 
Poverty headcount 
ratio at national 
poverty lines (% of 
population) 
1998 2.55 57.90 
2001 1.98 64.30 
2004 7.37 51.70 
2005 7.67 50.40 
2007 4.83 44.10 
2010 1.61 36.80 
2011 2.75 36.30 
2013 4.37 29.50 
           Source: Author’s calculation based on WDI of the World Bank 
 
In contrast, the Kuznets’s inverted U-curve hypothesis exhibits that higher growth 
initially leads to higher inequality among the population (Thornton, 2001). The study by 
Cheema and Sial (2012) established a significantly positive link between poverty and 
inequality in Pakistan. Their empirical findings confirmed that positive effects of economic 
growth could not be transferred to the poor and that economic growth paved the way for 
higher inequality. The growth elasticity of inequality is higher in the urban zones than in 
the rural regions and the growth effects are offset by the increase in inequality. The absolute 
magnitude of gross elasticity of poverty to growth is higher than the net elasticity of poverty 
to growth. Also, the net elasticity of poverty to growth is higher in rural areas than in urban 
areas. The regional patterns of poverty in Pakistan are presented in table 2.3: 
 
Table 2.3: Headcount Ratio across provinces over time in Pakistan 
Provincial Region 1993 1994 1997 1999 2002 2005 2006 2008 
Punjab (Rural) 25.48 33.97 28.74 34.24 35.85 27.89 26.67 19.06 
Punjab (Urban) 21.28 18.29 17.38 23.69 23.41 16.26 12.96 10.45 
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Sindh (Rural) 28.64 32.14 20.20 33.13 45.02 23.87 32.20 23.02 
Sindh (Urban) 16.68 12.19 12.10 15.09 20.01 11.14 11.11 08.95 
KPK (Rural) 35.04 40.35 43.96 42.93 43.39 34.80 31.02 19.20 
KPK (Urban) 24.48 26.90 28.12 25.89 29.10 22.10 24.81 13.17 
Baluchistan (Rural) 26.21 28.14 43.21 20.93 37.74 28.85 57.05 55.21 
Baluchistan (Urban) 30.43 16.96 23.26 22.78 26.18 18.78 33.74 26.87 
Source: Reproduced from Cheema and Sial (2012)   
  
The intra-provincial analysis revealed that poverty initially increased in all 
provinces until 2002 and then decreased a bit afterwards. The incidence of poverty is highly 
prevalent in Baluchistan province especially in rural Baluchistan. It is the most backward 
region of the country in terms of economic growth and poverty prevalence.  
 
  The progress of the country is also measured through human development because 
poverty is also defined as the deprivation of opportunities and social exclusion due to 
inequality and injustice in society. The progress evaluation based on human development 
is measured by the method of ‘Human Development Index’ (HDI) introduced by the 
‘United Nations Development Program’ (UNDP). Table 2.4 exhibits the details of HDI for 
Pakistan during 1980 to 2014: 
 
Table 2.4: Pakistan’s HDI trends based on consistent time series data and new 
goalposts 
YEAR 
Life expectancy at 
birth 
Expected years 
of schooling 
Mean year 
of schooling 
GNI per capita 
(2011 PPP$) 
HDI Value 
1980 57.00 3.70 1.80          2,437  0.353 
1985 58.60 4.10 2.10          2,836  0.380 
1990 60.10 4.40 2.30          3,094  0.399 
1995 61.50 4.80 2.80          3,284  0.423 
2000 62.70 5.20 3.30          3,324  0.444 
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2005 63.90 6.20 4.50          3,996  0.495 
2010 65.10 7.40 4.60          4,380  0.522 
2011 65.40 7.50 4.70          4,453  0.527 
2012 65.70 7.70 4.70          4,557  0.532 
2013 66.00 7.80 4.70          4,680  0.536 
2014 66.20 7.80 4.70          4,866  0.538 
Source: Human Development Report (2015) 
 
 Table 2.4 shows that Pakistan’s HDI value for 2014 is 0.538, giving it a rank of 147 
out of 188 countries in the world. The overall HDI value has increased from 0.353 in 1980 
to 0.538 in 2014 or an increase of 52.5%. The country is still in the “low development 
group” with below the average value of HDI (0.607) for countries in South Asia. Also, the 
‘inequality adjusted human development’ (IHDI) shows that Pakistan’s HDI dropped to 
0.377 from 0.538 when it is discounted for inequality. It shows a drop of 29.9% due to 
inequality in distribution of HDI indices (Human Development Report, 2015). Table 2.5 
shows the cross country comparison of HDI in South Asia.  
Table 2.5: Cross country comparison of HDI in South Asia 
Regi
onal 
Rank 
Country  
Human 
Developm
ent Index 
(HDI) 
HDI 
Rank 
Life 
expectancy 
at birth 
Mean 
years of 
schooling  
Expected 
years of 
schooling  
Gross 
national 
income 
(GNI) 
per 
capita 
Human 
Development 
Index (HDI) 
Value (years) (years) (years) 
(2011 
PPP $) Value 
2013 2013 2012 2012 2013 2012 
1 Sri Lanka 0.750 73 74.3 10.8 13.6 9,250 0.745 
2 Maldives 0.698 103 77.9 5.8 12.7 10,074 0.695 
3 India 0.586 135 66.4 4.4 11.7 5,150 0.583 
4 Bhutan 0.584 136 68.3 2.3 12.4 6,775 0.580 
5 Bangladesh 0.558 142 70.7 5.1 10.0 2,713 0.554 
6 Nepal 0.540 145 68.4 3.2 12.4 2,194 0.537 
7 Pakistan 0.538 146 66.6 4.7 7.7 4,652 0.535 
8 Afghanistan 0.468 169 60.9 3.2 9.3 1,904 0.466 
Source: Author's compilation of Human Development Report (2014)'s data  
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Table 2.5 shows that no South Asian country falls in the category of ‘very high 
human development’ category of HDI and only Sri Lanka have achieved the category of 
‘high human development’ with HDI value of 0.750 which is higher than the average HDI 
value in the world (0.720). The category of ‘medium human development’ includes 
Maldives, India, Bhutan and Bangladesh, and the category of ‘low human development’ 
contains Nepal, Pakistan and Afghanistan. These HDI scores clearly indicate that despite 
showing enormous economic growth, the process of human development could not be 
aligned with the pace of growth. In addition, the increasing trend of GDP per capita clearly 
exhibits unequal distribution of income which is a dominant factor in income inequality. 
 
2.3 Determinants of Poverty in Pakistan 
 A number of determinants are responsible for poverty prevalence in Pakistan; they 
can be broken down into two broad categories i.e. administrative factors and 
socioeconomic factors (Arif and Farooq, 2012). One of the main administrative factors is 
governance. The governance of the country affects its economic path and ultimately results 
in a better life for its citizens. Good governance is an essential support to achieve economic 
growth and development (ADB, 2002). Unfortunately, Pakistan has been lacking good 
governance throughout its history. The era of the 1990s witnessed a topsy-turvy political 
condition with evidences of loot and corruption by the politicians and public sector 
plunders. The political stability and peace are necessary ingredients of economic growth 
and business promotion. A business-friendly environment entices the domestic investments 
as well as the foreign investments.  On contrary, political instability weakens consumer-n-
investor’s confidence on banking and finance sectors that ultimately paves the way for 
31 
 
capital flights. Apart from lack of good governance social injustice and unequal playing 
fields thrash the potential of economic growth and poverty alleviation in Pakistan. Since 
its inception in 1947, the country has been in a constant political rivalry between politicians 
and armed forces. The period of marital coup in Pakistan is as almost equal to the period 
of democratic regimes; therefore, such rivalry exerts the pressure on socioeconomic 
institutions and causes a failure of institutionalization in Pakistan. Social injustice is 
another prevalent phenomenon in Pakistan that drags it in constant cycles of poverty. A 
weak regulatory framework with inadequate access to justice cause a failure of property 
rights enforcement and protection. The lack of transparency in resource allocation (both 
budgetary and non-budgetary) increases the sense of deprivation in poor and a major cause 
of poverty prevalence in Pakistan. A common use of political power for the exploitation of 
poor is a main concern in the vulnerability, social injustice and deprivation of poor in the 
country.  
  
The trend of poverty is not declining in Pakistan rather it shows a fluctuated one. 
The growth-employment-poverty nexus couldn’t achieve the target of poverty reduction. 
The poor and deprived have been trapped in a continuous cycle of poverty due to 
ineffective governmental policies. The country became an ally of the US forces in war-
against-terrorism after the brutal incidence of 9/11 but the decision threatened its own 
sovereignty and peace; the militancy increased in the country and the intensity of terrorist 
attacks has intensified. The overall uncertainty reduced the business potential and foreign 
direct investment. The budgetary allocations were not sufficiently allocated on human 
development sectors like education, health and infrastructure development. The budget 
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allocation for education is just about 2% of GDP and the share of health in budget is only 
about 1% of GDP (Arif and Farooq, 2012). The agricultural growth is not substantial and 
up to the mark to eradicate poverty at rural level. One of the significant factors is the 
unequal distribution of lands due to the failed policies of land reforms in the country. 
During the 1970s and 1980s the agricultural growth had effectively reduced the rural 
poverty but the trend did not continue in the 1990s onwards (World Bank, 2005). The data 
indicate that 73% of farms were owner-operated in 1990 and the rest were under tenancy 
agreements. The land ownership increases the potential of growth in cultivation and it 
enhances the access to credit through formal banking and financial sectors (ADB, 2002). 
Another important factor for poverty prevalence in the country is macroeconomic 
instability. The ‘International Monetary Fund’ (IMF)’s paper regarding the strategy to curb 
poverty suggests that the poor are mainly distributed around the poverty line; therefore, the 
growth in income and distribution has positive effects on poverty reduction but the relative 
increase in prices offsets the potential of real income growth. The cost of volatile income 
growth is higher for the poor (IMF, 2005).        
 
2.4 Poverty Alleviation Strategies in Pakistan 
 According to IFAD (2015) Pakistan has adopted a national strategic plan to 
eradicate poverty with the following six point agenda:  i) acceleration of  economic growth; 
ii) macroeconomic stability; iii) development of human capital; iv) augmenting target 
interventions; v) expanding social safety nets; and vi) improving governance. The social 
safety net or social safety programs to mitigate poverty are not conducted under the 
umbrella of any specific institution in Pakistan (ADB, 2002) but the country’s “vision 
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2030” is considered a key policy document alongside medium term development 
framework 2011-2014 and poverty reduction strategy paper-II (IFAD, 2015). Another 
renowned project for poverty alleviation in Pakistan was ‘Pakistan 2025: One Nation One 
Vision’ that aimed to achieve ‘millennium development goals’ (MDGs) and ‘sustainable 
development goals’ (SDGs) (LSE, 2014). Poverty in Pakistan is considered mainly a rural 
phenomenon, which is why most of the policies are focused on rural poverty alleviation. 
Some of the key elements of these policies focus on land reform, rural development 
program, social development program, social safety net schemes, and microfinance. 
 
 Land reforms addressed a biggest hurdle in growth for an agricultural country, 
namely unequal land distribution. The concentration of land ownership was severe in early 
90s as  Khan (1999) reported that the  “large farms (defined by the Census as > 60 acres) 
accounted for a negligible number of total farms in both 1980 and 1990, but the area they 
cultivated more than doubled from 3 percent to 7 percent of the total.”. The land ownership 
situation has not changed since 2000.  Only 37% of all farmers own land and out of that 
61% own less than 5 acres. Government-owned lands were distributed among the poor 
thrice in the history of Pakistan (see Table 2.6) but such corrective measures did not impact 
a lot on poverty because the distributed lands were quite a meager relative to the need of 
poor people. All previous attempts for land reforms in Pakistan miserably failed due to a 
lack of follow-up, unavailability of farm inputs and a failure to provide an easy access to 
rural credits.  
Table 2.6: Land Reforms in Pakistan 
Reforms Ceiling (Acres) Area (000 Hectare) Beneficiaries 
(000) Irrigated Non-Irrigated Resumed Distributed Balance 
1959 500 1000 1022.90 955.70 62.30 186.6 
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(5.6%) 
1972 150 300 481.20 
(2.55%) 
295.90 185.30 71.5 
1979 100 200 1578.30 
(8%) 
1290.10 288.20 272.6 
Source: (Qureshi, 2001; Arif and Farooq, 2012) 
 
Rural development programs were conducted just after the inception of Pakistan. 
In the early 1950s, the village aid program (1952) was launched to target rural 
development, including progress in production, health and education sectors. The other 
similar projects include Rural Works Program (1963-1972), the People’s Works Program 
(1972-1982), the Integrated Rural Development Program (1972-1980), the Five-Point 
Program (1985-1988), the Tameer-e-Watan Program (1991), and the Khushhal Pakistan 
Program (1991-2001). The total expenditures on these development programs reached to 
Rs.400 billion but unfortunately not even a single program achieved its targets due to 
mismanagement and a lack of dedication.  
 
 The social action plan (SAP) was initially launched in mid-1980s in two phases. 
The target areas were education, health, water supply, sanitation, and population welfare. 
The program could not achieve its target due to the lack of management and follow-up; the 
allocated budget for SAP was Rs.600 billion but only Rs.356 billion was used and the rest 
of the development funds lapsed. In the second phase of SAP during (1997-2002) only 
45% of its allocated budget was used (Arif and Farooq, 2012).  
 
 As for social safety net schemes, direct income transfers to the poor were employed 
e.g. Benazir Income Support Program (BISP), Zakat, Employees Old Age Benefit 
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Institution (EOBI), food support program by Pakistan Bait-ul-maal, Employees Social 
Security Institutions (ESSI), Pakistan Poverty Alleviation Funds (PPAF), and the small 
loans by Zarai Taraqiati Bank (Arif and Farooq, 2012).  
 
 Microfinance is one of more recent poverty alleviation strategies adopted by the 
government. The provision of small credits in the form of microfinance had gained 
momentum after the success story of the Grameen Bank in Bangladesh. The Orangi Pilot 
Project (OPP) and the Aga Khan Rural Support Program (AKRSP) were considered the 
pioneers in the field of microfinance in Pakistan. The existing practice of microfinance is 
mainly dominated by the conventional or interest-based microfinance.  
 
2.5 Current state of Conventional Microfinance in Pakistan 
 Microfinance practitioners in Pakistan can be distinguished into three broad 
categories:  “micro-finance institutions” (MFIs); micro-finance banks (MFBs), and “rural 
support programs (RSPs). MFIs are mostly ‘non-government organizations’ (NGOs) 
having non-bank status, registered under the Societies Act, Trust Act, and Companies 
Ordinance. ‘Micro finance banks’ (MFBs) have a commercial bank license but their 
services are exclusively for microfinance. The first MFB was established through a 
presidential decree in 2000. Currently ten MFBs are licensed, eight of which are working 
at the national level and two at the provincial level.  ‘Rural support programs’ (RSPs), 
characteristically, an NGO with the status of non-profit organization, are specifically 
focused on rural areas and working under the jurisdiction of ‘securities and exchange 
commission of Pakistan’ (SECP).  
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Out of fifty microfinance practitioners who are registered with ‘Pakistan 
Microfinance Network’ (PMN), nine are MFBs, thirty-three are MFIs, and eight RSPs. At 
the end of 2014, the microfinance industry had crossed the mark of 3 million borrowers 
(3.14 million) a first in the history of Pakistan (Pakistan Microfinance Review, 2015). 
Despite some serious growth challenges, microfinance growth has been accompanied by a 
corresponding growth in micro-savings and micro-insurance. The main challenges to 
microfinance’s growth include some macro-level factors such as the shortage of energy in 
the country, inconsistent interest rates fixation, and a trend of slow economic growth,  
serious threats to sustainability from the macroeconomic side like energy shortage, a 
consistent pattern of interest rate reduction and slow economic growth. Regarding the 
regulatory framework, one of the significant developments in regulations was the issuance 
of prudential regulations by the State Bank of Pakistan on June 10, 2014 3 . These 
regulations allow the microfinance banks to use formal clearing system which will greatly 
affect the mechanism of deposit mobilization. On the regularization front of the non-bank 
financial institutions, the Securities and Exchange Commission of Pakistan’ (SECP) 
headed the steering committee of all stakeholders including the State Bank of Pakistan 
(SBP). It is expected that the committee will finalize the regulatory framework by the end 
of 2015. Another important development on regulations is the enhancement of a ‘micro 
credit guarantee facility’ (MCGF) which allows the MFIs to get loans from commercial 
banks and can issue redeemable capital. In 2012, ‘microfinance credit information bureau’ 
(MFCIB) was established with the help of SBP, ‘Pakistan poverty alleviation fund’ 
                                                 
3 Details are available at : http://www.sbp.org.pk/acd/2014/C3-Annex.pdf 
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(PPAF), ‘department for international division’ (DFID), and ‘international finance 
corporation’ (IFC), aimed at resolving the issues of information asymmetry, adverse 
selection, moral hazards, over-indebtedness and multiple borrowings. A number of MFIs 
are consulting and availing the facilities of MFCIB for loan sanctioning through formal 
queries. A viable development towards outreach expansion is the evolution of branchless 
banking which is focused on granting loans through digital medium. Although currently a 
few MFIs have adopted their branchless banking through cellphones, other market players 
are also extending their services with the help of digital channels (Pakistan Microfinance 
Review, 2014).  
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CHAPTER 3 
LITERATURE REVIEW 
CONVENTIONAL AND ISLAMIC MICROFINANCE 
 
This chapter reviews existing literature on microfinance’s role in poverty 
alleviation. It discusses both “conventional” and “Islamic” microfinance approaches.  The 
first part reviews the definitions of microfinance and the growth of its development 
initiative as a means of poverty alleviation.  It also describes the state of conventional 
microfinance in South Asia and summarizes the literature, including selected criticisms, on 
conventional microfinance.  The second section briefly describes Islamic microfinance and 
sheds light on its viability in poverty alleviation efforts. 
 
3.1   Poverty Alleviation through Conventional Microfinance 
3.1.1 Defining microfinance 
 Since its inception, microfinance has been considered a major tool for poverty 
alleviation due to its versatility and accessibility that differentiates it from other available 
methods of poverty alleviation. The simple or textbook definition of microfinance focuses 
on the services that it provides, but the core definition exhibits not only the literal meanings 
but the element of responsibility as well. The literal meaning of microfinance asserts ‘a one 
millionth part of finance.’ Adding responsibility to the definition makes microfinance a 
firm way of providing financial services to poor, deprived and unbanked people. Otero 
(1999) looks at microfinance as the financial provision to the poor and self-employed. 
Wrenn (2007) defines microfinance as the financial services provider to deprived people 
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especially to those who are underserved by the formal financial sector. These services 
include loans, savings, and insurance. Marulanda and Otero (2011) enhanced the core 
definition by asserting that financial inclusion of the poor through microfinance provides 
a shield against the “up-and-down income streams” in poor’s lives due to the lack of 
financial resources. The primary objective of microfinance was to satisfy the financial 
needs of the poor across the globe, but its noble objective is not merely to fill the income 
gap of poor but to lift them out of the poverty trap and to show them a way of successful 
financial management. Rhyne and Otero (2006) assert that the proper use of financial 
inclusion enlightens the poor about the ways of protection against catastrophic shocks. 
Expanding the canvas of financial inclusion can create better societies with the active 
participation of previously excluded people. The former Secretary General of the United 
Nations (UN), Kofi Annan said that ‘Microfinance is an idea whose time has come.’ Its 
accessibility would reduce poverty by generating income through jobs creation. Also, the 
sustainability of microfinance could be used to alleviate poverty in order to achieve 
millennium development goals (MDGs) of poverty reduction (UNCDF, 2005). At its 
inception, microfinance was just treated as microcredit whose objective was to help poor 
farmers as the initial outreach was limited to rural areas. But a worldwide 
acknowledgement made it an active tool for income generation and poverty reduction 
(Bateman, 2014). The definition of microfinance could not be completed without the 
expressions of Muhammad Yunus, Nobel Laureate and legend in the field of microfinance. 
He extended the basic idea of microfinance by asserting that ‘right to credit’ is to be 
included in the list of basic human rights like food, shelter and education (Grameen Bank, 
2012; Akula, 2010; The Guardian, 2007; Yunus and Julis, 1999, p. 17). Such 
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pronouncements highlight the importance of microfinance for the sustenance of poor lives. 
Recent authors like Musa, Couchoro, and Ashta (2013) suggest that microfinance should 
look upon the existing financial products like equity, savings, insurance and remittances, 
alongwith its original goal of microcredit. Also, the consistent monitoring and evaluation 
of microfinance products can maintain the balance between the poor’s needs and financial 
products without any exploitation of both lenders and borrowers. The definitions of 
microfinance covered above, draw a basic framework that heavily depends on microcredit 
or the form of tiny credit to poor, unbanked, and deprived people. However, the 
modernization of financial markets and products has paved the way for new and innovative 
microfinance products. Before describing those microfinance products and their innovative 
forms, it would help to shed light on the historical evolution of microfinance, formerly 
known as microcredit.   
 
3.1.2 Microfinance in History: Selected Developments 
Financial borrowing is not a new concept in the history.  Ibn-Khuldun mentioned it 
in his famous writing of Al-Muqaddimah (1377, p. 364) and at another place while 
referring to the poem of Sharif-ibn-Hashim (p. 795). Formal financial institutions have 
been providing services to financially neglected poor for centuries. For example, the Irish 
Loan Fund (ILF) was the oldest one in the lot that was established in the 18th century with 
the objectives of uncollateralized loans to poor and needy people. Nevertheless, the history 
of modern microfinance can be considered during the 18th century when Spooner (1846, 
p.9) asserted that the poor entrepreneurs should acquire the credit on any agreed upon terms 
if they don’t have their own means of investment for productive activities.  In the context 
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of rural agricultural farmers, he emphasized that productive activities shouldn’t be 
constrained due to the lack of financial resources and they must borrow to streamline 
consumption smoothing. The credit for starting village banking and credit unions could be 
given to Raiffeisen who established the first bank in Austria in 1886. The village bank 
movement, started by Friedrich Wilhelm Raiffeisen in Germany had reached around 2 
million customer by the end of 1901. The Irish Local Fund, founded by Jonathan Swift in 
1700s, was widely acknowledged in Ireland and reached around 300 local funds at the end 
of 1840s. Small loans on cheap interest rates were provided through (ILF) for a short span 
of time. In the early 18th century, Wakefield instituted the movement of savings bank to lift 
poor children and their parents out of poverty trench (Roodman, 2012). The last decade of 
the 18th century also marked the inauguration of the Peoples Credit Bank4 and the Bank 
Perkreditan Rakyat in Indonesia (CGAP, 2006). Apart from informal credit sources, a 
range of diverse credit institutions was available in the field of microcredit lending. 
Domestic arrangement of credit cooperation had existed way before the inception of 
microfinance. For example, Rotating Savings and Credit Associations (ROSCAs) and 
Savings and Credit Cooperatives (SACCOs) are found across the world, e.g. Chit Funds in 
India, and BEE-SEE5 in Pakistan, among others. Up until the early 1970s, the focus of 
microcredit was largely on rural agriculture farmers with the hope of productivity and 
income increase. State-owned banks and financial institutions were instructed to grant soft 
loans to poor and marginalized farmers. Those efforts were heavily supported by the states 
in the form of concessionary loans and subsidiaries. The experiments of ‘development 
through tiny-loans’ were being adopted around the globe especially in India, Pakistan, 
                                                 
4 PCB later became the largest microfinance serving unit in Indonesia with around 9000 units. 
5 The root word came from the people who used to accumulate Rs.20 each (Bees is Urdu word for twenty). 
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Bangladesh, Brazil, and most of the poverty hit countries. Such experimental efforts 
include the success story of Muhammad Yunus, an economics professor in Chittagong, 
Bangladesh In 1976. He initiated tiny-loans to poor agricultural women in the form of 
group-lending 6 . The project got unexpected success and helped direct attention to 
microfinance for poverty alleviation.  
  
The growth of microfinance has been particularly significant in South Asia.  South 
Asia is home to almost 1.6 billion people where majority of the population (60%) live 
below the poverty line ($2 / day) and almost half of such population (54%) are financially 
excluded (South Asian Association of Microfinance Networks, 2015). Recent estimates by 
the ‘microfinance information exchange’ (MIX) indicated that the region has reached 54.1 
million borrowers, with a gross loans portfolio of US$ 9.7 billion (MIX, 2013). The 
countries in this region have a very diverse financial development history as the region 
contains 46% of adults who have a bank account, which has significantly been increased 
from 32% in 2011. Sri Lanka is on top of the list with 83% adults having a bank account 
and both Afghanistan and Pakistan with merely 15% adults having a bank account (CGAP, 
2015).  
 
The microfinance industry shows an enormous growth in the South Asian region. 
At the end of 2014, the industry had reached to 58.5 million borrowers with ‘gross loan 
portfolio’ (GLP) of US$10.48 billion. India and Bangladesh are leading in the region with 
28.69 million borrowers (US$4,978 million GLP), and 25.67 million borrowers (US$ 4,462 
                                                 
6 The group lending method was later acknowledged throughout the world.  
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million GLP), respectively. Microfinance in Afghanistan, Pakistan and Sri Lanka 
moderately performed well during the same period. The overall sustainability could be 
considered satisfactory as the value of ‘portfolio at risk’ (PAR>30 days) is great than 1.6% 
(SAMN, 2015).  Table 3.1 shows the financial indicators for the South Asian microfinance 
at the end of the second half of 2014. 
 
Table 3.1: South Asian microfinance (at the end of 2014)  
 
* Data for Nepal is not included 
Source: SAMN, 2015 (recompiled by the author) 
Country Afghanistan Bangladesh India Pakistan 
Sri 
Lanka TOTAL 
Number of 
Branches 
Fixed 149 17,702 10,251 2,527 863 31,492 
Mobile - - - 11 - 11 
Number of Staff 
  2,415 126,817 75,195 18,269 5,125 227,821 
Micro Credit 
Active 
Borrower 
(million) 0.17 25.67 28.69 3.14 0.84 58.51 
GLP (million) 126.64 4,462.00 4,978.00 664.3 251 10,481.94 
Micro 
Savings 
Active Savers 
(million) 0.24 32 - 8.52 - 840.76 
Savings (USD 
million) 23.1 2,472.00 - 432.8 - 2,927.90 
Micro 
Insurance 
Policy Holders 
(million) - 212 30.31 3.75 - 55.26 
Sum insured 
(USD million) - 182 9,459.80 601.2 - 10,243 
Sustainability  
Number of 
institutes with 
OSS> 100% 4 550 41 35 - 630 
Total 
Reporting 
instructions 14 550 46 41 - 651 
% of 
sustainable 
institutions 28.57% 100.00% 89.13% 85.37% - 96.77% 
Risk 
Portfolio at 
Risk 2.1 3 0.31 1.1 - 1.63 
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3.1.3 Critical issues in conventional microfinance 
 The role of microfinance in poverty alleviation cannot be determined without 
addressing the following issues of serious nature. A well-designed microfinance program 
must have the capacity to reach the poorest of the poor. The non-targeted poor can exclude 
themselves from microfinance services if such services are offered without matching the 
needs of poor people. Selectively targeting the entrepreneurial poor may provide the 
financial sustainability to MFIs but at the expense of neglecting the poorest and thus 
hindering the goals of poverty alleviation (Navajas et al., 2000; Simanowitz, 2000 referred 
in Morduch and Haley, 2001). Some of these critical issues may be considered as “supply-
side” or “microfinance institution-related” matters, while others as “demand-side” or 
borrower-oriented.  Supply-side issues include:  uncollateralized loans; adverse selection 
and moral hazard; high transaction costs; and information asymmetries.  Demand-side 
issues include:  exorbitant interest charges; and unethical recovery practices. 
 
3.1.3.1 Uncollateralized loans 
 One of the main issues for MFIs is the provision of loans without collaterals which 
differentiates formal financial institutions that have been strongly criticized for not 
providing the loans to small entrepreneurs due to the lack of collateral. From a financial 
sustainability prospect, the collateral against loans ensures a sold loan-security against the 
possible default. The unsecured loans are considered a highly risky business by the formal 
financial system and such criteria discourage poor entrepreneurs to use formal financial 
services. Although the inception of microfinance opens the doors of financial services to 
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poor entrepreneurs, the issue of loan-security is not waived off completely. The method of 
group-lending (in which social-capital or peer pressure is used as a security) got success 
throughout the world (Marakkath, 2013, p.6), and it is considered a way of loan-security 
but a number of reported group-defaults cast doubts on its applicability. Joint liability in 
group lending increases the repayment rates and efficiency because contract enforcement 
becomes less costly and the probability of resource exploitation in case of default 
approaches to minimum (ibid, p.24, 47). Despite the success of group lending in 
microfinance, it is evidently proven that the repayment failure of one member of the group 
instigates the other members to follow and eventually the whole group defaults. On the 
other hand, individual-based lending is quite closer to conventional banking and finance. 
To address such issues, the methods of lending need to be modified under the current 
scenario to fine-tune the microfinance applicability and to make microfinance more useful 
in poverty alleviation.  
 
3.1.3.2 Adverse selection and moral hazard 
 In the absence of collateral against loans, the main problem for microfinance is the 
selection of borrowers which is quite quintessential for a long run relationship between the 
borrowers and the lenders (in this case microfinance). The assurance of loan repayment 
especially from poor borrowers demands a systematic way of idiosyncratic risk 
minimization. Such pitfall increases the difficulties of MFIs in borrower’s selection and in 
most of the cases, interest rate is used as a proxy to select the borrowers. This increases the 
risks of default because the target population of MFIs is usually considered the poorest 
strata of the society. MFIs charge high interest on highly risky loans on the verge of high-
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risk high returns environment. At a certain level of interest rate, the poorest borrowers 
choose to leave the market without borrowing when their ‘willingness to pay’ approaches 
to zero. The exclusion of poorest-borrowers strikes dualistically, first, MFIs’ core objective 
of poverty alleviation is not achieved, and second, rest of the borrowers in market borrow 
at high interest rates who have a very low probability of repayment. The adverse selection 
seriously hurt the financial sustainability of MFIs that creates an extra burden of subsidiary 
dependence, and in the long run, such phenomenon impends the whole microfinance 
system to collapse. The forced-savings method (borrowers are bound to save with MFIs) 
seems a solution of adverse selection problem (Armendáriz-de-Aghion and Morduch, 
2000), but an additional book-keeping and management increases the cost of loans. 
Eventually, higher cost reduces the profits of MFIs that requires an increase in interest rates 
to match the revenue with cost and to keep the financial sustainability of MFIs intact. 
  
3.1.3.3 High transaction costs 
 Another important issue revived in recent innovative development in microfinance 
industry is a high transaction cost. The emblem of high interest charges is always justified 
with high transaction cost by the MFIs as they entertain poor who usually are unserved by 
the formal financial system. A majority of MFIs customers belong to rural areas where 
formal banking and financial services are scarce. That is why, the startup cost and the cost 
of transaction for MFIs operating in rural areas are high. In addition, the profit margin in 
small loans is relatively lower than the corporate-level loans that makes the business 
environment for MFIs is difficult in terms of financial management. Beside the high sunk 
cost or startup cost, the operational costs are also higher relatively than the big loans 
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(usually granted by the banks) due to an excess demand of microloans in poor regions. 
Also, the administrative cost and the cost of fund (borrowed by MFIs if not subsidized) are 
also at higher level that makes the total transaction cost high at MFIs end (Micro Capital, 
2006). A potentially high demand for loans requires the MFIs to deploy active loan-officers 
who can simultaneously manage many loans. Such demands put extra burden on loan-
officers that increases the probability of poor’s exploitation from the loan officers. 
Armendáriz-de-Aghion and Morduch (2000) assert that high transaction costs can be 
reduced in group lending with the help of scheduled meeting of borrowers by the loan 
officers (CGAP, 2007). This assertion looks quite valid but the domain of rural area and 
the fact that most of the MFIs customers are rural farmers, attending such frequent meetings 
might reduce their working time and revenue generation which is essential for a timely 
repayment of the loan installment.  
 
3.1.3.4 Information asymmetries 
 Information asymmetries is defined as the scenario of market transactions in which 
one party is less informed than the other, and it is considered a worst case of market failure 
in microfinance (Autor, 2010, p.3; Healy and Palepu, 2001). Such transactions look highly 
risky in microfinance due to the grant of insecure loans (without physical collateral). The 
imbalanced power in such situations provides the opportunities of exploitation to the better-
informed party. It is usually considered in microfinance that the information asymmetry 
works only within the relationship of lenders (MFIs) and borrowers, but adding donor 
agencies in this relationship creates further complications in the microfinance system. In 
the tripartite system of microfinance, donors lack complete information about the end users 
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of their funds, borrowers do not have information about donor agencies, and MFIs 
(financial intermediary) lack a complete information of borrowers. This three tier weak 
system raises the issues of adverse selection and moral hazard, and such negative 
externalities ultimately cause market failure. Stiglitz and Weiss (1979) suggest that the 
method of credit rationing can be used to solve the problem of information asymmetries. 
The asymmetric information system of microfinance (see figure 3.1) describes that the 
donor agencies do not interact directly with the borrowers but the MFIs play the role of 
intermediary. That is why the donor agencies lack the full information of the borrowers 
who basically use their funds.  
 
 
Figure 3.1:  Tricyclic Information Asymmetric System of Microfinance 
Source: Author’s representation 
  
Ghosh and Van Tassel (2013) describe that the donors in information asymmetric 
environment grant funds according to the loan magnitudes. Optimal grants come in the 
shape of small loans, while large loans require some financial returns. Also, poverty 
alleviation is not subject to equilibrium (a point where the demand for funds exactly 
matches the supply of funds) but a better information system is required to grant the loans 
to appropriate borrowers. 
MFIs
Borrowers
Donor 
Agencies
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3.1.3.5 Exorbitant interest charges 
 One of the main issues that microfinance borrowers always face is an excessive rate 
of interest on loans. Exorbitant interest rates are always justified by MFIs with high 
transaction cost but from the borrowers’ perspectives excessive interest charges on loans 
put an extra burden of income generation not only on them but for the repayment of the 
principal amount. The claim MFIs put forward in justification of high interest rate is that 
highly risky uncollateralized microloans need extra risk-premium. Such claims look valid 
if the main objective of microfinance is just to maintain a financial business with the poor, 
otherwise, exorbitant interest rates can be lethal for the poor’s subsistence. The attainment 
of financial self-sufficiency requires high interest rates and poor borrowers are ready to 
pay such high interest (Brau and Woller, 2004) but the main concern here is for the poorest 
borrowers with few income generation opportunities, due to incomplete, incompetent and 
uncompetitive markets, usually found in rural and undeveloped areas. Secondly, with a 
target of high interest, the selection bias will come into effect because MFIs will sanction 
the loan applications of relatively wealthier borrowers and in such cases, microfinance will 
be ineffective in poverty alleviation. Gonzalez-Vega (1998) gives the importance of 
regulation to standardize the lending interest rates because unregulated MFIs charge 
relatively higher interest rates to cover the startup cost with some profit margins. Possibly, 
loan market might be cleared at very high interest rates due to an excessive demand for 
loans against relatively lesser supply of funds, but the potential growth opportunities might 
not be availed of and the objective of poverty alleviation won’t be achieved. The recent 
regulations in the Russian microfinance industry require the MFIs to register with the 
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Russian Central Bank and Federal Financial Markets Service with a mandatory reporting 
requirement. Also, the regulatory body (the Russian Central Bank and Federal Financial 
Markets Service) will regularly publish an average interest rate on retail financial products 
that could be used as a ‘benchmark interest rate’. An interest margin 20 percent of official 
average interest rate (published by the regulatory authority) is allowed, and anything 
beyond that level will be considered usurious (Mamuta, 2012). It is pertinent to note that 
the guidelines provided by the CGAP regarding the effective interest rates on microloans 
can principally be used by MFIs especially new comers. The pricing formula given by 
CGAP is stated below: 
R =
𝐴𝐸 + 𝐿𝐿 + 𝐶𝐹 + 𝐾 + 𝐼𝐼
1 − 𝐿𝐿
 
Where; 
R  Effective interest rate 
AE  Administrative expenses 
LL Loan loss rate 
CF Cost of capital 
K Capitalization ratio 
II Investment income 
  
Besides the above-mentioned base formula for pricing, a number of alternative 
methods were also provided to easily compute annual interest rate according to the nature 
and structure of the MFI. It is of a great concern that changing the method of interest 
calculation can affect the magnitude of interest. A one percent monthly interest rate can 
amount to thirty nine percent annual interest rate, and a six percent monthly interest rate 
can be as devastating at 189% per annum (CGAP, 1996). Table-3.2 shows the annualized 
effective interest rates. 
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Table 3.2 : ANNUALIZED EFFECTIVE INTEREST RATES 
Stated 
Monthly 
Rate 
BASE CASE Alternative 4 Alternative 5 Alternative 6 Alternative 8 
Interest charges 
on declining 
balances, 4 equal 
monthly 
payments 
Flat interest 
charged on 
initial balance, 
prorated over 4 
months 
payments 
Flat interest 
charged on initial 
balance, 
deducted from 
loan 
disbursement 
Flat interest (on 
initial bal.) and 
3% commission 
deducted from 
loan 
disbursement 
Flat interest (on 
initial bal.) and 3% 
commission 
deducted from 
loan disbursement 
1.00% 12.00% 19.00% 19.80% 35.60% 38.90% 
1.50% 18.00% 28.50% 30.30% 46.60% 51.50% 
2.00% 24.00% 37.50% 41.00% 58.00% 64.50% 
2.50% 30.00% 47.10% 52.00% 69.80% 78.00% 
3.00% 36.00% 56.30% 63.80% 82.00% 92.00% 
3.50% 42.00% 65.50% 75.80% 94.70% 106.60% 
4.00% 48.00% 74.60% 88.30% 108.00% 121.80% 
4.50% 54.00% 83.60% 101.30% 121.70% 137.60% 
5.00% 60.00% 92.60% 114.80% 136.10% 154.20% 
5.50% 66.00% 101.50% 128.80% 151.10% 171.40% 
6.00% 72.00% 110.40% 143.50% 166.70% 189.50% 
Source: CGAP (1996)     
 
3.1.3.6 Unethical recovery practices 
 One of the strong criticisms against microfinance is that it uses unethical recovery 
practices in the case of default. A number of reported cases have blanched the true face of 
microfinance before the world. The double-edged sword of exorbitant interest rates with 
harsh and unethical recovery proceedings triggered the suicides among the microfinance 
borrowers (who were not able to repay) in India. The high interest rate ceiling imposed by 
the government of Andhra Pradesh, India, was practically ineffective for most of the MFIs. 
The ex post facto interest rate of 100% becomes 158% on ‘annual percentage rate’ (APR) 
and almost 353% on ‘annual effective interest rate’ (AER). Most of the MFIs do not get 
harmed with interest rate capping (Ashta, Khan, and Otto, 2011). Such lexical provision 
allowed the MFIs to exploit the poor in the name of poverty alleviation.  According to the 
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BBC News, more than 80 people have committed suicide in Andhra Pradesh after 
defaulting microloans (BBC News, December 16, 2010). Another published report says 
that more than 200 people had committed suicide in 2010 due to the debt burden and harsh 
recovery practices in Andhra Pradesh, India (Business Insider, February 24, 2012). While 
explaining the root-cause of such misery, Dobusch, Mader, and Quack (2013, p. 52) assert 
that the bubble of lending growth in microfinance had ruptured due to an excessive 
indebtedness. After such incidents, some of the Indian politicians started to believe that the 
goal of poverty alleviation through microfinance is just a creep. The microfinance crises in 
Bolivia and Bangladesh had erupted at almost the same period in late 1990s. The intensity 
of the crisis in Bangladesh was so severe that the Grameen Bank’s repayment rates dropped 
from 98% to below 90% (Armendáriz, and Morduch, 2010, p. 146). The issue of unethical 
recovery practices is of a great nature and needs the immediate attention of the regulatory 
authorities of microfinance.  
 
3.1.4 Rethinking conventional microfinance 
Inasmuch as poverty alleviation has been considered the core objective of 
microfinance since its inception, it is important to critically examine the role of 
microfinance. The success story of the Grameen Bank in Bangladesh helped reinforce the 
importance of microfinance in development paradigm. Before microfinance, the poor were 
not able to borrow from formal financial institutions as their empty-pockets did not allow 
them to use such financial facilities. The startup of microfinance has provided such 
opportunities to them through financial inclusion. Financial inclusion was necessary to 
bring the poor into the formal financial system. The lack of borrowing due to unavailability 
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of collateral was the main constraint in socioeconomic development in rural areas in 
general and in agricultural sector in particular. The poor are always in dire need of 
microfinance services because their financial streams do not have systematically consistent 
patterns especially for rural and agricultural farmers and peasants. The agricultural income 
usually comes twice or thrice in a year (through the sales proceeds of cultivation) but the 
expenses incur on daily basis such piecemeal income doesn’t cater consumption smoothing 
in their everyday lives. Also, unequal income streams do not allow to get appropriate farms 
inputs necessarily require for crops and cultivation. The edge of risk increases in case of 
catastrophic shocks and weather vulnerabilities. In many ways, microfinance has come to 
be considered as a “silver bullet” that would solve all the problems of the poor people 
(Kernani, 2007; Financial Times, 16 December 2010; Holingworth, 2014). 
 
Several studies have taken a second look at the claims of and for microfinance.  
Khandker (2001) concludes that despite increasing dropout-rates (5% to 10%), 
microfinance borrowers performed better in both periods, in terms of per capita income 
and expenditure, and overall growth. The study conducted in Bangladesh based on follow-
up surveys (initial survey in 1991-92 and final survey in 1998-99) found some positive 
effects of microfinance on poverty alleviation. Also, poverty incidence was lower in 1998-
99 than 1991-92. Appah, John, and Wisdom (2012), in their study on poverty reduction 
and microfinance in Bayelsa state of Nigeria, concluded that traditional rotating credit is 
significantly different from microfinance, and the microfinance has statistically significant 
impacts on poverty but the government assistance is necessary to eradicate poverty. The 
autonomy of microfinance in Nigeria requires freedom from political manipulation and 
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influence. Durrani, Usman, Malik, and Shafiq (2011) also found that efficient microfinance 
enhances poor people’s quality of life as it helps in consumption smoothing, risk 
management, asset acquisition, entrepreneurial capabilities, income generation, and an 
overall improvement. Jegede, Kehinde, and Akinlabi (2011) found that the income and 
socioeconomic status of the poor in Nigeria had increased due to microfinance services. 
Microcredit is a vital tool for poverty alleviation in Nigeria despite having the issues of 
accessibility and outreach.  In Bangladesh, Pitt, Khandker, Chowdhury, and Millimet 
(2003) ascertained the evidence of microfinance on gender differences and health status. 
They found that the impact on women participants strongly outweighed the impact on their 
male counterparts. Also, the credit provided to women had significant effects on children’s 
health status.  
 
Poverty has different faces and different consequences. As Robinson (2001, p.27) 
noted, the poor do not suffer due to lack of basic necessities but due to other social diseases 
such as homelessness, disenfranchisement, self-disgrace, and social backwardness etc. 
McCulloch and Baulch (2000) also argue that income smoothing strategies can reduce 
transitory poverty but chronic poverty eradication requires sustainable income growth of 
the households. For higher income streams, capital accumulation (both human and 
physical) can be obtained through an active intervention. Microfinance services can have 
a lasting impact on poverty as it can bring the economic welfare and power of self-
sustenance (Remenyi and Quinones, 2014, p.53-54). However, hoping to get rid of chronic 
poverty through credit interventions is difficult to establish because chronic poverty does 
not come through financial market failures but from low productivity and a lack of resource 
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endowment (Lipton and Ravallion, 1993, p. 62). Therefore, considering microfinance a 
‘master key’ for all unsolved problems might have over-generalization effects. 
  
Institutional settings play an important role in microfinance success which differ 
from country to country. Navajas, Schreiner, Meyer, Gonzalez-Vega, and Rodriguez-Meza 
(2000) conclude that the impacts of microfinance on social improvement depend not only 
on accessibility and outreach but scope, length, breadth and cost. Among them length is 
most important because it brings incentives that trigger investment in other spheres. The 
microfinance movement is almost in its fifth decade (considering its initiation in the early 
1970s) and gained a momentum in the development studies. However, a paradigm shift 
towards institutional self-sufficiency can be seen in its core objectivity that drastically 
affect the borrowers’ selection and an overall impact of microfinance on poverty. The 
negligence of the poorest of the poor and the selection of relatively wealthier borrowers 
bring a mission drift in microfinance (Mersland, and Strøm, 2010; Armendáriz, and 
Szafarz, 2009; Copestake, 2007). Simanowitz (2000) indicates that the adviser to the 
‘Consultative Group to Assist Poor’ (CGAP) stressed the need for financial self-sufficiency 
of microfinance institutions (MFIs). He asserts that the microfinance will not create the 
positive impacts on poverty until the price charge by MFIs doesn’t coerce the borrowers to 
discontinue their relationship with MFIs. This looks quite valid from the financial 
sustainability point of view but one should not forget that the core objective of 
microfinance is not merely to provide banking services to the poor but to uplift them from 
poverty. The applicability and effectiveness of microfinance heavily rely on socioeconomic 
conditions of the country and the domains of its services which in most cases are rural areas 
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with low education and high prevalence of poverty. This fact has been proven throughout 
the world that microfinance creates opportunities for the poor and improves their lives in 
terms of financial strength. 
 
 A number of studies have shown through different lenses the impact of 
microfinance on the poor and its role in poverty alleviation.  However, there are also many 
studies that have investigated the possible counterproductive effects of microfinance on 
poverty. Most of the impact studies are focused to draw the line between borrowers and 
non-borrowers that might overstate the resultant effects due to selection bias. Hulme and 
Mosley (1996, p.19) did not find the positive effects of microfinance on poor households. 
They noted that most of the borrowers whose income were below the poverty line were 
actually worse-off after microfinance loans as compared to non-borrowers.  Dichter (2006) 
established the fact that most of the microfinance borrowing have been used for 
consumptions rather than on entrepreneurial activities. That is why, the impact of 
microfinance on poor’s income is not significant. Although microfinance borrowing 
provides a better consumption-smoothing, it also increases the dependency on external 
source of income rather than self-sufficiency.  Leikem (2012) concluded that the goals set 
in Microcredit Summit in 1997 have not been accomplished. The neglected stratum of the 
poorest of the poor is not benefitted by microfinance as their income has not significantly 
increased despite availing the opportunities of microfinance products. One of the reasons 
for the negligence of the poorest is an over-emphasis on financial self-sufficiency by 
lending institutions that coerces them to choose relatively stable poor rather than the 
deprived and the poorest. Many recent studies suggest that the microfinance services alone 
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could not enhance and uplift the poor if not integrated with proper training and monitoring. 
The provision of small loans is not a standalone factor in poverty eradication because most 
of the microfinance customers lack education, skills, and a risk-taking instinct. Income 
generation though entrepreneurial skills requires a broad vision, creativity, and consistency 
which are not viable in microfinance customers as most of the poor are merely ‘employees’ 
rather than employers or entrepreneurs (Mahajan and Ramola, 2003; Pollin, 2005; Karnani, 
2007). The focus on less-poor entrepreneurs casts doubts on its objectivity because the 
prime motive of microfinance is poverty alleviation. The main reasons of ‘mission drift’ 
are the effects of commercialization and business-orientation. The other formal financial 
institutions, operating for profits, purposefully neglect the small entrepreneurs due to cost 
considerations (usually higher in small lending). On the other hand, microfinance 
institutions provide financial resources to small entrepreneurs on the expense of neglecting 
the poor to intact their financial sustainability. Bateman (2011) asserts that after the 
adoption of ‘randomized control trial’ (RCT) methodology in 2007, most of the impact 
evaluation studies based on RCT have found no or little effects of microfinance services 
on the poor. In general, the media usually shows the success stories of microfinance and 
neglect the failed-programmes. A biased attitude of media strengthens the concept that 
microfinance is an all-in-one toolkit for the poor.  
 
The overwhelming importance given to microfinance sometimes generates 
improper assessment of its role in poverty alleviation. Without saying that the claims of 
poverty eradication are invalid, a thorough probe can broaden our vision on the viability of 
microfinance. Usually, the target customers of microfinance are the poor, destitute, 
58 
 
unbanked, and unintegrated with the formal financial system especially women who, in the 
case of the Grameen Bank, account for 95% of the customers. The term ‘empowerment’ is 
broadly conceived for empowerment without gender discrimination especially for societies 
where women have less authority in decision making. As Kabeer (2001) notes, the gender 
specific empowerment goals are undermined due to the fact that these goals are linked with 
a single function of loan’s repayment. This preoccupation creates hindrances in model 
making of effective financial services especially in male-chauvinistic societies where 
women’s entrepreneurial abilities are not counted due to their suppressed roles. In addition, 
higher loan returns by women borrowers is not the reflection of their empowerment or 
financial authority because in male dominant societies like Bangladesh, India, and Pakistan 
etc. women coercively share their borrowing with other household members. Thus, if 
women empowerment is measured merely through the ratios of loans repayment then the 
impact evaluation of microfinance can give misleading results. Hulme (2000) insists upon 
the need of careful monitoring of microfinance in the context of its overlooked role in 
poverty alleviation. Microfinance should be more welfare-oriented than business-oriented. 
Regarding the claims of poverty alleviation, he cites that except for Bangladesh 
microfinance couldn’t even ‘scratch the surface of poverty’ in the world. The myth created 
by microfinance that the poor are always able to repay loans is illogical and unrealistic. 
Although microfinance can create opportunities for the poor due to financial inclusion, it 
does not always happen. For example, the poor people working in narrow and inefficient 
markets where income-generating opportunities are scarce, the probability of debt 
incidence is high, considering the vulnerabilities of exogenous shocks (both catastrophic 
and social). While a majority of MFIs target poor women, the problem of repayment from 
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women strata is high, and in some cases female borrowers committed suicides due to the 
fear of repayment inability. Hulme (2000) indicates that the Kenya Women’s Finance Trust 
and other MFIs discourage ‘savings only’ and apply the balancing out if the incumbent 
borrowers refuse to take further loans. The efficiency of microfinance is not enough in 
poverty eradication and a multifaceted strategy is required to combat the existing 
challenges. Nteziyaremye and MkNelly (2001) noted that making a weekly repayment is 
quite difficult for the poor women with the existence of weak domestic markets. The poor 
households are more vulnerable to external shocks due to unavailability of alternative 
sources of income. The dynamic distinction between the poorest and economically active 
poor shows that poor households shift from one category to another with the passage of 
time. Although microfinance provides a better bargaining power to women, patriarchal 
societies do not allow the women to get an authoritative position. The women’s financial 
control is seen negatively in such societies where male members of the household dominate 
in income and consumption decision making processes. Vengroff and Creevey (1994) 
indicate that women empowerment through microfinance is often perceived negatively in 
patriarchal societies and increases the burden and workload on women. In such societies, 
house chores and children’s upbringing are considered the innate tasks for women. 
Additional entrepreneurial responsibilities increase their workload that is inevitable to 
ensure timely repayment of microfinance loans. In their study of social capital formation 
by the Bangladesh Rural Advancement Committee (BRAC) in a rural village of 
Bangladesh, Saharia and Iiguni (2007, p. 104) found that although the MFIs have the 
potential to create social capital through enforcement and mobilization, it is not a built-in 
functionality of MFIs to create such social capital. The effective social capital formation 
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requires a well-designed social capital formation strategy and its implementation at the 
grass roots level.  
 
3.2   Poverty alleviation through Islamic microfinance 
 As discussed in the previous chapter, conventional microfinance in Pakistan has 
not significantly contributed to poverty alleviation.  Consequently, the prospect of what is 
termed “Islamic microfinance” has been raised in some sectors.  This section describes the 
characteristics features of Islamic microfinance, its strength, weaknesses, and potential to 
curb poverty with special reference to Pakistan. It also investigates whether or not it can 
be used as a replacement of conventional microfinance.  
 
3.2.1 Islamic Microfinance and its Foundations 
 The basic definition of Islamic microfinance can be derived from its name i.e. the 
way to provide tiny loans within the legitimate boundaries of Islamic jurisprudence called 
Shariah. It is a set of defined rules applicable to all market transactions without harming 
the interest of any party. It can efficiently be used to reduce the probability of exploitation 
by any party involved in a market transaction. The common misconception about the 
difference between conventional microfinance and Islamic microfinance is that the latter 
doesn’t charge interest while the former one is strongly criticized for charging exorbitant 
interest. However, the said difference is partially true because Islamic microfinance also 
differs in its objectives which supersede financial sustainability. The religion itself is 
focused on tolerance, compassion, and society’s welfare; that is why the societal interests 
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are always preferred over individual interests in Islam. The concept of Islamic 
microfinance is principally based on solidarity, consolidation, brotherhood and mutual 
agreements. Business transactions are not just the profit of one party at the expense of 
others because it increases the probability of exploitation and creates an uncomfortable 
business environment. The Islamic way of business believes in a win-win situation for all 
the parties involved in the business.  
 
3.2.1.1 Fundamental doctrine of Islamic microfinance 
 The rationale of Islamic microfinance rests upon the egalitarian doctrine which 
demands an equal treatment for all (El-Sheikh, 2011, p.89). The Islamic beliefs of equality 
are quite reflective of the Judeo-Christian beliefs that God loves all human equally and 
they should be treated with equal status and morality. Egalitarianism proposes equal 
sociopolitical and economic rights and indiscriminate privileges for all (Rothbard, 1974). 
It is a philosophical position that keeps the central thought of equality in the shell of justice 
so it demands that inequality be reduced to a level where it cannot harm the society at large. 
Societies with justice provide equal opportunities to all and constraints the ways of extra 
advantages, where people get prosperity due to an abundance of opportunities (Robinson, 
2016). Such characterization of societies can be taken from the concept of ‘welfare state’ 
in Islam (Chapra, 1979, p. 4). Although the core objective of conventional microfinance 
was poverty alleviation and welfare in terms of social development but the present era of 
globalization transcends its objectives in the direction of commercialization. On the other 
hand, Islamic microfinance believes in the equality of opportunities such as the 
indiscriminate accessibility of financial resources, and the main focus is on the poor strata 
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of society which remains highly negligible in the sights of financial players. The strategy 
to establish a welfare state with a strong focus on the poor is a fundamental departure in 
launching Islamic microfinance. The concept of grass-root level development through 
micro lending comes from the collection of divine scripts. It is pertinent to note that the 
divine instructions about lending poor, come together with innate prohibition of interest on 
loans (Chapra, 1979, p. 22). Such lending without interest is quite similar to the form of 
lending used in Islamic microfinance which, as noted earlier, differs primarily from 
conventional microfinance.  
 
3.2.2 Religious assertions 
The notion of lending to the poor is as old as human history, and the assertions 
considered as divine are presented in almost all holy scripts in one form or another. In the 
following sections we shed light on religious assertions that are believed to encourage 
lending to poor and needy people. An important element or the common factor in such 
instructions is the protection of the rights of borrowers and lenders that avoids disputes 
between these two and provides a built-in mechanism against the conflicts of interests.   
 
3.2.2.1 Judeo-Christian Commandments: The Biblical Verses 
Dr. Rabbi Louis Jacobs explains in his book The Jewish Religion: A Companion 
(1995) that granting loans on interest, termed as ‘usury’ is forbidden in Biblical assertions. 
The excerpt taken from Exodus (22:24) says “if you lend money to any of my people, even 
to the poor with thee, thou shalt not be to him as a creditor; neither shalt thou lay upon him 
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interest.”  On the same subject, the excerpt from the Deuteronomy (23:20-21) says “Thou 
shalt not lend upon interest to thy brother: interest of money, interest of victuals, and 
interest of anything that is lend upon interest. Unto a foreigner thou mayest lend upon 
interest; but unto thy brother thou shalt not lend upon interest; that the Lord thy God may 
bless thee in all that thou puttest thy hand into, in the land whither thou goest in to possess 
it.” It is also mentioned that support of the poor through financial means is obligatory, as 
Leviticus (25:35-37) says “You shall not charge interest on loans to your brother, interest 
on money, interest on food, interest on anything that is lent for interest. You may charge a 
foreigner interest, but you may not charge your brother interest, that the Lord your God 
may bless you in all that you undertake in the land that you are entering to take possession 
of it.”  Similarly, Luke (6:34-35) asserts “And if you lend to those from whom you expect 
to receive, what credit is that to you? Even sinners lend to sinners, to get back the same 
amount. But love your enemies, and do good, and lend, expecting nothing in return, and 
your reward will be great, and you will be sons of the Most High, for he is kind to the 
ungrateful and the evil”, and “Give to the one who begs from you, and do not refuse the 
one who would borrow from you” (Matthew, 5:42).  
 
3.2.2.2 Islamic Commandments: The Quranic Verses 
The Quran says “Allah has permitted trade and forbidden usury. Allah destroys 
usury and gives increase for charities. And Allah does not like every sinning disbeliever” 
(2:275-276). While protecting the rights of lenders, it is commanded that “O You Who 
Believe! When you contract a debt for a fixed period, write it down. Debts are written and 
given within two honest witnesses” (2:282-283). Islam doesn’t want the exploitation of any 
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party involved in any business transaction whether it would be on cash or on credit basis. 
Instructions are therefore given to write down the contract with two honest witnesses so 
that the chances of quarrel in future could be minimized. The written contract can be used 
as a proof in case of any dispute arises between the parties involved in a transaction. On 
the same note, getting a loan under necessary circumstances is permitted in Islam but the 
borrower must have the intention of repayment otherwise it would be considered a willful 
oppression and a great sin (Yusuf, 2010). The objective of establishing a welfare state 
thorough charities and almsgiving is considered a pathway of brotherhood. Such bonding 
among rich and poor shares not only the resources and opportunities, but it minimizes the 
gulf between rich and poor. That is why the concept of income redistribution is quite 
important in the welfare state. The Holy Prophet Muhammad (peace be upon him) urged 
the followers to give loans to the needy and deprived. The Prophet (peace be upon him) 
said “The one who gives charity is rewarded tenfold. The one who gives loan is rewarded 
eighteen fold” (Ibn-e-Maja, p. 175). The act of giving loan supersedes the act of giving 
charity in terms of virtuousness and reward. To protect the rights of lenders, the borrowers 
are instructed to obey the rules and they should have pure intentions of repayment. Another 
saying of the Prophet (peace be upon him) narrates “The person who takes wealth from 
people with the intention of repaying it, Allah will assist him in repayment of loan. The 
person who takes wealth from people with the intention of squandering it, Allah will cause 
him destruction” (Bukhari, Musnad-e-Ahmed, 3:285). The conditional constraints on loan 
usage restrict the misuse of loans by the borrowers and implicitly require them to use loans 
on productive activities while attaching the conditions of repayment intents. Such 
proximity could efficiently be used to minimize the long-standing issues of information 
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asymmetry and moral hazards in conventional microfinance. As a common practice, the 
conventional MFIs barrage loans without assessing the ex post facto repercussions of over-
stretching the financial elasticity of the poor.    
 
3.2.3 Islamic approach of poverty alleviation  
 The Islamic vision of poverty alleviation is a bit different from the orthodox 
approach of poverty alleviation through conventional microfinance which is evidently 
skewed towards the goals of ‘commercialized finance’ (the term I specifically use for the 
commercialization of financial services). The Islamic ways of poverty alleviation rest upon 
the concept of a welfare state in which the welfare of society is pursued. Being the 
custodian of economic resources, the state’s role in creating a welfare state comes at 
primary position that demands an active contribution. If the state fails to establish an active 
mechanism for redistribution of resources, the emblem of responsibility is transferred to 
other economic players in society especially the rich and elite class, who enjoy a majority 
of perks during prosperity and economic development. The main framework of Islamic 
microfinance is based on egalitarianism which demands the equality of all human being. 
The main point of departure is that all resources belong to God (Allah) who created 
everything and humans are merely the custodians of God’s creation. This gives the 
understanding that the Supreme power is God, being the creator of the universe, as the 
Quran says “He it is Who created for you all that is in the earth” (2:29). Nevertheless, it 
does not contradict or reject the property rights of the owners but extends it further so that 
equality could prevail and to make an egalitarian society. In the present world of economic 
scarcity, the concept of resource redistribution balances the perks among human beings 
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and reduces the inequality between them which is a necessary element to form a welfare 
state. Figure-3.2 shows the main components required to build a model welfare state.       
  
Figure 3.2: Components of a Welfare State in Islam 
Source: Author’s representation 
 
The above figure shows the Islamic view of the welfare state which requires the 
following components for an active resource redistribution: Supremacy of God, universal 
brotherhood, equality, socio-economic justice, and accountability. Wealth has a tendency 
to concentrate at one point, creating income inequality between rich and poor, which is 
why the Islamic mode of poverty alleviation uses resource redistribution to reduce wealth 
concentration. Although the accumulation of wealth is not prohibited, it is instructed that a 
meager share of wealth should be spared for poor and needy people. The concepts of Zakat, 
almsgiving and Sadaqat take precedence over other commandments related to financial 
matters. Foremost among the five pillars of Islamic theology, Zakat is a financial obligation 
on each and every Muslim who holds a certain level of wealth in a given year. It is used as 
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a tool for poverty alleviation in which, every year, a prescribed rate of wealth is shared 
with the poor and thus to discourage wealth concentration. Islamic microfinance is used as 
an institutionalized way of resource redistribution that is why a majority of Islamic 
microfinance models are based on zakat and charities.  
 
3.3 Empirical studies on Islamic microfinance 
The concept of microfinance is closely associated with poverty alleviation and its 
main objective is to help financially excluded, unbanked, and poor entrepreneurs with some 
capability to generate funds. However, the concept of financial inclusion is not limited to 
small credits only; it covers a broad range of financial products like deposits, payments 
services, money transfers and micro insurance as well (Conroy, 2003, pp. 2). Microfinance 
services provide some hopes in the lives of the poor entrepreneurs who are usually away 
from formal banking services (Ledgerwood, Julie, and Candace, 2013, pp. 5). Their innate 
inability to provide collateral against the loans coerce them to live their entire life in deep 
poverty cycles. Despite the fact that microfinance is committed to a noble cause, modern 
commercialization effects have often raised a skepticism on conventional microfinance 
services because the recent trend in microfinance advances against the double bottom line 
objectives (Drake and Rhyne, 2002).  It is worth noting that most of the modern 
microfinance practitioners agreed that existing microfinance could not achieve the double 
bottom line because the institutions focused on financial self-sufficiency lack a social view 
of microfinance, and the institutions concerned about poverty outreach outrightly ignore 
financial aspects. This unfilled gap in microfinance paves the ways for Islamic 
microfinance.  
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Broadly speaking, the Islamic financial system comprises Islamic banking and 
finance including microfinance. The fundamental doctrine for both Islamic banking and 
Islamic microfinance is Islamic (Shariah) jurisprudence (a set of divine principles revealed 
in the Quran). The Shariah emphasizes two main restrictions on all financial matters.  First, 
interest (Riba) is forbidden in all transactions because of its exploitative nature; and second, 
all transactions involving risk and uncertainty (Gharar) such as gambling and speculation 
are prohibited. Pollard and Sameers (2007) noted that Islamic finance encourages asset-
based investments to connect the financial sector and the real sector of the economy. 
Intuitively, the money has a tendency to concentrate at one point, which is why Islam does 
not consider money as a commodity because its value cannot be increased until and unless 
it is used for some productive activities. An alternative mechanism of profit-n-loss in 
Islamic finance envisages a circular channel of growth by enticing all stakeholders onboard. 
Fund providers are not merely considered money lenders (having fail safe return-on-
investments) but the active investors who share risks and rewards (CGAP, 2006). Although 
both Islamic microfinance and conventional microfinance have the same objectives of 
financial inclusion for economic growth, the methods of application are significantly 
different from each other. Conventional microfinance largely depends upon the interest 
charges on loans; whereas Islamic microfinance is based on interest-free contrivance and 
relies mainly on charities like zakat, sadaqat, and, almsgiving. This point is also attributed 
by Rahman (2007) that Islamic microfinance maximizes social services through charities. 
The profit-n-loss method of Islamic microfinance uses other channels to fulfil the demand 
for funds without eyeballing the interest income. He concludes that Shariah-compliant 
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financing instruments can be used more efficiently if risk mitigation techniques can be 
aligned with the modern financial environment. The substantial growth of Islamic banking 
can be used to financially back up Islamic microfinance because both of them work under 
the same jurisdiction and fundamental principles. According to Abdouli (1991), Islamic 
banks can narrow the gap of income distribution which has been increasing due to the 
conventional banking. Islamic banks provide not only financial assistance but also establish 
a long-term business relationship with small and medium entrepreneurs through active 
monitoring and proper guidance. The probability of project success increases when loans 
provided with proper guidance, technical assistance, and supervisory skills. To explain 
rudimentary contracting practice of Islamic banks, Rajesh, Aggarwal and Yousuf (2000) 
assert that most of the Islamic banks lack Shariah-based equity (PLS) financing because 
they are skewed towards debt-like instruments, as rational response to their operating 
environment. An intensified competition between Islamic banks and conventional banks 
can create more opportunities for profit and loss contracts. At present, the way Islamic 
banks are operating is more or less incentive seeking than Shariah compliance because a 
significant portion of financial contracts consists of debt-like financing (Murabaha and 
Ijarah) instead of profit-n-loss sharing-based financing (Mudarabah and Musharakah). 
Dhumale and Sapcanin (1999) noted that there is a compatibility match between the 
practices of Islamic banks and microfinance. The former one grants loans on the basis of 
expertise and skills without physical collateral while the latter one uses entrepreneurial 
abilities and expertise in profit generating economic activities; thus these two can make the 
difference by working together. Ahmed (2002) considers Islamic microfinance to be in its 
infancy period and is yet to develop a profound system that can compete with existing 
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microfinance. Conventional microfinance is facing some serious challenges such as 
serving the ultra-poor, asymmetric information, high drop-out ratio, and double dipping 
etc. (Ahmed, 2002). Although Islamic microfinance has yet to develop a solution set, it has 
the potential to cope such issues. He pointed out that a lack of ‘research and development’ 
(R&D) is a root cause of the communication gap between loan providers and the poor 
entrepreneurs. He proposed that international agencies can provide financial training and 
assistance to both groups to align the existing system. Financial subsidization is also 
needed to enhance the outreach and efficiency of microfinance. Khan (2008) asserts that a 
distant gap between demand and supply of loanable funds causes the limited success of 
conventional microfinance. The inconsequential subsidization from international donors 
puts an extra burden on ‘micro finance institutions’ (MFIs) to become self-sufficient rather 
than merely dependent on external sources. A paradigm shift from social welfare to 
financial sustainability coerces MFIs to charge exorbitant interests. This mission drift 
enlarges the inconsistency of conventional microfinance (Mersland, and Strøm, 2010; 
Armendáriz, and Szafarz, 2009; Copestake, 2007). Khan (2008) proposed that Islamic 
microfinance can acquire funds through Islamic charities i.e. Zakat, Sadaqat and 
Almsgiving to fill the demand and supply gap. However, his theoretical assertion does not 
provide a clear-cut line of action to make microfinance a substantial tool for poverty 
alleviation. In addition, other consequential factors are also undiscussed such as 
information asymmetry, concentrated outreach, loans from multiple sources, and the 
adverse selection etc. In the context of microfinance in Australia, Ahmad and Ahmad 
(2008) explain that Islamic Microfinance Service Providers (ISMPs) play a dominant role 
in the welfare of Australian Muslim Community but their clientele base is limited. The 
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outreach expansion is needed to make it more efficient. Moreover, ISMPs should formulate 
Islamic financial products according to the needs of the poor in Australia. Uddin and Barai 
(2016) explored the role of Islamic microfinance in Bangladesh, and found that the loans 
provided by the Islamic microfinance significantly increased the income of the respondents. 
The study is based on 87 structured interviews conducted under the Rural Development 
Schemes of Islamic Bank Ltd, to determine the income differentials after the Islamic credits. 
The empirical findings of the study noted that the Islamic credits have a positive relation 
with the income and age of the borrowers. However, the study does not address the possible 
issues of multicollinearity and heteroscedasticity in the dataset.   
 
3.4 Selected analytical approaches:  Linear probability models 
The last section of this study uses linear probability model to assess the probability 
of success of Islamic microfinance in Pakistan. For this purpose, this section reviews some 
studies that have applied linear probability models with some policy options. Although 
some of these studies focus on other issues, they nonetheless show the validity of using 
linear probability models. For instance, Gebreselassie and Ludi (2008) use a Logit model 
to investigate the factors that influence smallholders’ decision whether or not to participate 
in output markets. The model uses observations taken from survey data and binary dummy 
values where household participation is represented with Yi=1 and not-participation is 
mentioned with Yi=0. The empirical findings indicate that household do not participate in 
relatively older markets on an average six years older. Also, the female household head do 
not participate in output markets. Ozier (2011) studied the impact of secondary school on 
human capital, occupational choice, and fertility for young adults in Kenya by using the 
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linear probability model. The main concern is the recent trend showing that the probability 
of enrolment in government-operated schools was rising, thus allowing an estimation of 
the causal effect of schooling in a regression discontinuity framework. The empirical 
findings reveal that secondary schooling increases the human capital. Regarding the gender 
distribution, the probability of low-skill self-employment for male was reduced, and the 
secondary schooling for female reduces the early-age pregnancy in teenaged girls. 
Bertrand, Black, Jensen and Lleras-Muney (2014) studied the effects of board quotas on 
Female Labor Market Outcomes in Norway. Their study found that post the reforms period, 
the newly appointed female board members were more qualified than their female 
predecessors. Also, the gender gap in earning within board members was reduced in the 
post-reforms period. Nevertheless, the reforms had less effects on women’s decisions in 
general i.e. decisions to attend business education programs and convergence of earning 
trajectory between male-female graduates of such programs. Bernardi and Riddle (2014) 
studied the long term consequences of parental divorce on children’s education 
achievement. The objective of the study is to find the connection between parental divorce 
and children’s education. A comparative approach is used on survey level data with linear 
probability models. The empirical results indicate that parental divorce is negatively linked 
with children’s tertiary education attainment. The penalty of breakup for highly educated 
parents is higher than other parents. Also, the breakup penalty is independent of the degree 
of diffusion of divorce. Dharmapala and Hines (2009) conduct the study to find out the 
countries which become tax heavens by using the linear probability model (Probit). The 
data of 41 countries is used to investigate the probability of becoming tax heaven country. 
The empirical findings suggest that after controlling the other effects, the quality of 
73 
 
governance has a significantly large connection with the probability of becoming tax 
heaven. Huizinga, Laeven and Nicodeme (2012) studied the international taxation and 
multinational firm location decisions. Their findings suggest that the parent country’s 
corporation taxation has independent and strongly negative effects on the probability of 
foreign subsidiary location. The parent country’s taxation is evidently distortive because 
of a high sensitivity of foreign subsidiary location decision and corporation taxation. Dollar 
and Svensson (2000) analyze the success or failure of structural adjustment programmes 
based on 200 reform programmes. They found that a number of donor-effort variables are 
the main determinants of success and failure of such programmes. In summary, these 
studies show the logic and validity of using linear probability models to determine the 
consequence of a policy decision or intervention. 
 
3.5 Chapter Summary 
The critical analysis on poverty alleviation through microfinance reveals that the 
relationship between these two is not as straightforward as it looks because poverty is a 
chronic disease which requires a long term solution. Microfinance can be a remedial 
measure to settle the issues of transitory poverty with proper monitoring and evaluation. 
Treating microfinance as a “silver bullet” can have devastating overstated effects that may 
turn the table in the opposite direction. Targeting the double-bottom line without adjusting 
the issues of mission drift can only bring the inefficiency and distraction that will seriously 
hurt the noble cause of poverty alleviation (Mersland, and Strøm, 2010; Armendáriz, and 
Szafarz, 2009; Copestake, 2007). The literature review sheds light on the role of 
conventional and Islamic microfinance in poverty alleviation. Conventional microfinance 
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has achieved a limited success due to integrated malfunctioning in the existing system. On 
the other hand, Islamic microfinance has the potential to cope with these challenges but 
also requires a sound financial backup and product diversification. A consortium of Islamic 
banks and financial institutions can be utilized to establish a common pool that will be 
useful to cater the needs of poverty alleviation projects in an efficient manner. 
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CHAPTER 4 
METHODOLOGICAL FRAMEWORK 
 
 The methodological framework of this study includes the following four segments: 
i. Performance Evaluation of conventional microfinance based on efficiency 
scores through Data Envelopment Analysis (DEA) and Financial Ratios 
(FRA); 
ii. Perceived differences between conventional microfinance and Islamic 
microfinance based on primary survey data; 
iii. Proposed mosque-based Islamic microfinance model to overcome the 
shortcomings of existing microfinance; and, 
iv. Probability of successful implementation of Islamic microfinance in 
Pakistan based on primary survey data.   
 
4.1 Performance evaluation of conventional microfinance in Pakistan 
through Data Envelopment Analysis (DEA) 
Microfinance institutions are bit different from the conventional banking system in 
their operational settings because they grant loans without the requirement of physical 
collateral despite having other commonalities with conventional banking system like 
deposits, loans, and insurance services. The ‘double bottom line’ is an extended feature of 
microfinance that addresses its financial sustainability and social value creation (Tulchin, 
n.d.; Brau and Woller, 2004; Lewis, 2008; Gutiérrez-Nieto, Serrano-Cinca, and Molinero, 
2009). The traditional methods to assess the banking units mainly focus financial 
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performance only but the performance evaluation of microfinance requires a prism to 
evaluate both financial and social performances. The financial performance is usually 
measured through financial indicators but there is no specific method to assess the social 
performance. No universal standard is emerged by now that can be used to evaluate social 
performance of institutions (Zeller et. al. 2006; Gutiérrez-Nieto, Serrano-Cinca and 
Molinero, 2009). Ferro-Luzzi, and Weber (2006) used factor analysis for the performance 
evaluation of 45 MFIs in Geneva. They used factor analysis with seemingly unrelated 
regression (SUR) with the help of Simultaneous Equation Model (SEM), however, their 
correlation coefficient matrix shows some significantly higher correlations that might be 
the case of multicollinearity and heterecoscedacity.  
  
Data Envelopment Analysis (DEA) is extensively been used to evaluate the 
efficiency of financial institutions especially in banking and finance (Charnes et al, 1978). 
Some of the studies from banking and finance literature that used DEA for performance 
evaluation are Yeh (1996); Paradi and Schaffnit (2004); Charnes, Cooper, Huang and Sun 
(1990); Saha (2005). This study extends the DEA model to assess the performance of 
microfinance institutions in Pakistan. We will extend our assessment through DEA to the 
extent that it could cover both financial and social performance. The performance 
evaluation of microfinance is not extensively been conducted in Pakistan due to an 
unavailability of reliable data. The usual practice of performance evaluation of MFIs is 
based on the methods used by the rating agencies. Some of the very common 
methodologies of MFIs’ rating are PEARLS rating system developed by the World Council 
of Credit Unions, ACCION Camel developed by ACCION International, Girafe rating 
77 
 
system developed by PlaNetFinance, MicroRate developed by Damian von Stauffenberg 
of MicroRate, MicroBanking Bulletin/ MicroBanking Standards Project funded by CGAP, 
the Philippine Coalition of Micro-finance Standards, CGAP Microfinance Rating And 
Assessment Fund, Institutional Performance Standards and Plans, developed by the 
Committee of Donor Agencies for Small Enterprise Development and Donor’s Working 
Group on Financial Sector Development, United Nations Capital Development Fund, M-
CRILs developed by Micro-Credit Ratings International Ltd. Most of the rating agencies 
focus only financial sustainability aspect and follow the standard guidelines and framework 
used by Standard and Moody. The ‘Girafe’ gives weightage to efficiency while other rating 
agencies have developed their own rating scales and mainly focus on sustainability of MFIs 
(Gutiérrez-Nieto, Serrano-Cinca and Molinero, 2009). Some of the frequently used social 
performance evaluation methodologies are shown in Table 4.1. 
 
Table 4.1: MFIs Social Assessment Methodologies 
 
Name Description Analysis 
IMP-ACT International action-research program 
that aims at improving the quality of 
micro financial services and their impact 
on fighting poverty. 
_http://www.imp-act.org_ 
It relies on the collection of quantitative 
and qualitative information from MFI 
clients. Descriptive statistics, test of 
differences in means and medians, 
correlations and hypotheses tests are 
generated from data obtained. 
AIMS Assessing the Impact of Microenterprise 
Services (AIMS) tries to measure how 
microfinance interacts with their 
borrowers’ lives. 
_http://www.msiworldwide.com/gral/n
wproductsinfo/aims page.htm_ 
It places families at the center of its 
analysis. It uses qualitative and 
quantitative techniques. It considers 
hypotheses at household, individual, 
Enterprise and community levels. 
SROI Social Return On Investment (SROI) 
attempts to measure in the form of an 
investment ratio the social and 
environmental value created by an 
organization.  
The methodology is still under 
construction. For example, the income 
generated by enterprise tries to be 
measured through savings to donors. 
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_http://sroi.london.edu_ 
ACCION 
PAF 
Accion Poverty Assessment Framework 
(PAF) has been created by Accion, a not-
for-profit North American organization 
that groups MFIs, many of which are in 
Latin America. It compares socio-
economic characteristics of its clients 
against national and international 
poverty lines (e.g. a $ a day). 
_http://www.accion.org_ 
The data it employs at the moment are 
the data available within the MFI. 
Income or expenditure is compared 
with poverty lines. It analyses 
correlations and multivariate 
regressions to assess the potential of 
some variables as proxies of poverty 
level. For example, loan size. 
PAT The Poverty Assessment Tool of CGAP 
(PAT) measures poverty outreach by 
placing the clients of an MFI in the 
context of the non-clients. This is the 
same methodology used by United 
Nations Human Development Index 
(HDI). 
The analysis is done on the basis of 300 
poverty indicators that are reduced to 
30 by means of principal components 
analysis. A poverty index is finally 
constructed from these indicators. 
SPI The Social Performance Indicators 
Initiative (SPI) goes beyond poverty 
outreach. Social performance would 
have four dimensions: outreach to the 
poor and excluded, adaptation of the 
services and products to the target 
clients, improving social and political 
capital of clients and communities, and 
social responsibility of MFIs. 
_http://www.spifinance.com_ 
Four dimensions are collected by a 
questionnaire. The answers receive a 
weighting system from a principal 
components analysis. The results are 
represented by means of a rhombus, 
whose four vertices give a measure of 
MFI social performance. 
Source: Gutiérrez-Nieto, Serrano-Cinca and Molinero (2009) 
 
 
4.1.1 Data and Variables 
 The data are collected through microfinance information exchange (MIX) which is 
a US-based data provider. The MIX publishes standardized data across the industry to ease-
out the intra-industry comparisons among the indicators. The dataset used in this study is 
constructed by compiling the data of 27 MFIs of Pakistan for the period 2007~2011. The 
efficiency scores are calculated for the period of 5 years to get the robust results. Table 4.2 
shows the classification of MFIs in Pakistan.  
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Table 4.2: Classification of MFIs in Pakistan 
S# Name Abb. S# Name Abb. 
1 Akhuwat AKH 15 Khushhali Bank KHU 
2 Apna Microfinance Bank  APN 16 NRSP NRS 
3 ASA Pakistan ASA 17 Orangi ORA 
4 Asasah ASH 18 Orix Leasing ORI 
5 BRAC – PAK BRA 19 POMFB POM 
6 Buksh Foundation BUK 20 PRSP PRS 
7 CSC CSC 21 RCDS RCD 
8 CWCD CWC 22 Rozgar ROZ 
9 DAMEN DAM 23 SAFWCO SAF 
10 FFO FFO 24 SRSP SRS 
11 FMFB - Pakistan FMF 25 Sungi SUN 
12 JWS JWS 26 TMFB TMF 
13 Kashf Bank KAB 27 TRDP TRD 
14 Kashf Foundation KAF       
  Source: Author’s compilation 
 4.1.2 Input and Output Variables 
 The efficiency scores calculated through DEA require the selection of input and 
output variables that is a cumbersome task because it exhibits the operational setting of the 
firms / decision making units (here MFIs). The traditional approach in banking and finance 
literature does not exhibit any consensus about the constituents of input-output variable 
selection (Kumar and Gulati, 2008). The banking and finance literature reveals two main 
approaches for input-output selection i.e. production (value-added) approach, and 
intermediation (assets) approach. The intermediation approach defines the banks as 
intermediary that perform financial intermediation between the depositors and investors 
(Sealey and Lindley, 1977; Kumar and Gulati, 2008) or in economics’ term the banks 
convert economic savings into investments. On contrary, the production approach defines 
the banks as production units that use factor of production in the form of physical inputs 
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and produce output. The production approach defines the MFIs characteristics more than 
the intermediation approach because a majority of MFIs are dependent on donations and 
subsidiaries rather than just collection of deposits. Table 4.3 shows the description of input 
and output variables used in this study: 
 
Table 4.3: Description of variables used in this study 
Variable 
Class 
Variable Name Description Unit of 
Measure
ment 
Variable used in 
Previous Literature 
Input Total Assets (TA) As per CGAP (2003)’s 
classification of all assets account 
net of contra-assets accounts such 
as loan-loss rate provision and 
accumulated depreciation 
US 
Dollar 
Gutiérrez-Nieto, Serrano-
Cinca and Molinero 
(2009); Kumar and 
Gulati, 2008; Luo 
(2003); Seiford and Zhu 
(1999); Akhavein, 
Burger and Humphary 
(1997). 
Input Operating Cost 
(OC) 
Total cost of operations including 
personnel expenses, financial 
expenses and depreciations. 
US 
Dollar 
Pastor, Lovell, and 
Tulkens (2006); 
Athanassopoulos (1997); 
Akhavein, Burger and 
Humphary (1997). 
Input Number of 
Employees (E) 
Total number of employees 
including consultants and part-
timers.  
Number Gutiérrez-Nieto, 
Serrano-Cinca and 
Molinero (2009); Pastor, 
Lovell, and Tulkens 
(1999); Sherman and 
Ladino (1985); 
Athanassopoulos 
(1997); Akhavein, 
Burger and Humphary 
(1997). 
Output Total Revenue 
(R) 
Total revenue including interest 
and non-interest income 
US 
Dollar 
Seiford and Zhu (1999); 
Pastor, Lovell, and 
Tulkens (2006). 
Output Interest Income 
(I) 
Total income earned through 
interest.  
US 
Dollar 
Seiford and Zhu (1999); 
Pastor, Lovell, and 
Tulkens (2006). 
Output Gross Loan 
Portfolio (G) 
As per CGAP (2003)’s 
classification of the outstanding 
principal balance of all of an 
MFI’s outstanding loans, 
US 
Dollar 
Gutiérrez-Nieto, 
Serrano-Cinca and 
Molinero (2009); 
Athanassopoulos 
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including current, delinquent, and 
restructured loans, but not loans 
that have been written off. 
(1997);  Akhavein, 
Burger and Humphary 
(1997); Sherman and 
Ladino (1985); 
Output Number of 
Borrowers (B) 
The number of borrowers is used 
to acquire the social value 
creation by the MFIs. 
Number Gutiérrez-Nieto, 
Serrano-Cinca and 
Molinero (2009). 
Output Outreach (O) The variable is created by taking 
the ratio between average loan 
balance per borrower and per 
capita GNP.  
Number Gutiérrez-Nieto, 
Serrano-Cinca and 
Molinero (2009). 
Source: Author’s compilation 
 The performance evaluation of financial institutions needs different specifications 
so that the results can be compared (Akhavein, Berger and Humphery, 1997; Gutiérrez-
Nieto, Serrano-Cinca and Molinero, 2009).  These specifications in DEA models reflect 
the combinations of various inputs and outputs. This study investigates an overall 
performance of MFIs in Pakistan and for this purpose I evaluate financial efficiency and 
social efficiency. The financial efficiency is evaluated by three output indicators i.e. total 
revenue (TR), interest income (I), and gross loans portfolio (G). The social efficiency is 
evaluated by two output indicators i.e. number of borrowers (B), and Outreach (O). These 
DEA efficiencies are calculated under the assumption of constant returns to scale following 
the studies conducted by Charnes et al. (1978), Gutiérrez-Nieto, Serrano-Cinca and 
Molinero (2009), and Kumar and Gulati (2008). Seven different specifications are used in 
this study, first, I calculated efficiencies by using three inputs and one output for financial 
and social indicators then I used three inputs and two outputs for each class. First, R, I, and 
G for financial efficiency, and B and O for social efficiency are calculated separately than 
I used G and TR together for financial efficiency, and O and B together for social 
efficiency. The empirical results are shown in ‘empirical results’ chapter.         
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4.2 Performance evaluation of conventional microfinance in Pakistan 
through Financial Ratios Analysis (FRA) 
4.2.1 Indicators for financial performance evaluation 
 The financial indicators are used to evaluate financial performance. Data 
projection and ratio analysis are used to measure the overall performance of conventional 
microfinance in Pakistan with special reference to the South Asian microfinance industry. 
Four broad categories are used for financial performance evaluation, namely serving the 
poor, financial sustainability, efficiency; and competition.   
 
4.2.1.1 Serving the poor (Depth of microfinance)    
  The indicators to evaluate serving to poor include depth of microfinance, breadth 
of microfinance and quality of loan portfolio. The depth of microfinance exhibits how far 
the microfinance services are facilitated to poor, non-banked and deprived people. The 
common indicator is the number of active clients in a given time.  
 
4.2.1.2 Breadth of outreach  
  It is observed that the size of the loans offered by the microfinance determines the 
serving to poorest of the poor. The breadth of microfinance outreach (poverty extent) is 
measured through the ratio between average loan outstanding and GNI per capita of each 
country in corresponding years.  
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4.2.1.3 Portfolio quality  
 This measure is important to check the operational performance of the MFIs 
because an appropriate level of loan repayment is mandatory for operational stability. The 
success of business demands the protection against possible delinquency issues, and a 
failure to maintain the quality of portfolio (in terms of loan repayment) may seriously hurt 
the financial backbone of the business because it will increase the loan loss ratio. The 
quality of portfolio is measured through the PAR > 30 days i.e. portfolio at risk >30. 
 
4.2.1.4 Financial Sustainability (Returns on Equity or ROE) 
 The indicators to evaluate financial sustainability include Return on Equity, and 
Return on Assets. The ratio return on equity describe the financial position of the firm. A 
sound value of ROE exhibits a better management of financial investments. The ratio 
between net income and shareholders’ equity defines the return on net worth.  
 
4.2.1.5 Returns on Assets (ROA) 
  Another frequently used measure in financial accounting is “returns on assets” 
(ROA) which describes the net income generated by using the assets. The percentage 
between net income and total assets shows the financial soundness and profitability of the 
firm. 
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4.2.1.6 Efficiency (Operating Expenses Ratio or OER) 
 The indicators to evaluate the efficiency of microfinance, a couple of commonly 
used measures are taken on board i.e. operating expenses ratio (OER) and cost per loan. 
Besides above mentioned two measures, operational self-sufficiency (OSS) exhibits an 
overall position of the microfinance. The capital adequacy ratio (CAR) is also used. The 
OER explains how efficiently MFIs operate and do they have necessary capacity to cope 
the insolvency shocks. It also shows the efficiency of management because it compares the 
operating expenses to net income.  
 
4.2.1.7 Operational Self-Sufficiency (OSS) and Cost per loan 
  For the measurement of financial efficiency, OSS and cost per loan indicators are 
used. OSS defines how efficiently MFIs cover operating expenses by using their operating 
income and cost per loan indicator exhibits the ability of providing low cost loans to their 
customers.    
 
4.2.1.8 Capital Adequacy Ratio (CAR) 
  The capital adequacy ratio is an important indicator of efficiency as it determines 
the ability of MFIs to meet their financial obligations and absorb the risk. The ratio 
measures the amount of capital relative to weighted average assets of MFIs.  
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4.2.2 Competition 
Two mainstream approaches explain the mechanism of competition with a 
particular reference to firms’ performance in the industry. The ‘structure conduct 
performance’ (SCP) paradigm (Mason, 1939; Bain, 1951) explains that the performance of 
firms is a function of industry structure which is made up by its operating environment (the 
way buyers and sellers meet and transactions take place). According to McGee (1988) the 
SCP is not a dynamic model which takes industry in equilibrium under the strict conditions 
of perfect competition. On the contrary, ‘efficient structure hypothesis’ (ESH) measures 
efficiency on the basis of market shares. The market shares are used as a proxy and their 
links with profitability are determined. Smirlock (1985) asserts that ESH implicitly 
presumes that the market concentration provides a market power irrespective of the number 
of firms in the market. Market shares reallocate from inefficient firms to efficient firms 
that means it demands the firms to keep efficient in order to remain in a competitive 
environment. The firms can pay the price of being inefficient by losing the market shares 
which will force them exit after reaching the shut-down point. Catena (2009) asserts that 
highly competitive environments force inefficient firms to lose the business while 
remaining firms in the market implicitly reallocate the shares of losing firms.    
 
4.2.2.1 Panzar and Rosse (PR) model (H-Statistics) 
  Competition can directly be measured through the Lerner Index (introduced by 
AP Lerner, 1934)  in which ‘price-cost-markup’ (PCM) approach is used but the problem 
is that PCM estimation requires a detailed data of all costs and prices which sometimes 
difficult to obtain. Therefore, alternative method of non-structural model like Herfindahl-
86 
 
Hirschman Index (HHI) is used which assesses the competition through market 
concentration but it has some accuracy issues that give misleading results. Another non-
structural method ‘Panzar and Rosse’ (PR, 1987) has vastly been used in ‘new empirical 
industrial organization’ (NEIO) literature. The PR model uses a reduced form revenue 
equation with factor input prices. One of the main benefits of using PR model is that it 
gives a parsimonious estimation and doesn’t depend on large data set that usually requires 
in other models like HHI. 
The empirical relationship of PR model is written as:  
  
 (1) 
 
The basic propositions of the PR model assert that a sum of factor price elasticities 
of reduced form revenue would have either a negative value or zero in case of monopoly 
because an increase in factor prices creates negative implications on monopolist’s revenue. 
In contrast, a positive H value indicates the intensity of competition in the industry. If the 
H-value goes higher at positive streak (from 0 to 1) the competition becomes better. The 
H-value peaked up to unity will indicate a perfect competition in the market. The second 
proposition of PR model explains that a sum of the factor price elasticities in the long run 
competitive environment must be equal to unity implying that a change in factor prices 
also changes the marginal cost with same magnitude. Therefore, to remain in a competitive 
environment, firms need to adjust the quantity being a price taker in the competition. Table-
4.4 shows the interpretation of H-statistics. 
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Table 4.4: Interpretation of H-statistics 
Source: Author’s compilation 
 
 Microfinance has now become a subset of formal financial system. Thus, there is 
a chance that it will be affected by the global financial crises. To test this hypothesis we 
empirically investigate the implications of ‘global financial crisis’ (GFC, 2007-08) on 
microfinance in South Asia. The following model with dummy variables is established to 
get the impact of GFC (2007-08): 
   
(2) 
 
 To check the robustness of the model(1) specified above,  two other specifications 
are also applied by replacing the dependent variables with interest income and ROA; while  
keeping the independent variables same as in equation (1). 
 
4.2.2.2 Boone Indicator (2004) 
In contrast to PCM, the Boone Indicator uses ‘Relative Profits Difference’ (RPD) 
to measure the competition between the firms. It provides a direct link between profits and 
firms’ efficiency i.e. in competition, firms need to maintain a high level of efficiency to 
Equilibrium Test 
Equilibrium Disequilibrium 
H=1 0<H<1 H≤ 0 
Perfect Competition Monopolistic 
competition free  
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remain in the business to keep their market shares intact which could be reallocated to other 
firms if the business efficiency drops down. It also imposes a rigorous condition on less 
efficient firms to increase their efficiency level to remain in the competitive industry. The 
competition is measured by comparing the relative profits of the firms with the level of 
their efficiency. Nevertheless, RPD primarily assumes that the markets contain 
homogenous goods, the homogenous working conditions prevail in the markets, the 
exogenous factors could not affect efficiency levels and the marginal cost is same across 
business units.  The Boone Indicator can be written as: 
  
(3) 
Where β1 is expected to be a negative value because marginal cost has a negative 
relationship with profits, implying that an increase in marginal costs will decrease the 
profits of the firms in a competitive environment. Consequently, a significantly higher 
value of β1 will indicate the intensity of competition in the market. The equation (3) 
requires marginal costs of the firms which is not directly observable; therefore, I use the 
following Translog Cost function to derive the marginal cost: 
 
 
(4) 
      (t = 1, 2, 3…T),   (Pi = L, K, F), ( jiij   ) 
(ln C represents log of total cost of production, ln pi, ln pj are log of prices 
and ln q is log of output, time is measured through t. Whereas,  , and 
are estimation parameters).  
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The following equation for marginal cost is derived after some mathematical substitutions: 
 
 (5) 
 
4.2.2.3 Data and Variables  
To investigate competition in microfinance I use Panzar-and-Rosse and Boone 
Indicator models with fixed-effects and random-effects regressions. The dataset is 
constructed by compiling the data of 354 MFIs located in six countries of South Asia for 
the period 2003~2011.  The data are collected from ‘microfinance information exchange’ 
(MIX) which is a U.S. based data service provider. Three variables for factor costs are 
calculated as the ratio of capital expenses to net fixed asset, interest expenses paid for 
borrowings, and personnel expenses to number of employees. Total assets include tangible 
fixed assets and non-fixed assets. Interest income includes interest earned on loans and 
total income includes interest income plus non-interest income. The proxy variable to 
measure the size of MFIs is number of employees. The ratio of equity-to-assets is 
calculated as total equity to total assets and the proxy variable for borrowers indebtedness 
is loan loss rate. The dummy variables are also used for scale, self-sufficiency, regulatory 
framework and legal status. All values are represented in the US dollar except indicated 
otherwise.  
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4.3 Social Performance Evaluation 
4.3.1 Indicators for Social Performance Evaluation 
 The analysis of social performance indicators is based on the survey reports 
collected by the Pakistan Microfinance Network for 27 MPs at the end of 2014. 
 
4.3.1.1 Target Customers 
 This indicator defines the priority areas of microfinance institutions. It has the 
classification of women customers, rural area focused, urban area focused, and adjacent 
and youth customers as the priority customers.  
 
4.3.1.2 Social Objectives 
 This indicator explains the main goals of microfinance institutions like poverty 
alleviation, employment generation, initiation of entrepreneurship, health improvement, 
gender equality and women empowerment, improvement of water and sanitation services, 
and enhancement of financial accessibility.  
 
4.3.1.3 Poverty Alleviation 
 This indicator shows the target clients of microfinance institutions. It exhibits the 
core objective of microfinance as its classification suggest i.e. ultra poor, moderate poor, 
or low income poor. 
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4.3.1.4 Interest Rate Calculation Methods 
 This indicator is important to determine the social performance of microfinance 
institutions because the interest rate calculation derives the repayment schemes of the 
borrowings. It is pertinent to note that different calculations give different repayments 
incidence of interest on borrowers.  
 
4.4 Survey of people’s perceptions of conventional and Islamic 
microfinance in Pakistan 
 In order to examine the people’s perceptions of conventional and Islamic 
microfinance, the study conducted a sample survey in Karachi, Pakistan.  The survey 
covered all six districts in Karachi, a mega city with nearly 17 million population, or 
roughly nine percent of Pakistan’s total population of 200 million, Karachi is the capital of 
Sindh province (World Population Review, 2016). The contribution of Karachi in 
manufacturing GDP of Sindh province is about 30 percent and the percentage share of 
Sindh in Pakistan’s GDP is 28-30%. Administratively it has 6 districts, 18 towns, and 178 
union councils (Karachi Metropolitan Corporation, 2016). The city is diversified in terms 
of citizens as it shares the population of all provinces of Pakistan. The city is chosen to 
draw our samples because of its diversified nature and the representation of all castes and 
culture of entire Pakistan. 
 
 A pilot survey was initially conducted in the district central, Karachi.  After a 
careful scrutiny of the responses, a full-scale survey was carried out during the period July-
October 2014.  A sample size of 420 respondents (70 respondents per district) was set, 
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allowing for a sampling error of plus or minus 5 percent, and a confidence level of 95 
percent.  Due to invalidated survey responses, however, the final sample size of 332 
respondents was obtained.  Respondents were selected using a street-intercept technique, a 
method commonly used in market research (Butler, 2008).  To ensure that the sample 
would represent the variability in the population, interviewers made sure to conduct the 
interviews in various locations in each district.  Six highly qualified enumerators (one for 
each district) helped out in data collection.   
 
 The questionnaire included five sections, with the first three sections consisting of 
30 close-ended questions and the last two sections containing 15 items using a five-point 
Likert-type scale.  The responses taken from the surveys were recorded in SPSS 16.0 and 
assigned the codes accordingly. The data projection technique was used to analyze the data 
by using Microsoft excel, SPSS 16.0, and E-Views 8.0. 
  
4.5 Probability of Successful implementation of Islamic Microfinance 
in Pakistan 
 This section empirically examines the probability of successful implementation of 
Islamic microfinance in Pakistan. For this purpose, a linear probability model could be 
used but the problem in using such model is that the probabilities could not be limited 
between the lower bound of 0 and upper bound of 1 (figure 4.1) because of the functional 
form of ‘linear probability model’ (LPM). The functional form can be written down as: 
𝑃𝑖 = 𝑝(𝑦𝑖 = 1) = 𝛽𝑜 + 𝛽1𝑥2𝑖 + 𝛽2𝑥3𝑖 + 𝛽3𝑥4𝑖 + … . . +𝛽𝑘𝑥𝑘𝑖 + 𝜀𝑖   ...... (1) 
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And for binary random variable 
P (Y=1 / X) is equal to E (Y/ X)  
 
Figure 4.1: The difference between Linear Probability Model and Logit Models 
Source: Iqbal (2012) 
 
The LPM has some serious issues as Iqbal (2012) explains; the dependent variable 
in LPM takes only a value of either zero or one. The explanatory variables and stochastic 
random errors are also taken an only value from the two, therefore, the assumption of 
normal distribution for the disturbance term is violated. Also, as the error term 
systematically changes, the chances of heteroscedasticity increase. For this reason, the 
heteroscedasticity-robust standard errors are preferably used in limited probability models. 
The alternative approaches of Logit and Probit are preferred to avoid such estimation 
issues, therefore, this study uses Probit model instead of linear probability model. The 
functional form of Probit is written down as: 
𝑃(𝑦𝑖 = 1/𝑥𝑖) =  𝜑(𝑥
′
𝑖𝛽) …… (2) 
(where 𝜑is cumulative density function) 
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4.5.1 Data 
 We use the questionnaire survey data which were collected to ascertain the people’s 
perception about conventional microfinance and Islamic microfinance in Pakistan. The 
data is primary in nature and the data collection was held in July to October’2014, in all 
districts of Karachi, Pakistan. A total 332 survey questionnaires are used to gather the data 
for this study.  
 
4.5.2 Variables 
 This section assesses the probability of success for the implementation of Islamic 
microfinance in Pakistan. The likelihood is investigated by using the variables that 
determine the awareness of Islamic microfinance in our respondents. For the independent 
variables, five categorical variables are transformed into dummy variables by assigning the 
values of 1 for ‘agree’ and ‘strongly agree’ Likert-scale categories, and 0 otherwise. The 
dependent variable ‘success’ is transformed into dummy by using the variables that gives 
the awareness that Islamic microfinance is a better tool for poverty alleviation.  
 
4.5.3 Model 
 The following model is developed for this study: 
𝑃 (𝑆𝑥𝑖 = 1/𝑥𝑖) =  𝜑{(𝐼𝑀𝐹𝐼𝐸𝑀𝑅. 𝛽1 +  𝐼𝑀𝐹𝐼𝐺𝑂𝑉. 𝛽2 + 𝐼𝑀𝐹𝐼𝐻𝐸𝐿𝑃 . 𝛽3 + 𝐼𝑀𝐹𝑆𝐻 . 𝛽4 +
𝐼𝑀𝐹𝑈𝑁 . 𝛽5 + 𝜀1)) 
 
Where, 
 
Sx is 1 in case of positive response that IMFI serves poorest of the poor and 0 otherwise. 
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IMFI.EMR is 1 in case of positive response that IMFI emerges due to Islamic Banks and 0 
otherwise. 
IMFI.GOV is 1 in case of awareness that the government support can catalyze the poverty 
alleviation efforts through IMFI and 0 otherwise. 
IMFI.HELP is 1 in case of awareness that it IMFI lifts poor out of the poverty and 0 
otherwise. 
IMFI.SH is 1 in case of awareness that IMFI works within Shariah boundaries and 0 
otherwise.  
IMFI.UN is 1 in case of awareness that IMFI doesn’t use unethical practice and 0 
otherwise. 
MFI.POOR is 1 in case of awareness that conventional MFI serves the poorest of the poor. 
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CHAPTER 5 
RESULTS AND DISCUSSION 
 
 The empirical findings presented in this chapter are based on the methodological 
framework of this dissertation that is divided into four segments. The first segment 
evaluates the role of microfinance in poverty alleviation in Pakistan through data 
envelopment analysis (DEA). Financial and social efficiencies are calculated through DEA 
to ascertain the overall efficiency of MFIs in Pakistan. The performance evaluation is also 
conducted through financial ratios analysis (FRA). Segment two explores the perceived 
differences between conventional microfinance and Islamic microfinance based on 
primary data gathered through a survey conducted in Pakistan from July to October 2014 
which sought to ascertain the peoples’ perceptions about conventional and Islamic 
microfinance. Segment three proposes a newly developed model for Islamic microfinance 
for poverty alleviation, and section four investigates the probability of successful 
implementation of Islamic microfinance in Pakistan. The empirical results are presented in 
order of investigation.  
 
5.1 Performance evaluation of conventional microfinance in Pakistan 
through Data Envelopment Analysis (DEA) 
 The financial and social efficiencies are calculated through data envelopment 
analysis (DEA). To keep the discussion simple, a mnemonic notation was used. The first 
letter of the notation contains the type of efficiency, i.e. F for financial efficiency, S for 
social efficiency and O for overall efficiency, and the second part exhibits the output 
variables, i.e. R for total revenue, I for interest income, G for gross loan portfolio, B for 
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number of borrowers, and O for outreach. The names of MFIs are also reduced to their first 
three letters. Table 5.1 exhibits the descriptive statistics of the variables. 
 
Table 5.1: Descriptive Statistics of variables  
Source: Author’s compilation 
 
Table 5.2 displays the Pearson’s coefficient correlation matrix between the 
efficiency scores for financial and social specifications. The Pearson’s coefficient 
correlation between the social efficiency and the financial efficiency is 0.510, and is 
significant at the 1% level of significance. These two efficiencies are associated with each 
other suggests that both efficiencies are equally important in order to obtain the double-
bottom line objectives. The positive correlation between the number of borrowers and 
outreach (0.730) is also significant implying that a higher outreach increases the probability 
of more borrowers.  
 
 
 
 ASSETS COST EMP TOT_INC INT_INC GLP BRWRS OUTRCH 
 Mean  18670884  9620807.  504.5630  3278851.  3212653.  14938906  68719.90  0.316031 
 Median  4682307.  2252579.  191.0000  999592.0  999592.0  3326817.  23730.00  0.210000 
 Maximum  1.27E+08  61809315  3731.000  22028321  21532907  2.86E+08  565863.0  6.042700 
 Minimum  70424.00  65594.00  12.00000  0.000000  9866.000  98435.00  84.00000  0.000000 
 Std. Dev.  28185608  13448299  710.1675  5326933.  5175358.  33117404  110668.8  0.560633 
 Skewness  1.817410  1.792104  2.137901  2.112369  2.115375  5.194640  2.397860  8.330740 
 Kurtosis  5.308218  5.636122  7.525731  6.410869  6.426153  37.87129  8.117274  83.03704 
         
 Jarque-Bera  104.2863  111.3508  218.0516  165.8387  166.7124  7447.184  276.6680  37594.87 
 Probability  0.000000  0.000000  0.000000  0.000000  0.000000  0.000000  0.000000  0.000000 
         
 Sum  2.52E+09  1.30E+09  68116.00  4.43E+08  4.34E+08  2.02E+09  9277187.  42.66424 
 Sum Sq. Dev.  1.06E+17  2.42E+16  67581279  3.80E+15  3.59E+15  1.47E+17  1.64E+12  42.11752 
         
 Observations  135  135  135  135  135  135  135  135 
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Table 5.2: Pearson’s coefficient correlation matrix between efficiency scores 
 
Specification S_B  S_O  F_G  F_R  F_I  F_GR  S_BO  
S_B  1.0000 - - - - - - 
S_O  0.7309* 1.0000 - - - - - 
F_G  0.8086* 0.6789* 1.0000 - - - - 
F_R  0.6631* 0.6809* 0.6535* 1.0000 - - - 
F_I  0.6665* 0.6753* 0.6820* 0.8605* 1.0000 - - 
F_GR  0.0623** 0.1094 0.1589*** 0.3923* 0.3029* 1.0000 - 
S_BO  0.2391** 0.3722* 0.1432*** 0.3130* 0.1973** 0.5107* 1.0000 
*, **, *** show significant at 1%, 5%, and 10% level of significance 
  
Table 5.3 shows the efficiency scores obtained through different specifications. 
Three inputs (total assets, employees, and total costs) are used to obtain these efficiencies. 
The mnemonic notation of variables is used to classify the efficiencies with input-output 
combinations, i.e. S-B stands for Social efficiency with number of Borrowers as output 
variable, S-O stands for Social efficiency with Outreach as output variable etc.  
Table 5.3: Efficiency scores through different specifications 
 
MFI's 
Name 
Social Efficiency Financial Efficiency  Financial Social 
Mean 
Efficiency Three Inputs Single Output 
Three Inputs Two 
Outputs 
S-B S-O F-G F-R F-I F-GR S-BO Overall 
AKH 0.021 0.021 0.030 0.509 0.615 0.592 0.885 0.739 
APN 0.023 0.073 0.120 0.607 0.617 0.599 0.968 0.784 
ASA 0.033 0.081 0.033 0.387 1.000 0.165 0.141 0.153 
ASH 0.011 0.029 0.052 0.190 0.188 0.423 0.710 0.567 
BRA 0.003 0.022 0.031 1.000 0.412 0.673 1.000 0.837 
BUK 0.001 0.002 0.024 0.143 0.142 0.866 1.000 0.933 
CSC 0.016 0.016 0.049 0.265 0.265 0.440 0.371 0.406 
CWC 0.013 1.000 0.064 0.324 0.330 0.445 1.000 0.723 
DAM 0.021 0.031 0.045 0.326 0.326 0.390 0.591 0.491 
FFO 1.000 0.321 1.000 0.764 1.000 0.853 1.000 0.927 
FMF 0.030 0.346 0.073 0.526 0.526 0.553 1.000 0.777 
JWS 0.072 0.166 0.252 0.587 0.587 0.599 0.440 0.520 
KAB 0.053 0.452 0.400 1.000 0.675 1.000 0.978 0.989 
KAF 0.036 0.861 0.041 0.456 0.469 0.482 1.000 0.741 
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KHU 0.027 1.000 0.081 0.507 0.507 0.525 1.000 0.763 
NRS 0.028 1.000 0.038 0.437 0.437 0.462 1.000 0.731 
ORA 0.023 0.023 0.047 0.336 0.336 0.212 0.099 0.156 
ORI 0.021 0.079 0.041 0.327 0.327 0.340 0.336 0.338 
POM 0.033 0.175 0.216 0.576 0.576 0.977 0.985 0.981 
PRS 0.054 0.216 0.162 0.925 0.925 0.979 1.000 0.990 
RCD 0.011 0.029 0.026 0.249 0.291 0.563 0.955 0.759 
ROZ 0.041 0.041 0.155 0.561 0.561 0.469 1.000 0.735 
SAF 0.015 0.038 0.041 0.280 0.280 0.461 0.704 0.583 
SRS 0.018 0.019 0.130 0.330 0.351 0.782 0.563 0.673 
SUN 0.035 0.035 0.048 1.000 0.436 0.532 1.000 0.766 
TMF 0.007 0.028 0.018 0.304 0.309 0.232 0.814 0.523 
TRD 0.013 0.044 0.057 0.311 0.389 0.287 0.304 0.296 
Source: Author’s compilation  
Figure 5.1 exhibits the efficiency plots for all MFIs according to their social and 
financial efficiency scores. The upper right corner shows the MFIs with highest efficiency 
scores in both classes, i.e. social and financial. 
 
 
 
Figure 5.1: Social Efficiency against Financial Efficiency 
Source: Author’s compilation on the basis of DEA efficiency scores 
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 It is pertinent to mention that not a single MFI achieved a full-fledged efficiency or 
the peak of double-bottom line. KAB is leading from the front in highest financial 
efficiency but less perfect in social efficiency. Similarly, a few MFIs have achieved social 
efficiency but didn’t get high scores in financial efficiency like BRP, BUK, CWC, FFO, 
FFM, KAF, KHU, NRF, PRS, and SUN. The MFIs that perform on both fronts (BUK, 
FFO, KAB, POM, and PRS) can be called as industry leaders. Figure 5.2 depicts the 
situation of overall efficiency scores. The MFIs in the lower right quadrant moderately 
performed in financial and social efficiencies and the MFIs in the lower left corner 
performed below the average on both financial and social fronts. In order to stay in the 
microfinance market they should improve or strengthen their operational settings and 
improve their efficiencies. Out of 27 MFIs only a single unit (KAB) is shown to be a full-
fledged financially efficient institution and only 11 are full-fledged socially efficient MFIs. 
The overall efficiency picture is shown in Figure 5.2.     
 
Figure 5.2: Overall Efficiency of MFIs in Pakistan 
Source: Author’s compilation on the basis of DEA efficiency scores 
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Out of 27 MFIs, not a single MFI achieved 100% overall efficiency or the double-
bottom line objectives during the period under consideration. PRS, POM, KAB, BUK, and 
FFO performed quite superbly with overall efficiency scores of 0.990, 0.981, 0.989, 0.933, 
and 0.927 respectively. The lack of efficiency might be the result of a low level competition 
in microfinance industry in Pakistan (see detailed analysis on competition in Section 5.2.2). 
The competition-efficiency hypothesis asserts that a higher competition leads to a higher 
efficiency (Schaeck and Čihák, 2008; Jiménez, Lopez, and Saurina, 2013).  In order to 
increase portfolio of borrowers, the MFIs relax the borrowing constraints; Hay and Liu 
(1997) (as cited in Berger and Hannan (1998) noted that under the Cournot competition 
there is an additional incentive of more market shares.  
 
5.2 Performance evaluation of conventional microfinance in Pakistan 
through Financial Ratios Analysis (FRA) 
5.2.1 Financial Performance Indicators 
Table 5.4 shows the financial performance indicators of microfinance in Pakistan 
for the period 2003-2014. The shaded columns show the industry averages for 
microfinance in South Asia.  
Table 5.4: Financial Performance indicators of microfinance in Pakistan 
Fiscal 
Year 
Pakistan  Average for South Asian Countries 
OSS 
Cost 
per 
loan  
(in 
US$) 
OER 
 (%) 
ROA 
Depth of 
Outreach 
(%) 
CAR 
 (%) 
OSS 
Cost 
per 
loan  
(in 
US$) 
OER 
 (%) 
ROA 
CAR 
 (%) 
2003 82% 5.02 18.60 -0.97 10.00 47.87 116% 5.90 24.90 -5.10 22.89 
2004 79% 29.18 21.53 -2.64 13.00 38.89 113% 9.70 23.74 -5.38 23.96 
2005 172% -30.11 20.16 -20.75 14.00 31.10 124% 13.50 19.86 -4.21 17.72 
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Source: Author’s calculation based on Microfinance Information Exchange’s data 
  
Table 5.4 shows the strength of microfinance in Pakistan where operational self-
sufficiency has been increasing for the last six years and MPs in Pakistan are successful to 
maintain the average OSS greater than 100 percent for the period under consideration. 
However, it is lesser than the industry average (117%) of the South Asian microfinance. 
The main reason for a higher industry average in South Asia is the performance of three 
outstanding countries (Bangladesh, India and Sri Lanka) which maintained the average 
OSS for the same period as 125%, 111%, and 117% respectively. The average cost per 
loan for the microfinance in Pakistan is also higher (US$31.25) than the average in the 
region (US$26.81). It can be argued that the cost per loan is affected by high operating 
expenses ratio in Pakistan as it could only be maintained at 21.25 (on average) which is the 
second highest in the region after Afghanistan (37.82) and higher than the South Asian 
industry average (17.09). The average ROA for Pakistan is negative (-2.86) but it shows a 
positive trend in the last few years (since 2011). However, the country’s average ROA is 
lower than the average ROA in the region (-0.95). The average for the depth of outreach is 
11.97% which shows that on average, the percentage of serving the poorest is around 12% 
in the gross loan portfolio. Interestingly, these ratios are in single digits for the last few 
2006 88% 34.67 22.69 -1.80 17.00 31.15 117% 14.40 17.34 -0.52 17.31 
2007 93% 39.02 23.59 -1.70 15.00 24.06 125% 24.29 15.75 0.21 15.53 
2008 63% 29.48 19.88 -12.52 13.00 21.94 119% 24.88 15.25 -1.38 15.52 
2009 93% 36.88 24.09 -1.50 22.00 24.83 110% 28.88 15.99 0.39 15.37 
2010 97% 39.22 15.38 -0.03 15.00 1.40 121% 35.68 13.74 1.15 12.25 
2011 103% 41.10 22.89 0.25 8.00 22.08 122% 37.18 14.39 -0.32 16.31 
2012 110% 37.27 21.44 1.77 7.00 20.84 113% 28.04 12.54 -0.56 15.70 
2013 118% 36.78 20.31 2.92 7.00 21.28 113% 53.13 16.29 2.50 21.81 
2014 117% 76.11 25.69 2.63 4.00 18.30 109% 46.16 15.34 1.85 20.13 
Average 101% 31.22 21.35 -2.86 11.97 25.31 117% 26.81 17.09 -0.95 17.88 
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years and stand at merely 4% in 2014 which shows an imbalance between financial 
sustainability and social outreach. Regarding financial strength, the capital adequacy ratio 
(CAR) of 25.31% (on average) is highest in the region and higher than the average CAR 
of the South Asian microfinance (17.88%). Although the financial strength of microfinance 
in Pakistan is apparent, the element of capital under-utilization cannot be ignored. 
According to Basel-II guidelines, the financial units should maintain the CAR at 8% to 
12% and above. The overall picture of financial performance shows that microfinance in 
Pakistan did not perform convincingly well as compared with other countries in the region. 
The reported figures of PMR (2014) show that GLP has increased by 31%, from 46.6 
billion rupees in 2013 to 61.1 billion rupees in 2014, but the largest share of GLP belongs 
to MFBs (61%), followed by MFIs (21%) and RSPs (19%). The market is highly 
concentrated as around 82% of GLP is shared among nine MPs. Regarding the lending 
methodology, a majority of MPs use group lending (68%) while the individual lending is 
just (32%) but most of the MFBs prefer to use individual lending due to procedural 
leniency. The ratio between male and female borrower is 58% to 42% and the split between 
rural-urban is 57%-43% with an increasing trend of urban lending. The majority of MFBs 
are urban-focused and expand their outreach in urban peripheries. They enjoy a lion’s share 
of overall profit in the industry (47%) followed by MFIs (25%) and RSPs (28%).  
 
5.2.2 Competition  
Competition is first assessed through a PR model, then Boone Indicator is employed 
to measure the intensity and evolution of competition over time. Next, the H-statistics 
(collected through PR model) is used to compute the partial factors of competition intensity. 
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The empirical estimation is based on panel regression instead of ‘ordinary least squares’ 
(OLS) to a cross-section data of 354 MFIs for the period 2003-2011. The summary 
statistics of variables is presented in table 5.5. 
 
Table 5.5: Summary statistics of variables 
Source: Author’s compilation 
 
Description 
Varia
bles 
Formation Unit Mean Median Std. Dev. Skewness 
Total Assets A Total Assets US$ 18864184 1774669 87608884 10.200 
Output Q Gross Loan Portfolio US$ 16706326 1497704 71028629 8.092 
Total Cost TC 
Operating Cost+ Non-
Operating Cost 
US$ 6721432 611029 29635435 8.83 
Cost of Capital K 
Capital Cost-to-Net 
Fixed Assets 
- -2.284 -0.150 28.386 -4.890 
Equity/ Asset Ratio E 
Total Equity / Total 
Assets 
- 2.369 0.150 12.027 5.319 
Unit Fund Cost F 
Interest Cost/ Total 
Borrowing 
- 0.099 0.080 0.143 10.696 
Interest Income/ 
Assets 
IR 
Interest Income / Total 
Assets 
- 0.168 0.140 0.183 7.246 
Unit Labour Cost L 
Personnel Cost/ No. of 
Employees 
- 2062.544 1667.930 1421.751 1.804 
Loan Loss Rate LL Loan Loss Rate - 0.434 0.020 2.983 29.638 
Total Income/ 
Total Assets 
TR 
Total Income/ Total 
Assets 
- 0.273 0.210 0.269 7.092 
Returns on Assets ROA Returns on Assets % -0.020 0.020 0.299 -12.260 
Returns on Equity ROE Returns on Equity % 0.272 0.120 5.100 31.707 
Economic Growth GDP GDP Growth % 6.749 6.240 3.320 1.891 
Size of the Firm S No. of Personnel No. 527.000 84.000 2174.699 8.855 
Self Sufficient SS Dummy 1=Self-sufficient; 0=Otherwise 
Regulated R Dummy 1=Regulated; 0=Otherwise 
Scale S Dummy 1=Small; 2=Medium; 3=Large 
Legal Status LG Dummy 1=NGO; 2=Bank; 3=NBFI;4=Otherwise 
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One of the main advantages of using panel regression is that it gives more accurate 
inferences of parameters by keeping more variability in the sample with high degree of 
freedom. The panel regression is quite appropriate to test the dynamic relationships due to 
a better control for omitting variable bias (Hsiao, 2007). Three different models are used 
to assess competition with different dependent variables, i.e. total income, interest income 
and ROA. ‘Fixed effects’ (FE) estimation is employed based on significant rejection of 
null hypothesis by the Hausman Test that the ‘random effects’ (RE) estimation is consistent 
and efficient. The regression results are displayed in Table 5.6.  
 
Table 5.6: Regression results of the competition in microfinance sector in South Asia 
Independent 
Variables 
Dependent variables 
TR IR ROA 
Fixed 
Effects 
Random 
Effects 
Fixed 
Effects 
Random 
Effects 
Fixed 
Effects 
Random 
Effects 
Intercept 
-5.464* 
(0.528) 
-4.973* 
(0.397) 
-4.544* 
(0.412) 
-4.555* 
(0.333) 
-0.499* 
(0.143) 
-0.124 
(0.103) 
Log(L) 
0.179* 
(0.054) 
0.179* 
(0.039) 
0.133* 
(0.042) 
0.167* 
(0.03) 
0.017 
(0.014) 
-0.017 
(0.010) 
Log(K) 
-0.046* 
(0.018) 
-0.036* 
(0.015) 
0.007 
(0.014) 
0.005 
(0.012) 
-0.008 
(0.005) 
-0.009 
(0.010) 
Log(F) 
0.400* 
(0.060) 
0.221* 
(0.045) 
0.270* 
(0.047) 
0.153* 
(0.037) 
0.019 
(0.016) 
0.010 
(0.011) 
Log(Q) 
0.125* 
(0.017) 
0.101* 
(0.014) 
0.102* 
(0.013) 
0.086* 
(0.011) 
0.001 
(0.004) 
0.001 
(0.004) 
Log(A) 
0.055* 
(0.021) 
0.037* 
(0.018) 
-0.005 
(0.016) 
-0.015 
(0.015) 
0.023* 
(0.005) 
0.013* 
(0.004) 
Log(S) 
0.208* 
(0.033) 
0.113* 
(0.026) 
0.190* 
(0.025) 
0.141* 
(0.021) 
0.008 
(0.009) 
-0.0007 
(0.009) 
 0.69 0.15 0.75 0.13 0.61 0.17 
H statistic 0.533 0.270 0.410 0.325 0.028 0.010 
Wald statistic 
H=1 
-0.466 
(0.0756) 
-0.635 
(0.0582) 
0.058 
(0.059) 
-0.672 
(0.0486) 
-0.971 
(0.020) 
-1.016 
(0.015) 
Wald statistic 
H=0 
0.533 
(0.0758) 
0.0364 
(0.0582) 
0.411 
(0.059) 
0.327 
(0.0486) 
0.028 
(0.020) 
-1.016 
(0.015) 
Hausman 
Test 
- 
142.300 
[0.000] 
- 
90.735 
[0.000] 
- 
36.961 
[0.000] 
2
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Note: Log (L), log (K) & log (F) represent log of unit cost of labor, capital and fund, while log (Q) log (A) 
& log(S) represent log of output, assets and size respectively. We used ‘fixed effects’ (FE) panel 
estimation on the basis of Hausman Test. ( ) represent standard errors, [ ] show p-values & *, **, *** 
exhibit significance level at 1%, 5% and 10% respectively. Source: Author’s compilation. 
 
The Boone Indicator model is also applied to capture the evolution of competition 
with the passage of time because we assume that competition is not a time invariant 
phenomenon. The empirical results confirm that the competition has intensified in the 
South Asian microfinance during the period under consideration. The results for the 
evolution of competition are shown in Table 5.7.  
 
Table 5.7:   Evolution of competition over time (Boone Indicator) 
Note: The table represents the estimates of the Boone indicator. The dependent variable, log 
(ROA) is regressed on marginal cost derived from the Translog cost function in equation (4) using 
‘fixed effects’ (FE) estimation on the basis of Hausman test. Source: Author’s compilation.  
 
The empirical analysis also measures the impacts of GFC (2007-08) on 
microfinance in South Asia. Fixed Effect estimation is used on the basis of Chow test which 
Observations 1483 1483 1485 1485 1468 1468 
Years / 
Country 
Afghanistan Bangladesh India Nepal Pakistan Sri Lanka 
2003 -0.0411 -0.0221 -0.0231 -0.0412 -0.0323 -0.0472 
2004 -0.0421 0.0183 0.0172 -0.0007 0.0075 -0.0073 
2005 -0.0433 0.0173 0.0163 -0.0008 0.0073 -0.0075 
2006 -0.0391 0.0222 0.0201 0.0038 0.0113 -0.0035 
2007 -0.0381 0.0224 0.0212 0.0039 0.0120 -0.0027 
2008 -0.0372 0.0232 0.0223 0.0046 0.0128 -0.0020 
2009 -0.0392 0.0221 0.0212 0.0035 0.0117 -0.0031 
2010 -0.0386 0.0231 0.0214 0.0041 0.0123 -0.0026 
2011 -0.0392 0.0223 0.0212 0.0031 0.0113 -0.0035 
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gives the confirmation of structural breakup in the dataset. The estimates of Chow test and 
the testing of competition are presented in Table 5.8.  
 
Table 5.8: CHOW test estimation and competition 
TESTING FOR COMPETITION (H-STATISTICS) 
H0 = β1+ β2+ β3 = 1 (Perfect Competition) 
H1 = β1+ β2+ β3 ≠ 1 
Dependent 
variable 
TR IR ROA 
Period Pre GFC Post GFC Pre GFC Post GFC Pre GFC Post GFC 
Test 
statistics 
0.317 0.460 0.272 0.374 0.245 0.015 
Result 
Reject  
H0 
Reject H0 
Reject 
H0 
Reject  
H0 
Reject  
H0 
Reject H0 
Market 
Structure 
Monopolistic Competition Monopolistic Competition Monopolistic Competition 
ALTERNATIVE TEST (Wald test of zero restriction) 
H0 = H = 1 (Perfect Competition) 
Test 
statistics 
982.428 995.395 1554.999 1467.767 1574.595 12113.3 
p-values (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Result 
Reject  
H0 
Reject H0 
Reject 
H0 
Reject  
H0 
Reject  
H0 
Reject H0 
Market 
Structure 
Monopolistic Competition Monopolistic Competition Monopolistic Competition 
H0 = H = 0 (Monopoly) 
Test 
statistics 
04.759 19.976 6.787 12.041 5.580 1.009 
p-values (0.002) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.387) 
Result 
Reject  
H0 
Reject H0 
Reject 
H0 
Reject  
H0 
Reject  
H0 
AcceptH0 
Market 
Structure 
Monopolistic Competition Monopolistic Competition 
Monopolistic 
Competition 
Monopoly 
Note: The H statistics and the Wald tests reject the null hypothesis of perfect competition and monopoly 
before and after GFC in all three models except in model 3 where the Wald test shows the market structure 
as monopoly. Source: Author’s compilation. 
 
The empirical results suggest that the intensity of competition is increased after 
(GFC). Hence, it may be argued that business opportunities in post GFC period attracted 
new MFIs to enter with high expectations of potential profits. New MFIs choose to 
penetrate in established markets to minimize their startup cost. Although this strategy 
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provides them a better screening opportunities without incurring additional costs, it also 
increases the probability of double-dipping and default. The regression results of Pre-GFC 
and post-GFC estimates are presented in Table 5.9.  
 
Table 5.9: Regression results for the impact of GFC (2007-08) on microfinance 
Note: Log (L), log (K) & log (F) represent log of unit cost of labor, capital and funds, while log (Q) 
log(A) & log(S) represent log of output, assets and size respectively. We used ‘fixed effects’ (FE) 
Explanatory 
Variables 
Dependent Variables 
TR IR ROA 
Pre GFC Post GFC Pre GFC Post GFC Pre GFC Post GFC 
Intercept 
-4.831* 
(0.567) 
-4.447* 
(1.092) 
-3.568* 
(0.445) 
-4.438* 
(0.801) 
-0.369* 
(0.158) 
-0.605* 
(0.285) 
FD No 
0.384 
(0.455) 
No 
-0.870* 
(0.356) 
No 
-0.236 
(0.127) 
Log(L) 
0.092 
(0.059) 
0.169 
(0.097) 
0.028 
(0.046) 
0.140 
(0.076) 
0.226 
(0.016) 
0.006 
(0.027) 
Log(L).FD No 
0.076 
(0.038) 
No 
0.112* 
(0.030) 
No 
0.005 
(0.010) 
Log(K) 
-0.0002 
(0.019) 
-0.083 
(0.038) 
0.023 
(0.015) 
-0.007* 
(0.030) 
-0.011* 
(0.005) 
-0.006* 
(0.014) 
Log(K).FD No 
-0.082 
(0.018) 
No 
-0.031* 
(0.014) 
No 
0.005 
(0.005) 
Log(F) 
0.225* 
(0.068) 
0.374* 
(0.122) 
0.221* 
(0.054) 
0.241* 
(0.095) 
0.030 
(0.019) 
0.015 
(0.034) 
Log(F).FD No 
-0.082* 
(0.018) 
No 
0.020 
(0.041) 
No 
-0.015 
(0.015) 
Log(Q) 
0.078* 
(0.019) 
0.097* 
(0.038) 
0.063* 
(0.015) 
0.124* 
(0.030) 
0.002 
(0.005) 
0.006 
(0.010) 
Log(Q).FD No 
0.018* 
(0.019) 
No 
0.060* 
(0.014) 
No 
0.004 
(0.005) 
Log(A) 
0.072* 
(0.022) 
0.009* 
(0.050) 
0.020 
(0.017) 
-0.052 
(0.039) 
0.023* 
(0.006) 
0.024* 
(0.014) 
Log(A).FD No 
-0.063* 
(0.027) 
No 
-0.072* 
(0.021) 
No 
0.0004 
(0.007) 
Log(S) 
0.175* 
(0.035) 
0.241* 
(0.068) 
0.143* 
(0.027) 
0.225* 
(0.053) 
0.0003 
(0.009) 
0.012 
(0.019) 
Log(S).FD No 
0.066* 
(0.032) 
No 
0.082* 
(0.025) 
No 
0.0003 
(0.009) 
 0.71 0.71 0.77 0.77 0.62 0.62 
Chow Test 
H0 ; α1= α2:  β1= β2 
H1 ; α1≠ α2:   β1≠ β2 
 
knRSSRSS
kRSSRSSRSS
F W
2/
/)(
21
21


  
Tabulated 
values  
1%=2.65 
5%=2.11 
Test value 204.13 Result:  Reject  H0 
2
R
109 
 
panel estimation on the basis of Hausman Test. The financial crises dummy stands 1 in post GFC 
and 0 otherwise. The Chow test confirms the structural break in our dataset. ( ) represent standard 
errors, [ ] show p-values.  *, **, *** exhibit significance level at 1%, 5% and 10% respectively. Source: 
Author’s compilation. 
 
5.2.3  Social Performance Indicators 
 The analysis on social performance indicators is based on the data collected by the 
Pakistan Microfinance Network for 27 MPs. The responses are taken from 5 MFBs, 19 
MFIs, and 3 RSPs at the end of 2014. Table 5.10 shows the responses of the microfinance 
practitioners for the evaluation of social performance. 
 
Table 5.10: Social Performance Indicator of Pakistan’s Microfinance Industry 
1. Target Customers      
Priority Areas MFBs MFIs RSPs N.A TOTAL 
Women 5 18 2 2 27 
Rural Area Focused 5 18 3 1 27 
Urban Area Focused 5 16 2 4 27 
Adjacent and Youth - 2 - 25 27 
2. Social Objectives      
Goals MFBs MFIs RSPs N.A TOTAL 
Enhancement of financial accessibility 5 19 2 1 27 
Poverty alleviation 5 19 3 - 27 
Employment generation 2 13 1 11 27 
Initiation of entrepreneurships  1 7 2 17 27 
Support of existing business 5 14 3 5 27 
Opportunities for the youth - 5 - 22 27 
Health improvement 1 3 - 23 27 
Gender equality and women empowerment 2 10 3 12 27 
Improvement in water and sanitation services - 2 1 24 27 
3. Poverty Alleviation      
Target Clients MFBs MFIs RSPs N.A TOTAL 
Poorest of the poor - 3 1 23 27 
Moderately poor 5 11 2 9 27 
Low income poor 5 16 2 4 27 
4. Interest Rate Calculation Method     
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Calculation Methods MFBs MFIs RSPs N.A TOTAL 
Declining Balance 3 6 2 - 11 
Flat Rate 2 13 1 - 16 
Others. - - - - 0 
Source: Author’s recompilation of the data provided by PMR, 2014 
 
 The first section of Table 5.10 highlights that most MPs target women customers 
and neglect the youth, which is only considered by a couple of MFIs. Also, the majority of 
MFBs and RSPs are less concerned about youth development. Although targeting women 
customers is a good step towards women empowerment and gender equality, ignoring 
youth and serving mostly urban customers will not help in poverty eradication. In the 
second category of social objectives, all MPs have set the goals of poverty alleviation and 
enhancement of financial inclusion, but their goals are compared with the target strata of 
clients, most of the MFBs and MFIs have shown reluctance in serving the poorest of the 
poor who actually deserve the most microfinance services. The least prioritized areas 
among all are ‘health improvement’ as only one MFB, and three MFIs have this objective, 
and ‘water and sanitation improvement’ (only two MFIs and one RSP are concerned). The 
third section of Table 5.10 defines the role of MPs in poverty alleviation through the 
selection of their target clients.  Not a single unit out of five MFBs, only three of 19 MFIs, 
and only one of three RSPs serve the poorest of the poor. This scenario reflects that 
microfinance in Pakistan has lost track of the double bottom line, and the goals of poverty 
eradication have smoldered. A majority of MPs serve moderately poor and low income 
poor to secure repayment of loans and to maintain their GLP, which is an indication of 
skewedness towards financial commercialization. The microfinance authorities in Pakistan 
have consistently been claiming the expansion of outreach by showing the increased values 
of GLP and number of borrowers, but the above analysis shows that the poorest of the poor 
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have been neglected by all three major market players of the microfinance industry in 
Pakistan. The last section of Table 5.10 explains the methodology of interest calculation 
which is a prime factor in the possible exploitation of the poor through exorbitant interest 
charges on microloans. A majority of MPs use flat rate interest calculation method (60%) 
which is evidently higher than the declining balance method, used by only 40% of total 
MPs. The declining balance interest rate is better for microfinance borrowers because its 
calculation is based on outstanding loan balance. The borrowers have to pay the interest 
only on the remaining balance after each and every payment. In contrast, flat rate interest 
is calculated on the full original amount throughout the loan term without any consideration 
of loan repayment. 
  
 Both the financial and social performance evaluation revealed that the microfinance 
sector in Pakistan is clearly skewed toward business orientation and financial 
commercialization. The monopolistic competition of microfinance (see Table 5.6) provides 
the opportunity to involve in a rent-seeking behavior. Marotta (2013) observed that rent-
seeking does not add national value and is based on coercion including piracy, lobbying, 
or just giving away money.  
 
5.3 People’s Perceptions of Conventional and Islamic Microfinance in 
Pakistan 
 This section contains the actual responses recorded through the survey 
questionnaires and recapitulated here for further empirical analysis. It is pertinent to note 
that this section has been published in the Turkish Journal of Islamic Economics vide 2016: 
3(1) p.37-61. 
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5.3.1 Respondents’ characteristics  
 The demographics section includes age, gender, vicinity, marital-status, number of 
children, education, and religion. Majority of the respondents (43.34%) are young, 
belonging to the   age group of 18-30 years. About 29 percent belong to the age group of 
31-45 years, 20.46% are in the age category of 46-60 years, while 6.93 % are above 60 
years old. There were more female respondents than the males (55% versus 45%, 
respectively). Table 5.11 shows the demographics and financial position of the respondents.  
 
Table 5.11: Demographics and Financial Position 
Regional distribution of respondents (%) 
South 15 
East  20 
West  14 
Central  31 
Malir  12 
Korangi  8 
Total  100 
  
Age Groups Frequency Percentage Cum. Freq. 
18-30 144 43.37 43.37 
31-45 95 28.61 71.98 
46-60 68 20.48 92.46 
61 and above 23 6.93 99.39 
No Answer 2 0.61 100 
Total 332 100   
  
Education Frequency Percentage Cum. Freq. 
No Education 7 2.1 2.1 
Basic Education 7 2.1 4.2 
Secondary  14 4.2 8.4 
Intermediate 60 18.1 26.5 
Graduation 101 30.4 56.9 
Masters 131 39.5 96.4 
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Ph.D. 11 3.3 99.7 
Others 1 0.3 100 
Total 332 100   
  
Occupation Frequency Percentage Cum. Freq. 
Unemployed 14 4.2 4.2 
Student 100 30.1 34.3 
Govt. Service 39 11.7 46.1 
Private Service 108 32.5 78.6 
Business 18 5.4 84 
House wife 37 11.1 95.2 
Others 16 4.8 100 
Total 332 100   
  
Income Frequency Percentage Cum. Freq. 
No income 7 2.1 2.1 
< Rs.6000 8 2.4 4.5 
Rs. 6001 ~ Rs. 15000 23 6.9 11.4 
Rs. 15001~ Rs. 30000 61 18.4 29.8 
Rs. 30001~ Rs. 60000 120 36.1 65.9 
> Rs.60000 101 30.4 96.3 
No Answer 12 3.7 100 
Total 332 100   
Source: Author’s compilation 
    
The respondents are mostly Muslim (95.5 percent) and majority are highly educated 
– with a doctorate degree (3.3 percent), a master’s degree (39.5 percent), are college 
graduates (30.4 percent), or are currently in college (22.3 percent). 
 
More than half of the respondents (54 percent) are currently employed, either in the 
private sector (32.5 percent), in the government (11.7 percent), in their own businesses (5.4 
percent) and other income-generating activities (4.8 percent).  A third of the respondents 
are students (30.1 percent), 11.1 percent are housewives, and 4.2 percent were unemployed.  
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The respondents are of moderate income:  18.4 percent earn between Rs.15001 to 
Rs.30000, 36.1 percent earn between Rs.30001 to Rs. 60000, and 30.4 percent earn more 
than 60000.  Some earn less than Rs 6000 or none at all (2.4 and 2.1 percent, respectively). 
Out of 332 respondents, 158 mentioned additional income from sources such as farm land 
(4), capital investment (45), share market investment (26), remittance from abroad (27) and 
others sources (56).  Roughly one out of three owned a means of transportation:  29.5 
percent have motorbikes/scooters, and 29.2 percent have cars.  Others reported owning a 
rickshaw/qingi (5.2 percent), a bicycle (3.9 percent) or a tractor (2.4 percent).  However, 
some 26.5 percent reported not owning any means of transportation.  
 
Regarding the access to formal financial services, a majority have formal bank 
accounts (78.6%) and 21.4% do not have account in any bank. Of those with a bank 
account, 61.4% use a commercial banks, 10.2% use Islamic banks, 5.1% use foreign banks 
and 1.8% use other banks. Regarding the type of bank accounts, 36.7% have current 
accounts, 33.4% have profit-n-loss (PLS) accounts, 5.1% have interest free accounts and 
3.3% have other types of accounts.  
 
5.3.2 Credit comfortability 
This section analyzes the existing financial environment for borrowing. Pakistan 
has a broad range of banks but acquiring loan is difficult. Presently, 56 banks are in 
operation in the country (Pakistan & Gulf Economist, 2013) and most of the banks have 
either headquarters or main branches in Karachi. The survey asked about the major 
constraints in borrowing from the major banks. The data show that 128 out of 332 
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respondents had availed themselves of the bank facility to obtain loans in their life time. 
Of those who obtained a loan, 7% got a loan of Rs. 6000/- or less, 10% between Rs. 6001/- 
to Rs. 15000/-, 19% between Rs.15001/- to Rs. 30000/-, 36% between Rs. 30001/- to Rs. 
60000/- and 28% had Rs. 60001/- and more.  
 
Another issue that affects the effectiveness of microfinance is the usage of loans in 
inappropriate ways particularly for purposes other than economic activity or income 
generation. The survey results indicate that a major proportion of the borrowing was used 
for non-productive activities and only 23.44% reported using the loans for business 
purpose. The other purposes for which the loan was used included funeral ceremony of a 
relative (6.25%), accident, injury or illness of a family member (17.19%), catastrophes 
(3.91%), marriage of a family member (25.78%), other purposes (13.28%), and  
consumption purpose (10.16%). A high percentage of loans were used for non-income 
generation that could be a startling sign for lenders as their investments would be 
considered highly risky with the assumption of a high default. This leads to a high 
monitoring cost at the lenders’ end. Regarding the formal source of borrowing, 
conventional MFIs is a major source of borrowing (32%) followed by commercial banks 
(30%), NGOs (19%), Islamic banks/ MFIs (13%), credit unions (4%) and non-bank 
financial institutions (2%). Interestingly, it seems that commercial banks and conventional 
(interest-based) MFIs have better networks and systematic methods for a formal lending. 
On the other hand, Islamic banks or MFIs are still growing and need time to get the 
customers’ confidence necessary to attract the potential borrowers. Figure 5.3 shows the 
share of lending by various financial institutions. 
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Figure 5.3: Formal sources of borrowing (Source: Author’s compilation) 
 
A significant portion (62%) of the respondents acquired loans from the formal 
sources and 32% obtained the loans from informal credit sources. Interestingly, there is a 
big difference between the interest charges on loans, provided by informal sources and 
formal lending sources. It shows that informal source of lending is very attractive for 
borrowers because informal sources charge lesser interest on loan than formal sources. 
Table-5.12 shows the comparison of interest paid on loans.   
 
Table 5.12: Interest paid on loans to formal and informal source of lending 
Interest charges on loans Formal lending sources Informal lending sources 
No interest 10.13% 71.43% 
10% or below 7.59% 8.16% 
Between 11% to 20% 25.32% 6.12% 
Between 21% to 30% 21.52% 4.08% 
Between 31% to 40% 18.99% 10.20% 
40% or more 16.46% - 
Source: Author’s compilation of survey data 
 
Commercial banks
30%
NBFIs
2%
Credit unions
4%
NGOs
19%
Conventional MFIs
32%
Islamic banks / MFIs
13%
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5.3.3 Main constraints in borrowing 
 A significant portion (65%) of our respondents reported that they had faced 
problems while acquiring loans. Table 5.13 shows the main hurdles that borrower faced in 
borrowing. 
Table 5.13: Hurdles in borrowing 
Type of problems Freq. Per% Cum% 
Access to loan provider is far 18 21.43 21.40 
Collateral requirements 27 32.14 53.60 
Inordinate delays in loan processing 14 16.67 70.20 
Exorbitant interest charges on loan 25 29.76 100.00 
Total 84 100.00  
Source: Author’s compilation of survey data. 
 
One of the main issues in borrowing was the collateral requirement that 
contextualized the inception of microfinance. The data revealed that 32% respondents had 
severely faced this constraint while borrowing. The other borrowing issues include 
exorbitant interest charges on loans as mentioned by about 30% of respondents consider. 
The lack of outreach is also a burning issue for loan providers, because 21% respondents 
think that accessibility constraints cause the wastage of time and resources. Procedural 
lapse in formal borrowing is an issue that catalyzes inordinate delays in loan sanctioning 
and disbursement, with about 17% of respondents having faced this problem in borrowing.   
5.3.4  Repayment Issues 
Regarding the problems in repayment, a majority of respondents could not save 
enough to repay on time due to some unforeseen events. Forty four percent of respondents 
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reportedly consumed the loans because of catastrophic problems or marriage of a family 
member. The second main reason for nonpayment or delay in payment was exorbitant 
interest that made the borrowers bankrupt. Some of the borrowers (14%) purposely used 
the loans for nonproductive activities (see Table 5.14).  
 
Table 5.14: Repayment constraints 
Repayment constraints  Freq. Per% Cum% 
Used loans for consumption purpose 9 14.06 14.10 
No savings left due to catastrophes, accident, injury and illness 14 21.88 35.90 
No savings left due to marriage of any family member 14 21.88 57.80 
High interest rates made it difficult to repay 21 32.81 90.60 
Others 6 9.38 100 
Total 64 100   
Source: Author’s compilation of survey data 
 
5.3.5 Perceptions towards conventional (interest-based) microfinance 
How did respondents view the performance of conventional (interest based) 
microfinance? The first set of questions asked about existing microfinance’s role in poverty 
alleviation efforts in Pakistan. The issue of charging high interest rate has received strong 
criticisms since the inception of microfinance but in the last couple of decades it became a 
burning issue (CGAP, 1996). The main reason for the growing concerns is the 
transformation of some MFIs into a private commercial corporations (CGAP, 2006).  A 
significant majority of respondents (63.5 percent) agreed with the statement that existing 
microfinance charges distortionary interest, while 15.06 percent disagreed, 16.27 percent 
were undecided and 4.22 percent gave no answer. This majority view reflects the reality 
that conventional microfinance in Pakistan charges exorbitant rates, ranging from 30 
percent to 50 percent (Munir, 2012).  The conspicuous reasons MFIs always provide for 
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charging distortionary interest rates include high administrative and operational costs of 
loans, risks of default, and an excessive demand with relatively a short supply of loans. 
Nevertheless, as a guideline for loan pricing, Ledgerwood, Julie, and Candace (2013, p. 
218) assert that a balanced approach is required because charging too high will eventually 
reduce the loan demand that can hurt the sustainability of microfinance, while charging too 
low will not allow to cover the costs of loan.    
 
Table 5.15: Descriptive statistics and analysis of responses about conventional 
microfinance 
Questions Strongly 
Disagree 
Disagree Neutral Agree Strongly 
Agree 
No 
Answer 
Mean SD 
1. Do you agree that 
existing (interest 
based) microfinance 
charge exorbitant 
interest rates? 
16 
(4.82) 
34 
(10.22) 
54 
(16.31) 
119 
(35.81) 
95 
(28.62) 
14 
(4.22) 
3.76 1.139 
2. Do you agree that 
existing (interest 
based) microfinance 
use complex 
calculation of 
repayment 
instalments that is not 
understandable? 
12 
(3.61) 
32 
(9.64) 
39 
(11.75) 
130 
(39.16) 
108 
(32.53) 
11 
(3.31) 
 
3.90 1.090 
3. Do you agree that 
existing (interest 
based) microfinance 
is empowering the 
poor people despite 
high interest charges? 
53 
(15.96) 
136 
(40.96) 
58 
(17.47) 
57 
(17.17) 
18 
(5.42) 
10 
(3.01) 
2.54 
 
 
 
1.127 
 
 
 
4. Do you agree that 
existing (interest 
based) microfinance 
is serving poorest of 
the poor people in the 
society? 
71 
(21.40) 
 
 
 
142 
(42.80) 
54 
(16.30) 
44 
(13.30) 
9 
(2.71) 
12 
(3.59) 
2.31 
 
 
 
 
1.050 
 
 
 
 
5. Do you agree that 
existing (interest 
based) microfinance 
lift the poor out of 
poverty? 
65 
(19.59) 
 
 
141 
(42.47) 
50 
(15.06) 
53 
(15.96 
12 
(3.61 
11 
(3.31) 
2.40 
 
 
1.097 
 
 
6. Do you agree that 
existing (interest 
based) microfinance 
use unethical 
7 
(2.11) 
 
 
31 
(9.34) 
60 
(18.07) 
85 
(25.60) 
138 
(41.57) 
11 
(3.31) 
3.98 
 
 
1.097 
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practices for the 
recovery of loans? 
 
 
  
7. Do you agree that 
existing (interest 
based) microfinance 
is more business-
oriented? 
8 
(2.41) 
 
 
31 
(9.34) 
47 
(14.16) 
110 
(33.13) 
124 
(37.35) 
12 
(3.61) 
3.97 
 
 
1.072 
 
 
Source: Author’s calculation of survey data 
 
Microfinance is often criticized for being too complicated in the calculation of 
repayment installments. About 72 percent agreed with this point, 13.25 percent disagreed, 
11.75 were undecided and 3.31 percent did not answer to this question (Table 5.15, item 
2). It is worth noting that presently, two methods are frequently being practiced for the 
calculation of interest rates, i.e. flat rate method and declining balance method. Both these 
methods differ in their calculation and give different effective interest rates. The declining 
balance method is much easier to calculate but could be confusing for borrowers 
(Ledgerwood, Julie, and Candace, 2013, p. 219). 
 
Microfinance practitioners claim that the poor are being empowered through loans 
and financial inclusion because the microloans are considered the ways to gender equality 
and empowerment (Armendariz-de-Aghion and Morduch, 2005, p. 184). On this point, the 
survey showed that majority of people do not agree (56 percent), only 22.59 percent people 
agreed, while 17.47 percent were undecided and 3.01 percent did not answer (Table 5.15, 
item 3). While refuting the claim of empowerment, Armendariz-de-Aghion and Morduch 
(2005, p. 195) argued that gender empowerment was seen with a suspicious eye by 
microfinance practitioners who were focused on strong financial institutionalization.  
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The goal of serving the “ultra-poor” (poorest of the poor) is an utmost consideration 
for microfinance because it scales down poverty in the long run. Asked if microfinance is 
indeed serving the poorest of the poor, 66.16 percent of respondents disagreed with the 
statement, 15.96 percent agreed, 16 percent were undecided, and 3.61 percent had no reply. 
On the same note, Ghosh (2013) asserts that just in the last few years the status of 
microfinance has shifted, “from being lauded as the silver bullet to solve the problems of 
development and poverty reduction, to being derided as the progenitor of financial 
instability and enhanced vulnerability among the poorest people who can ill afford to take 
this additional burden.” Navajas et al. (2000) found that five major microfinance providers 
in Bolivia do not reach to poorest of the poor but just above and below the poverty line. 
Apart from the success stories, results of this research contradict the overemphasized and 
self-proclaimed claims of microfinance regarding poverty eradication in Pakistan.  
 
Although microfinance has been acclaimed in the world for many years, some of 
the critics have questioned its application and viability. A couple of recent randomized 
studies could not find the proofs that microcredit has raised the income and consumption 
of the poor people, at least during the term of studies (Rosenberg, 2009). Similarly, this 
research revealed that almost 62 percent of our respondents do not agree that microfinance 
really lifts the poor out of poverty. Only 20 percent agreed with this view, 15 percent 
remained neutral and 3 percent had no answer.   
 
Another important issue is the use of forceful measures in recovery proceedings. A 
non-discriminatory practice demands that each and every borrower should be treated fairly 
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with due respect and dignity. Unfortunately this is not being practiced especially if 
borrowers are ultra-poor or if loan officers have heavy workload. Because of such pressures, 
loan officers often make mistakes and behave inappropriately. Sarker (2013) notes that in 
such situations, loan officers adversely select borrowers and use unethical practices for 
repayment that sometimes lead to create chaos in borrowers.  One prime example of such 
indecent behaviour of loans officers is a microfinance in India. Hudon (2011, p.127) states 
that in Indian microfinance often uses unethical and aggressive recovery practices. 
However, the scope of this research is limited to the case of Pakistan, therefore, we get the 
views regarding the unethical practices used by microfinance in Pakistan. It seems that a 
majority of our respondents have the views reflective of the actual scenario as about 67 
percent respondents agreed that microfinance uses unethical practices for repayment. Only 
11 percent of respondents disagreed, while the rest (20 percent) were either undecided or 
did not reply to this question.   
 
The final survey question focused on the perceptions toward commercialization in 
microfinance. About 70.48 percent respondents agreed that microfinance is more business-
oriented.   In contrast, about 11.75 percent of respondents do not see any mission drift in 
microfinance, 14.16 percent were undecided and 3.61 percent had no answer (see Table 
5.15; items 7).  
 
 The survey findings on the people’s perceptions toward conventional microfinance 
or interest-based microfinance clearly indicate that a vast majority of people do not 
perceive the existing form of microfinance as a Silver Bullet which can solve all the 
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problems of the poor masses. The objectives of poverty alleviation through existing forms 
of conventional microfinance cannot be achieved because the current microfinance 
schemes lack the true approach of altruism.  The altruistic approach defines the objectives 
of help for others as explained by Suzuki and Miah (2015, p. 471). The deviant behavior 
of existing microfinance can also be defined with the help of Agency-Cost theory if we 
consider that the subsidiaries and donations received by the microfinance are redistributed 
to poor people. The principal-agent setting of microfinance triggers the conflict of interest 
between the funds providers (donors) and the funds redistributors (MFIs).   
 
5.3.6 Perceptions towards Islamic microfinance 
 Table 5.16 shows the descriptive statistics and the analysis of responses about 
Islamic microfinance.  
 
Table 5.16: Descriptive statistics and analysis of responses about Islamic 
microfinance 
Questions Strongly 
Disagree 
Disagree Neutral Agree Strongly 
Agree 
No 
Answer 
Mean SD 
8. Do you agree that Islamic 
(interest free) microfinance 
operate under the ‘Shariah’ 
boundaries? 
40 
(12.05) 
98 
(29.52) 
55 
(16.57) 
84 
(25.30) 
47 
(14.15) 
8 
(2.41) 
3.00 
 
1.281 
 
9. The main objective of 
Islamic (interest free) 
microfinance is to help poor 
people? 
12 
(3.61) 
46 
(13.86) 
61 
(18.37) 
128 
(38.56) 
77 
(23.19) 
8 
(2.41) 
3.65 
 
 
1.101 
 
 
12. Do you agree that 
Islamic (interest free) 
microfinance is a better tool 
for poverty alleviation? 
7 
(2.11) 
 
 
 
18 
(5.42) 
56 
(16.87) 
179 
(53.92) 
63 
(18.97) 
9 
(2.71) 
3.85 
 
 
0.875 
 
 
13. In case of default, 
Islamic (interest free) 
microfinance do not use 
20 
(6.06) 
 
 
47 
(14.16) 
107 
(32.23) 
104 
(31.33) 
46 
(13.81) 
8 
(2.41) 
3.34 
 
 
1.082 
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Source: Author’s compilation of survey data 
The analysis in this section is based on the responses of people on Islamic 
microfinance. As noted above, the prohibition of interest (Riba) in Islam does not permit 
Islamic microfinance to charge any form of interest on lending. The views presented in 
table-5.16 show that the perception whether Islamic microfinance work within the Shariah 
boundaries or not? About 42 percent respondents have given the vote against it and merely 
39 percent respondents agreed that Islamic microfinance work under the Islamic 
jurisprudence called Shariah. From rest of the 19 percent 17 percent were undecided and 
2 percent did not reply (see table-5.16; item 8). The responses look quite rational as the 
Shariah-compliant products in Pakistan are scarce. This asserts that despite the 
considerable growth of Islamic microfinance in the last few years, the Shariah-compliant 
products represents less than one percent in Pakistan. Moreover, the State Bank of Pakistan 
has also urged the Islamic banks to improve their investment for the expansion of outreach 
to meet the overwhelming demand of Shariah-based banking products (SBP-KAP Study 
Report, 2014).  
unethical practices for 
recovery? 
 
14. Do you agree that 
through government 
support Islamic (interest 
free) microfinance can be 
used more effectively in 
poverty alleviation efforts? 
7 
(2.11) 
 
 
 
 
 
41 
(12.35) 
43 
(12.95) 
164 
(49.40) 
69 
(20.78) 
8 
(2.41) 
3.76 
 
 
 
 
0.996 
 
 
 
 
15. Do you agree that 
Islamic (interest free) 
microfinance is emerging 
in Pakistan due to an 
emergence of Islamic 
banking and finance? 
7 
(2.11) 
 
 
 
 
 
23 
(6.93) 
55 
(16.57) 
184 
(55.42) 
55 
(16.56) 
8 
(2.41) 
3.79 
 
 
 
 
0.882 
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How do people perceive the core objectives of Islamic microfinance? A majority 
of respondents (62 percent) believe that the primary objective of Islamic microfinance is 
to help the poor,  About 17 percent disagreed with this view, while 19 percent were 
undecided and 2 percent had no answer (Table 5.16, item 9). In fact, Islamic microfinance 
can serve the goal of poverty alleviation more effectively than other form of microfinance 
because the innate objective of Shariah is to build a strong community capacity. In the 
same context, Abdul-Rahman (2007) asserts that the primary goal of microfinance is to 
assist the poor economically in order to get them out of the poverty trap, while Islamic 
microfinance takes one step farther by providing them interest-free loans. 
 
The analysis on the choice of borrowing revealed that a significant majority of 
borrowers (76%) like to borrow from Islamic financial sources, the second largest choice 
was informal sources i.e. friends and family (16%), and merely 6 percent trust on existing 
microfinance. Figure-5.4 shows the choice of potential borrowings. 
 
 
Figure 5.4: Choice of borrowing 
Source: Author’s compilation of survey data 
 
Existing microfinance
6%
Islamic Banks
76%
Others (family & 
friends)…
No answer…
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About 54% among those who chose Islamic banks / microfinance prefer it due to 
its impeccability of repayment without the imposition of interest. About 43 percent want 
to borrow due to religious reasons; getting involved in interest-bearing financial 
transactions is considered a big sin and against the basic ideology of Islam. Just 2 percent 
respondents think that getting loans by Islamic sources is a way of an easy access. Figure 
5.5 shows the reasons for choosing Islamic finance for borrowing. 
 
Figure 5.5: Reasons to choose Islamic banks / microfinance 
Source: Author’s compilation of survey data 
 
The difference between Islamic microfinance and existing microfinance is not just 
the imposition of interest charges; Islamic microfinance is considered a better tool for 
poverty alleviation because it is based on Shariah principles, thus distinguishing it from 
other microfinances (Onakoya and Onakoya, 2013). On the same note, Ul-Hassan (2007) 
asserts that Islamic microfinance is based on social justice which is a core element of 
Islamic principles. A majority of respondents (73%) view Islamic microfinance a better 
tool for poverty alleviation. Only 7 percent were against this view, 17 percent remained 
neutral and 2 percent did not reply (see table 5.16; item 12). 
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Another important criticism that conventional microfinance always faces, is 
coercive practices for recovery in case of default. In theory, Islamic microfinance shuns 
unethical practices for repayment. Table-5.16 shows the analysis of perceptions regarding 
recovery practice of Islamic microfinance. The responses revealed that 45 percent 
respondents agreed that in case of default, Islamic microfinance does not use coercive 
practices, 20 percent of respondents disagreed, 32 percent were indifferent and 2 percent 
did not reply (see Table 5.16; item 13).  
 
Government support can increase the participation of Islamic microfinance in 
poverty alleviation. A majority of respondents (70 percent) agreed that the government can 
play a vital role in poverty alleviation efforts through Islamic microfinance. It can provide 
subsidiaries and soft loans that can be channelized through Islamic microfinance. However, 
15 percent respondents reject the idea of government assistance in microfinance matters. 
The possible reasons for the rejection of government’s role in poverty alleviation might be 
the track record of poor performance and bad governance of democratic governments in 
the history of Pakistan (see Table 5.16; item 14). 
 
The term ‘financial inclusion’ is frequently used in microfinance literature to refer 
to the inclusion of financially excluded poor into a formal banking system. This concept 
tacitly acknowledges the role of microfinance as a part of the formal banking system and 
expects the banks to provide financial support to microfinance. How do people perceive 
the links between Islamic banking and Islamic microfinance? About 70 percent of 
respondents think that the emergence of Islamic microfinance is caused by the emergence 
128 
 
of Islamic banking. About 9 percent did not agree and 21 percent did not reply (see Table 
5.16; item 15). It is worth noting that Pakistan is always considered a pioneer in Islamic 
banking. In addition, the Islamic banking industry in Pakistan has been growing at an 
enormous pace (about 30 percent) for the last few years (SBP-IBB, 2014). 
 
The above analysis indicates that a majority of people in Pakistan understand the 
fundamental differences between Conventional and Islamic microfinance, and that 
respondents consider Islamic microfinance as a source of potential borrowing in the future 
because it works within the Shariah boundaries and charges no interest on loans. It can be 
used to eradicate poverty due to its altruistic approach that urges to help each other and 
establish a trustworthy relationship between borrowers and lenders. The mechanism of 
Islamic microfinance works with egalitarian principle (Ali, 2015, p. 238; Rahim, 2010; 
Rahman and Rahim, 2007) that considers the welfare of society as an utmost objective. 
The Islamic system of justice and fairness is quite closer to the theory of justice provided 
by the American philosopher John Rawls in his famous writing A Theory of Justice. The 
first principle of Rawlsian theory of justice demands the equal rights for all. It further 
elaborates that “Because the citizens are equal in their moral features, they have an equal 
claim to the benefits from the system of cooperation” (Moon, 2008). 
5.4  Towards an Islamic Microfinance Model 
 The preceding analyses, based on various sets of data, have shown the limits of 
conventional microfinance in Pakistan.  The financial and social performance evaluations 
of conventional microfinance showed a markedly business orientation, and a bias for 
financial commercialization. Moreover, the sample survey amongst the general population 
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showed a critical and skeptical attitude toward the aims and practices of conventional 
microfinance on the one hand, and an openness toward Islamic microfinance on the other. 
These results, therefore, point to the prospects of implementing a more effective Islamic 
microfinance system. 
  
In this section, therefore, I formulate a mosque-based Islamic microfinance model 
and attempt to test whether it can be successfully implemented.  I begin with a review of 
two general types of Islamic microfinance models, and follow it with a description of the 
main features of my proposed model.  I then present a project feasibility analysis of this 
model, supported by a business plan.  Finally, I run a regression analysis to test the 
probability of successfully implementing the model. 
 
 It must be emphasized at the outset that the proposed model is mainly exploratory.  
As such, more thorough studies are needed to test its empirical viability.  Analyses such as 
a demand forecast, for example, can provide more concrete data to help validate the model.  
Similarly, regression analyses can incorporate more risk factors that usually affect micro-
finance service delivery.  These limitations notwithstanding, the study hopes to examine 
the possibility of the model’s success/failure based on minimal conditions and 
assumptions, such as people’s basic awareness of Islamic microfinance’s aims and 
characteristics.      
5.4.1 Islamic microfinance models: Waqf (Endowment)-based and 
Charity-based 
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 Islamic microfinance models are skewed towards social outreach and social welfare 
rather than financial sustainability which has long been a focus of attention of conventional 
microfinance. These models follow the central theme of resource redistribution consistent 
with the aims of an Islamic welfare state. Their objectives are aligned with the components 
listed in Islamic concepts of poverty alleviation. The Waqf (Endowment) is considered an 
important feature in the history of Islamic finance. The concept has been widely 
acknowledged by a number of researchers (Khan, 2001; Ahmed, 2007; Kaleem and 
Ahmed, 2009; Adam and Lahsasna, 2013), but the model comprises some built-in risks 
that make its practical applicability ambiguous. For example, the Waqf endowments used 
for microfinance loans have some inherent risks such as high transaction cost of generating 
funds that do not cover the face value of loans in interest-free lending. The substitution 
effect occurs if the cost of generating loan is higher than the value of loan. In that case, the 
Waqf endowment could be invested in higher profit businesses rather than microfinance. 
Secondly, in countries like Pakistan, the Waqfs are managed by the provincial government 
authorities. These provincial authorities do not allow the Waqfs to work autonomously, 
therefore, they are not able to provide financial support to microfinance. In addition, legal 
complexities delay the lending process and require formal approval from the government 
departments thus making it inefficient.  
  
On the other hand, the charity-based model uses Islamic charities as a source of 
funding for their operation especially Zakat, Sadaqat, and Qard-Hasna. One such model 
is proposed by Kaleem and Ahmed (2009) which uses the Waqf certificate instead of 
ordinary shares. The funds generation is proposed to take place through the sale of interest-
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free Waqf certificates that could be used to finance the interest-free micro lending. Also, 
the volunteers are involved in the system to assist the professional management, but the 
model did not elaborate how the transaction costs in the system will be kept at par because 
appointing professional management needs their salaries and perks that can affect the cost 
of loan. Another important issue in the said models is the issuance of Waqf certificates that 
may require an approval from the legal authorities of the hierarchal order under which 
Waqfs operate, that can create legal complications. Figure 5.6 shows the charity based 
Islamic microfinance model. 
    
Figure 5.6: Charity based Islamic Microfinance Model 
Source: Kaleem and Ahmed (2009) 
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 Some other models of Islamic microfinance propose the inclusion of Islamic banks 
for fund generation that is a good strategy for financial inclusion. The joint-venture of 
Islamic banks with microfinance will enhance the technical expertise of microfinance 
through training. However, a possible conflict of interest may come into play if the 
microfinance’s customers directly approach the Islamic banks for borrowing.  
5.4.2  A Proposed Mosque-based Islamic Microfinance Model 
The model shown in Figure 5.7 shows an Islamic microfinance model that uses the 
mosque (Islamic prayer place) as a channel for the redistribution of funds. 
     
Funds Generation 
  
 
 
 
 
 
     Funds Redistribution  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 5.7: Basic Framework of Islamic Microfinance (IMFI) through Mosque 
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FOR CONSUMPTION FOR ECONOMIC ACTIVITIES 
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Benevolence Loans  
Interest-free Loans 
Other Loans  
Sadaqat (optional) 
Almsgiving (optional) 
Grants and Subsidiaries 
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IMFI:  Islamic Microfinance Institutes 
Mosque: Muslims’ worship place (used for channelizing the funds) 
Lenders:  Funds providers including Government and private sources, Islamic banks, 
other banks. 
Donors: Donations providers including local and international agencies, local 
individuals. 
Borrowers: Small and active entrepreneurs relatively less poor (productive user of funds). 
Poorest:  Extremely poor, needy and deprived, live below poverty line (consumption 
loans). 
The proposed model has the potential to alleviate poverty because it uses a dual 
strategy of helping the poorest of the poor through consumption loans and providing loans 
to the relatively less poor (but active entrepreneurs) who need funds to continue their 
economic activities. The inclusion of the mosque gives the edge of low transaction cost 
because the screening and monitoring operations could be performed through the prayer 
leader (Imam). The backward channel of funds generation includes both Lenders and and 
Donors. The lenders are the suppliers of funds and who need repayment of their loans, 
while the donors are those who provide donations on virtuous grounds and, being charity 
providers, do not demand repayment of donations. The classification of funds is based on 
Shariah compliance as the only fund reserve for the consumption lending to the poor is 
Zakat which is a religious obligation and which cannot be used as an ordinary loan because 
once given it cannot be taken back according to Shariah principles. Nevertheless, other 
charity funds may be used in a cyclic form to generate economic activities like sadqat, 
almsgiving, and other donations. Figure 5.8 shows the process flow diagram of lending 
through IMFI.  
Figure 5.8: Operational Process Flow Diagram 
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5.4.3 Project Feasibility Analysis of Islamic Microfinance Model 
 It is pertinent to mention that the following ‘project feasibility analysis’ of mosque-
based Islamic microfinance model specifies the startup-up phase of the project. At this 
stage, the operating expenses are considered zero in order to keep the initial outlay at a 
minimum. At a later stage, however, it is recognized that the operating expenditures will 
increase due to the assignments of salaries to the staff (as proposed in the Business Plan, 
see Appendix A). Expenditures on office building and furniture are also expected to 
increase. The startup costs are intentionally kept at a minimum to ensure the possibility of 
low-cost loans in the wake of interest-free business, and to reduce the potential dependence 
on high interest charges.    
 
The project feasibility analysis determines the probability of success of the project 
at hand. It also gives an understating of the cost structure of the project. 
 
Table 5.17: Project Feasibility Analysis of Islamic Microfinance through Mosque 
Head of account Cost Description 
Initial Investment Required US$ 4,000 Reserve for Loans. 
Initial Outlay 0 (Zero) Regular office and buildings are not required and 
a bank account will be used for operations. 
Office Building and 
Furniture 
0 (Zero) Mosque will be used for processing. 
Process End 
Machinery handed 
over to borrower by 
IMFI head 
Process End 
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Total staff7 at startup 5 person Project Head (1), Imam8 of Mosque (1), Financial 
Experts cum regular volunteer (2), Financial 
Expert cum reserve volunteer (1). 
Staff salaries and 
allowances9 
0 (Zero) Services will be rendered as religious duties. 
Operational Expenses 0 (Zero) Operations will be performed after regular prayers 
at mosque. 
Number of Consumption 
Loans (Initial) 
Tentative Subject to the collection of Zakat during the 
preliminary phase before the startup of actual 
project. 
Number of Production 
Loans (Initial) 
30 20 loans of $50 = $1,000 
10 loans of $100 = $1,000. 
Funds Reserve for Backup US$1,500 Reserve fund will be used for further loans after 
initial evaluation of the project. 
Funds Reserve for 
Miscellaneous Expenditures 
US$500 Reserve for unforeseen expenditures. 
Expected Time of Loan 
Recovery 
12 months First two months will be exempted for instalment; 
10 equal instalments of monthly payments. 
                                                 
7 At the startup the team comprises five members i.e. The Head of IMFI, Imam (Prayer leader), two financial 
experts, and a reserve financial expert. The idea behind the formation of this team is that the members must 
have the knowledge of microfinance operations. For example, the IMFI’s Head or financial experts would 
possibly be the person(s) from banking and finance sector preferably the retired person (s). The involvement 
of Imam is just to ensure the help in borrower’s selection which is quite difficult in microfinance business. 
The Imam would be given the task to assess the borrower’s moral character like integrity, piety, religiosity, 
etc. these elements are important to determine at first in order to ensure the repayment of the loans. Secondly, 
the Imam would distinguish the classification of loan whether the borrower falls in the category of ‘extremely 
poor or deprived’ (suitable for consumption loan) or in the category of relatively less poor (suitable for 
production loan).  
 
8The Imam is a highly educated person who has normally completed an 8-years course of Daras-e-Nizami or 
Fazil e Arabic that consists of about 20 different courses. The course of Daras-e-Nizami requires eight year 
of extensive study and equivalent to Bachelors of Theology (Honors) (AliGarh Muslim University, 2016). 
Daras-e-Nizami covers some 20 subjects which fall into two categories: al-uloom annaqliya (transmitted 
sciences) and al-uloom al-aqliya (rational sciences). Half of the curriculum includes subjects that are strictly 
religious in nature. The remaining subjects include medicine, mathematics, astronomy, history, philosophy, 
prosody, and polemics and were included in the 19th century to both equip the students for civil service jobs 
and to help them understand religious texts 8  (United States Institute of Peace, p. 2-3) (Pl refer to 
http://108.179.255.30/~christi4/pubs/trip_report.pdf.). The appointments of Imams in Pakistan is made on 
monthly salary basis and they serve under the jurisdiction of the constitutional settings of the Ministry of 
Religious Affairs and Inter Faith Harmony (www.mora.gov.pk) and their appointments were made in 
accordance with Rule No. 4 (l)-Auqaf O.S.D./66 section 21 of the West Pakistan Waqf Properties Ordinance, 
1961 (Ordinance XXVIII of 961). The clause II (7): B-III exclusively urged the compulsory qualification 
required for the post of Imam must be equivalent to Daras-e-Nizami or Sanad of Fazil-i-Arabi8 (1968, p.4).   
 
9 The salaries and allowance are intentionally kept to a minimum during the startup phase. However, in phase 
two the salaries and allowance will be paid to all staff (please see the details in the Business Plan, Appendix-
A). 
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Expected Loan Loss Rate 5%  
(five percent) 
Probability of pre-screening errors of projects and 
borrower’s selection. 
Interest Charges on Loans 0 (Zero) Interest free project because the interest is 
prohibited in Islamic Shariah. 
Financial self-sufficiency 
(FSS) 
Expected Will be attained in second phase of the project 
through amalgamation with Islamic banks. 
Operational self-sufficiency 
(OSS) 
Expected Will be attained with zero operational cost and 
low transaction cost (cost per loan = zero). 
 
 The feasibility analysis of the above mentioned project reveals that the initial 
outlays are reduced to nearly zero because of the inclusion of the mosque in the system. In 
general, the project’s initial cost increases due to some huge expenditures on office 
buildings and furniture but this project does not require formal office buildings and 
furniture (based on mosque). Secondly, the operational costs are reduced by minimizing 
the staff salaries with the appointment of field expert volunteers (retired government 
officers can be hired as volunteers).  The transaction costs will be reduced by involving the 
mosque’s Imam for borrower’s selection and project evaluation without incurring 
additional costs. (The detailed analysis on Mosque-based Islamic Microfinance is provided 
in the Business Plan; see Appendix-A). 
 
Finally, this project addresses the following issues that have constrained 
conventional microfinance projects:  (1) adverse selection and moral hazard; (2) exorbitant 
interest charges; (3) women/family empowerment; (4) double bottom line objectives; (5) 
high transaction costs; and (6) information asymmetry.  
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5.4.3.1 Adverse Selection and Moral Hazard    
 The probability of adverse selection is minimized in this project due to its 
mechanism for the selection of borrowers. The central authority is given to the mosque’s 
prayer leader (Imam) who is considered a well-informed and an honest person in Islamic 
society. If the borrowers are selected on merit (honest and active entrepreneurs), then the 
issues of adverse selection and moral hazards could be resolved.  
 
5.4.3.2 Exorbitant Interest Charges 
 The project is an interest-free project and does not demand extra charges on any 
account (processing fees and etc.) on loans. Such provisions allow the poor to work actively 
on their projects without getting an extra burden of interest charges. It is viewed in 
conventional microfinance that some MFIs charge exorbitant interest and use harsh 
recovery practices that exploit the poor. Such exploitation is not only ineffective in poverty 
alleviation but throws the poor into a deeper poverty trap. The proposed project resolves 
the issue of poor exploitation and provides the services to the poor. 
 
5.4.3.3 Women Empowerment / Family Empowerment 
  A vast majority of conventional microfinance targets poor women as their potential 
customers, but Islamic Microfinance targets the head of the household as a customer to 
support the whole family without gender discrimination. The Islamic Shariah believes in 
social development, and the concept of welfare state (discussed in above sections) demands 
that the whole family is to be empowered rather than just focus on women. The selection 
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of the household head for loans gives an advantage over women-only projects because it 
is highly likely that the loans to women would be used for family consumption than some 
economic activities. In most of the patriarchal societies in South Asia, women are not 
involved in household decision-making process due to male-chauvinistic approaches. It is 
highly probable that a woman borrower might use the loan for family consumption in case 
a family member is in dire need. The project resolves the issue by targeting the family head 
as a customer without any gender discrimination.  
 
5.4.3.4Double Bottom Line Objectives 
 One of the main issues in the prevailing practice of conventional microfinance is a 
balance between financial sustainability and social outreach which is difficult to maintain. 
To achieve the target of double bottom line, efforts are made to acquire financial 
sustainability while serving the poorest strata of the society. The project of Islamic 
microfinance resolves the issue by distinguishing these two groups into poorest and 
borrowers. The former group can acquire loans for consumption purposes that will be 
funded through Islamic religious obligation (Zakat), while the latter group can borrow for 
the economic activities. Financial sustainability will be achieved through the profit- 
generating economic activities, while social outreach will be achieved through serving the 
poorest people.   
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5.4.3.5 High Transaction Costs 
 The project of Islamic microfinance is a highly cost effective project in which the 
transaction cost is kept at a minimum (nearly zero) due to the inclusion of the mosque and 
the Imam. The proponents of conventional microfinance always put forward the issue of 
high transaction cost against the exorbitant interest charges. They charge sky-high interest 
rates on loans to cover the high cost per loan, thus seriously hurting the microfinance 
objective of serving poorest. The project has a low transaction cost because the funds are 
autonomously generated and IMFI does not borrow the loans on interest from other sources 
due to the restrictions imposed by the Islamic Shariah. The project’s low-cost loans do not 
require exorbitant interest charges to cover its cost; therefore, the issue of high transaction 
cost is resolved in this project.   
 
5.4.3.6 Information Asymmetry 
 One of the main issues in existing conventional microfinance is information 
asymmetry which creates further complications of double-dipping (loans from multiple 
sources) and borrower’s indebtedness. If the scale of such issues is large, then it might 
shake the whole system of microfinance and the repayment crisis might occur as has 
happened in the past in a number of countries (see details in Chapter 3 above). Such issues 
are handled in this project as the borrower’s selection and monitoring are done through the 
sanctions provided by the prayer leader (Imam). The performance monitoring will be 
performed at the mosque where the borrower can be consulted at any time after prayer as 
the Muslims are bound to pray five-times a day in mosque.  
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5.4.4  Probability of Successful Implementation of Islamic Microfinance 
in Pakistan 
 This section empirically investigates the probability of successful implementation 
of Islamic microfinance in Pakistan. The binary dependent regression (Probit) is used with 
dummy independent variables to get the possible probability of success / failure. The 
functional form can be written down as: 
𝑃𝑖 = 𝑝(𝑦𝑖 = 1) = 𝛽𝑜 + 𝛽1𝑥2𝑖 + 𝛽2𝑥3𝑖 + 𝛽3𝑥4𝑖 + … . . +𝛽𝑘𝑥𝑘𝑖 + 𝜀𝑖  ...... (5.1) 
And for binary random variable 
P (Y=1 / X) is equal to E (Y/ X)  
The alternative approaches of Logit and Probit are preferred to avoid such 
estimation issues, therefore, this study uses Probit model instead of linear probability 
model. The functional form of Probit is written down as: 
𝑃(𝑦𝑖 = 1/𝑥𝑖) =  𝜑(𝑥
′
𝑖𝛽) …… (5.2) 
(where 𝜑is cumulative density function) 
 
 I use the questionnaire survey data which were collected to ascertain the people’s 
perception about conventional microfinance and Islamic microfinance in Pakistan. The 
data are primary in nature and the data collection was held in July to October’2014, in all 
districts of Karachi, Pakistan. A total of 332 survey questionnaires are used to gather the 
data for this study.  
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 The likelihood is investigated by using the variables that determine the awareness 
of Islamic microfinance in our respondents. For the independent variables, five categorical 
variables are transformed into dummy variables by assigning the values of 1 for ‘agree’ 
and ‘strongly agree’ Likert-scale categories, and 0 otherwise. The dependent variable 
‘success’ is transformed into dummy by using the variables that gives the awareness that 
Islamic microfinance is a better tool for poverty alleviation.  
 
 The following model is developed for this study: 
𝑃 (𝑆𝑥𝑖 = 1/𝑥𝑖) =  𝜑{(𝐼𝑀𝐹𝐼𝐸𝑀𝑅. 𝛽1 +  𝐼𝑀𝐹𝐼𝐺𝑂𝑉. 𝛽2 + 𝐼𝑀𝐹𝐼𝐻𝐸𝐿𝑃 . 𝛽3 + 𝐼𝑀𝐹𝑆𝐻 . 𝛽4 +
𝐼𝑀𝐹𝑈𝑁 . 𝛽5 + 𝜀1)) 
 
Where, 
 
Sx is 1 in case of positive response that IMFI serves poorest of the poor and 0 otherwise. 
IMFI.EMR is 1 in case of positive response that IMFI emerges due to Islamic Banks and 0 
otherwise. 
IMFI.GOV is 1 in case of awareness that the government support can catalyze the poverty 
alleviation efforts through IMFI and 0 otherwise. 
IMFI.HELP is 1 in case of awareness that it IMFI lifts poor out of the poverty and 0 
otherwise. 
IMFI.SH is 1 in case of awareness that IMFI works within Shariah boundaries and 0 
otherwise.  
IMFI.UN is 1 in case of awareness that IMFI doesn’t use unethical practice and 0 
otherwise. 
MFI.POOR is 1 in case of awareness that conventional MFI serves the poorest of the poor. 
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The details of the variables10 are presented in summary statistics in Table-5.18. 
 
 
5.4.4.1 Regression Results 
Table 5.19 shows the empirical results from the Probit regression used for this 
study. 
 
 
                                                 
10 The limitation of the model used here is that it mainly uses variables that are based only on people’s 
perceptions, and lacks those variables that can assess the risk factors, i.e. possibility of default, general 
interest rates in the economy, borrower’s indebtedness, cost overrun etc.). Caution must therefore be used in 
generalizing the results of this regression analysis. The analysis only determines a probabilistic estimation or 
the feasibility of the success as it was estimated on the basis of available data. Since the actual project is not 
initiated yet, the collection of actual data relevant to this scheme is not possible at this stage. All the variables 
used in this estimation are selected from the survey data. The main idea behind the selection of those variables 
is that the Islamic microfinance is yet to be launched in Pakistan because the people are not well aware about 
its effectiveness. We therefore assume that if the people are highly aware about Islamic microfinance, then 
the probability of the project’s success will be high. The risk factor variables or the exogenous variables are 
intentionally not included to avoid the issues of heteroscedasticity and multicollinearity that are quite possible 
if we unnecessarily increase the explanatory variables in the binary regression model.   
 
Table 5.18 Summary Statistics 
  IMFI_EMR IMFI_GOV IMFI_HELP IMFI_SH IMFI_UN SX 
 Mean 0.7199 0.7018 0.6175 0.3946 0.4518 0.7289 
 Median 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 0.0000 0.0000 1.0000 
 Maximum 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 
 Minimum 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
 Std. Dev. 0.4497 0.4582 0.4867 0.4895 0.4984 0.4452 
 Skewness -0.9793 -0.8823 -0.4834 0.4314 0.1937 -1.0299 
 Kurtosis 1.9590 1.7784 1.2337 1.1861 1.0375 2.0608 
              
 Jarque-Bera 68.0560 63.7156 56.0888 55.8124 55.3528 70.8996 
 Probability 2E-15 1E-14 7E-13 8E-13 1E-12 4E-16 
              
 Sum 239 233 205 131 150 242 
 Sum Sq. Dev. 66.9488 69.4789 78.4187 79.3102 82.2289 65.6024 
              
 Observations 332 332 332 332 332 332 
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Table 5.19: Regression results of LPM 
Binary Dependent 
Variable: SX 
 
Coefficients 
Standard Error 
Independent Variables 
Intercept -1.044* (0.18273) 
IMFI_SH 0.690* (0.24035) 
IMFI_EMR 0.541** (0.21148) 
IMFI_GOV 0.981* (0.22061) 
IMFI_HELP 0.719* (0.19739) 
IMFI_UN 0.355 (0.24346) 
Average 0.577 - 
McFadden R Square 0.392 - 
LR Statistics 152.427 (0.000) 
No. of observations 332 - 
       *, **, *** exhibit significance level at 1%, 5%, and 10% 
 
The prediction rule is y=1 if the probability of prediction is greater than 0.5, and 
zero otherwise (Dollar and Svensen, 2000, p. 902). Table-5.19 shows the results of Probit 
regression for the assessment of probability of successful implementation of Islamic 
microfinance in Pakistan. It is evident from the results that the awareness about Islamic 
microfinance can increase the probability of successful implementation. We use five 
variables for the awareness and all variables are significant except IMFI_SH. The other 
variables are significant at 1% level of significance except IMFI_EMR which is significant 
at 5% level of significance. The model’s overall significance is indicated by McFadden 
Pseudo R-Square which is about 39 percent.  
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CHAPTER 6 
Conclusions and Recommendations 
 
 This study investigated the limits and prospects of microfinance for poverty 
alleviation in Pakistan. The dissertation is focused on four segments, and various 
methodological techniques are applied in different segments. The first segment evaluated 
the performance of microfinance institutions in Pakistan through the use of DEA and 
financial ratios. The second segment compared the people’s perceptions of conventional 
microfinance and Islamic microfinance based on survey data. The third segment proposed 
a new model of Islamic microfinance for poverty alleviation in Pakistan. The fourth 
segment tested the probability of successful implementation of Islamic microfinance in 
Pakistan, using regression analysis based on a linear probability model. 
 
6.1 Conclusions 
 The study noted that like many countries in the developing world, Pakistan has 
adopted microfinance as a means of poverty alleviation.  Unlike in Bangladesh where 
microfinance has achieved some success, the viability and usefulness of microfinance in 
Pakistan remain unclear. The current portfolio of conventional microfinance shows that it 
just covers 2.8 million borrowers which is just a 7% of potential borrowers (SBP, 2011) 
and “taking into account the magnitude of 45 million poor households, the level of 
microfinance deepening is still low” (Suzuki and Miah, 2015, p. 470).  In this context where 
conventional microfinance has not been successful, the prospect of an Islamic-oriented 
microfinance has been raised.  The study, therefore, asked several interrelated questions in 
order to determine the performance of conventional microfinance, compare how 
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conventional and Islamic microfinance are perceived, explore the components of an 
Islamic model of microfinance, and estimate its probability of successful implementation.   
 
How efficiently has conventional microfinance in Pakistan achieved the goal of 
social development?  This study found that conventional microfinance has not been able to 
achieve the “double-bottom line” objectives of financial stability and social outreach. Their 
performance evaluation revealed that some MFIs are financially sound and efficient but 
less efficient at social development, while others are socially efficient but lack financial 
self-sufficiency. A number of cultural and socio-political factors (e.g. domestic violence, 
terrorism, unfriendly business circumstances, and strict religiosity) can account for the 
underserving of conventional microfinance. From the financial performance view, 
microfinance in Pakistan performed below the par value of microfinance in South Asia. 
The average cost per loan in Pakistan is higher (US$31.25) than the average in the region 
(US$26.81). It seems that the cost per loan is affected by high operating expenses ratio in 
Pakistan as it could only be maintained at 21.25 (on average) which is the second highest 
in the region after Afghanistan (37.82) and higher than the South Asian industry average 
(17.09). The average ROA for Pakistan is negative (-2.86) and is lower than the average 
ROA in the region (0.95). The average for the depth of outreach is 11.97% which shows 
that on average, the percentage of serving the poorest is around 12% in the gross loan 
portfolio. The results thus support our hypothesis that conventional microfinance is skewed 
towards financial commercialization rather than social value creation. A majority of 
microfinance practitioners except RSPs do not serve the poorest of the poor who actually 
deserve microfinance services. The analysis revealed that only a few MPs serve the poorest 
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people:  not one of five MFBs, only three out of 19 MFIs, and only one out of 3 RSPs 
consider serving poorest of the poor. A majority of MPs serve the moderately poor and low 
income poor in order to maintain their GLP that is an indication of skewed behavior 
towards financial commercialization Regarding the social development, a majority of 
microfinance practitioners target women customers to assure high repayment rates for their 
financial sustainability (split ratio is 58:42 for women: men). Secondly, the expansion of 
outreach is considered with increased GLP and increased number of borrowers, but the 
objective list shows that the ultra-poor are not in the priority list of all market players in 
Pakistan’s microfinance industry. Moreover, the methodology of interest calculation is a 
prime factor in possible exploitation of the poor due to high incidence of exorbitant interest 
charges. A majority of MPs use flat rate interest calculation method (60%) that puts 
evidently higher incidence than the declining balance method that is used by only (40%) 
of total microfinance practitioners in Pakistan.  
 
How do the people of Pakistan perceive conventional microfinance and Islamic 
microfinance?   Survey results indicate that a majority of people in Pakistan understand the 
fundamental differences between these two types of microfinance. Also, the respondents 
expressed disagreement with the overly emphasized claims of conventional microfinance, 
i.e. empowering the poor (57% disagree), serving the poorest of the poor (94% disagree), 
and lifting the poor out of the poverty abyss (62% disagree).  A majority of respondents 
(76%) choose Islamic microfinance as a source of potential borrowing in the future because 
it works within the Shariah boundaries and charges no interest on loans.  Islamic 
microfinance is considered a better tool for poverty alleviation because of its welfarist 
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genre and working-boundaries of Islamic Shariah. In case of default, the scheduled 
repayments are extended without using the coercive practices for recovery that provides an 
additional time for poor people to accumulate sufficient funds. If the borrowers are 
completely deprived, then the loans are considered as written-off (Qard-e-hasna loans).  
According to peoples’ perception, Islamic microfinance could be used effectively in 
poverty alleviation efforts if it is aligned with modern financial environment. The 
emergence of Islamic banking in Pakistan provides a baseline for Islamic microfinance that 
can favorably be used to garner Islamic financial products in an integrated manner.  In 
summary, the survey results and findings to the length showed that Islamic microfinance 
is positively perceived and preferred over conventional microfinance by the people of 
Pakistan. 
  
The study thus suggests that the scope of microfinance can be enhanced through a 
dual approach. First, the banking industry can be used to channel the funds through Islamic 
microfinance; and second, government support can enhance the effectiveness of such 
programs. Direct subsidies and swift loans by local and international donors can enhance 
the financial sustainability of Islamic microfinance. The funds allocated by the government 
can be used to catalyze the poverty alleviation efforts in Pakistan through cross-
subsidization. This complementation will enhance the efforts to achieve the sustainable 
development goals (SDGs) of poverty eradication.    
 
Can Islamic microfinance be used as a replacement of conventional microfinance 
in Pakistan?  The study proposed a new model of Islamic microfinance based on religious 
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principles with an inclusion of the mosque (the Muslim’s prayer place). A mosque-based 
system integrates financial services with religious practice and addresses a number of 
existing issues of conventional microfinance. It is elaborated that the Islamic microfinance 
model can break the vicious circle of poverty with the injection of funds through 
entrepreneurial loans and consumption loans. The favorable opinions about Islamic 
microfinance by the people of Pakistan induced me to go one step further and test the 
probability of its successful implementation.   
 
What is the probability of Islamic microfinance being successfully implemented in 
Pakistan? Using the binary probability model (Probit) after recoding the peoples’ 
responses into dummy variables, the study revealed some significantly positive 
probabilities for the implementation of Islamic microfinance in Pakistan for poverty 
alleviation. The results confirm the hypothesis that the probability of Islamic 
microfinance’s successful implementation is high and that Islamic microfinance can be 
used as a replacement of existing microfinance to achieve the long-term goals of poverty 
alleviation in Pakistan. 
 
6.2 Recommendations 
 In light of the study’s findings, the following policy recommendations are proposed 
to make microfinance a more effective tool for poverty alleviation in Pakistan: 
 
i The State Bank of Pakistan’s Prudential Regulations {clause 4 (ii)} for MFBs 
demands the minimum paid up capital requirement of PKR 1 billion for national level 
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operations and PKR300 million for District level operations (SBP Prudential Regulations, 
2011). Such Regulation ensures the financial self-sufficiency of MFBs and provide 
provisions for solvency issues. However, the Prudential Regulations do not address the 
assurance of social value creation like minimum outreach expansion, minimum number of 
small loans etc.  These regulations are necessary to model in order to increase the social 
efficiency of conventional microfinance in Pakistan.  
 
ii. An effective mechanism of proper monitoring of MFIs is needed to ensure 
borrowers’ protection as well as MFIs’ financial protection against double-dipping and 
Non-Performing Loans (NPLs). The existing Prudential Regulations {clause 11(i)} 
requires that the MFBs should devise their own internal mechanism to safeguard against 
the potential risks. Such regulations should be monitored at Centralization level or the State 
Bank of Pakistan. This provision will increase the financial efficiency of Conventional 
Microfinance in Pakistan.  
 
iii. In order to catalyze poverty alleviation efforts, the mosque-based Islamic 
microfinance should be implemented in rural and agricultural areas to support the farmers 
and poor peasants throughout the country. The soft loans to ‘Small and Medium 
Enterprises’ (SMEs) should also be provided because the lending to SMEs is reportedly 
declining. As reported by the Islamabad Chamber of Commerce and Industry (ICCI) to the 
State Bank of Pakistan (SBP), lending in the second quarter of financial year 2015-16 had 
declined by 9 percent from Rs.287.8 billion to Rs.261.75 billion. Lending to SMEs in effect 
declined to 5.8 percent as compared to 6.7 percent in the previous year. 
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iv. The selection committees consisting of volunteers at the union council level should 
be formed to increase the effectiveness of mosque-based Islamic microfinance. Such 
committees can be helpful in the selection of potential borrowers of Islamic microfinance.  
 
v. Inasmuch as the prayer leaders have a central role in mosque-based Islamic 
microfinance model, training and awareness programs on financial lending and borrowing 
are proposed.  
 
vi. A team of union council members should be formed that can be headed by any 
government officer (acting or retired) to monitor the mosque-based Islamic microfinance 
model’s applicability and viability in order to improve and enhance its effectiveness in  
poverty alleviation.  
 
vii. The successful implementation of Islamic Microfinance in Pakistan requires some 
revolutionary changes in the banking system. The prevailing banking system in the country 
is based on interest which is completely forbidden in the Islamic Shariah. The current 
constitution adopted in 1973 (article 38 (f)} demands the authorities to completely 
eliminate interest (Riba) from the whole banking system but the existing banking does not 
comply with the constitutional demands. Out of 52 banks only five (5) have declared 
themselves fully Islamic banks, while six conventional banks have Islamic branches, and 
3 banks have sub-branches of Islamic banks (Saeed, 2012). A complete overhauling of the 
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existing banking system is required to institutionalize an interest-free banking and finance 
environment in Pakistan. 
 
viii. Follow-up and monitoring studies should be carried out after the mosque-based 
Islamic microfinance model is implemented.  These studies will help identify the 
shortcomings of the model, the issues faced by the borrowers, and the overall effectiveness 
of such projects, among others.  Ethnographic investigations would be particularly useful 
in understanding the everyday life experiences of the poor and how they are affected by 
microfinance interventions.  
 
6.3 Proposed Islamic Microfinance based Poverty Alleviation Model 
 The prime objective of microfinance is poverty alleviation and all the efforts are 
made in microfinance to achieve this noble goal. Islamic microfinance extends this goal 
one step further by attaching the goal of establishing welfare state. Active participation of 
all actors in the society is required to achieve such goals and a huge responsibility rests 
upon the rich or elite class who usually dominate in the society in terms of the occupation 
of economic resources. The following effort is an attempt to establish a model that can 
efficiently be used to break the vicious circle of poverty. The model presented in Figure-
6.1 shows the intervention of Islamic microfinance in breaking the vicious circle of poverty 
and transforming that into a virtuous circle of prosperity. 
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Figure 6.1: Breaking Vicious Circle of Poverty through Islamic Microfinance                   
(Supply Side Model) 
   
Figure-6.1 explains the model that breaks the vicious circle of poverty by using 
microfinance lending specifically the lending for entrepreneurial activities. As a first step, 
we inject the loans in the existing system (1) which increase the capital per worker (2) 
implicitly assuming that the loans will be used for economic activities. The increased 
capital per worker will trigger to increase the investment (3) that will be used for a higher 
production (4). The higher production will increase the opportunities for the worker to earn 
high real income (5) and eventually the savings will be increased (6). The higher savings 
will again trigger the capital per worker (7) which will increase the investment (8) and 
productivity (9) and finally a higher level of income (10). This hypothetical model shows 
how the vicious circle of poverty can be transformed into a virtuous circle of prosperity by 
the help of Islamic microfinance.  
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Figure 6.2: Breaking Vicious Circle of Poverty through Islamic Microfinance                   
(Demand Side Model) 
 
 Figure-6.2 shows the model that breaks the vicious circle of poverty through 
Islamic microfinance. It is pertinent to mention that the proposed model of Islamic 
microfinance (mosque-based) allows two different types of loans, i.e. loans for 
consumption and loans for entrepreneurial activities. The consumption loans are used to 
inject the funds in the system (A) that increase the demand for goods and services (B), such 
increase in quantity demanded triggers the inducement for investment (C) which forces the 
investors to invest more in search of higher profits. The higher investment leads to a higher 
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level of production (D) that eventually increases the real income (E). The consumption 
increases (F) with a higher level of real income. In the second phase of this cycle, increased 
consumption triggers the demand for goods and services to increase (G), the ripple effect 
continues and opportunities for investment increase (H) that increase high investment and 
production (I) and eventually a higher level of real income (J). These models show how 
the vicious circle of poverty can be transformed into a virtuous circle of prosperity. 
However, some cautions must be taken in interpreting the results because to keep the 
models simple, we implicitly assumed that the leakage of funds will be zero in both the 
models. The leakage of funds could disturb the models to some extent because it directly 
affects the income-generating activities. These leakages in the system could happen due to 
some exogenous shocks like catastrophic events as well as deaths, disease, and disasters.  
The study emphasizes the need for more empirical investigations in order to validate the 
proposed model and its viability. 
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Appendix-A 
Business Plan of Mosque Based Islamic Microfinance 
Name of the proposed NGO  
A POOR FRIEND 
(First ever Islamic Microfinance Institution in Pakistan) 
 
BUSINESS PLAN 
 
1. Executive Summary 
 A Poor Friend is a tax-exempted non-government non-profit organization which 
provides the interest free microfinance loans to deprived, extremely poor, and low income 
poor entrepreneurs. Our goal is to alleviate poverty through interest free microfinance 
services in Pakistan. The organization is focused to provide such services with the 
involvement of mosque in order to create social value creation in the society. Currently we 
provide two types of interest free microfinance loans i.e. consumption loans and production 
loans. We receive financial and social support from the donor agencies, charitable 
organizations, and individuals. The donations mainly consist Zakat, Sadaqat, and 
Almsgiving.     
Out of 58% poor living below the poverty line, the organization aims to target 
approximately 20% for its microfinance services. The target group includes extremely poor 
and deprived households, as well as the less income entrepreneurs who are eager to play 
their part in the society. It is estimated that the number of poor people who need our 
services will be increased in next five to ten years.  
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The organization’s clientele base is estimated to increase due its flexible loan terms 
with no interest charges on loans. A Poor Friend is an important startup for these poor who 
lack financial assistance in the absence of physical collateral that is usually requires for the 
loan from the formal banking channels. Our services will improve the living standard of 
poor families without hurting their self-esteem and dignity. Although the present setup of 
‘A Poor Friend’ is not as large as to cover the entire poor population, the services we 
provide, trigger an ambition to do something for the society in poor people.  
 
 
1.1 Mission Statement 
 The mission of ‘A Poor Friend’ is to alleviation poverty in Pakistan by creating a 
web of poor entrepreneurs who able to generate funds to support their families. The 
mission is to help those poor who are deprived and excluded from the financial net. To 
help them, to train them, and to support them to the extent that they can play an active 
role in the society.  
 
1.2 Objectives 
 This new form of interest free microfinance services is designed to cater the 
financial needs of poor and deprived people. Our main objectives are: 
 Establish the donation networks for the collection of Zakat, Sadaqat, and 
Almsgiving. 
 Establish a redistribution of Zakat channel through mosque. 
195 
 
 Create an active forum for the financial help of poor people.  
 Collect $4,000 for the pilot project and startup before the initiation of actual 
project at mass scale. US$10,000 for the first year operation, and increase 
the collection by 20% per annum. 
 Collect US$20,000 Zakat and redistribute it in poor people through 
consumption loans.  
 
2. Summary of the Organization  
 A Poor Friend is an interest free microfinance services provider, based in Karachi, 
Pakistan. The project’s focus is to utilize the minimum available resources to provide 
banking and financial services to extremely poor and deprived people. Currently, the 
program offers the following assignments: 
i. Helps poor people by redistribution of the Zakat through consumption 
loans. 
ii. Provides soft loans to poor and active entrepreneurs who have thirst to play 
their part in the society.  
 
2.1 Startup Summary 
  A Poor Friend’s startup cost including the pilot project is US$10,000 from which 
US$4,000 is allocated for project initiation and pilot project. A significant portion is 
designated as a backup money that will be used in future after a careful scrutiny of the 
project evaluation. The reminder are the other expenses normally require for opening an 
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office. The funds will be accumulated through donations mainly from Zakat, Sadaqat, and 
Almsgiving. 
  
BALANCE SHEET AT STARTUP 
S# Description Amount (in US$) 
1 Startup Expenses to Fund 2,500 
2 Startup Assets to Fund 7,500 
Total Funds 10,000 
Assets 
3 Non-cash Assets 500 
4 Cash and equivalent 7,000 
5 Additional cash funds 0 
6 Cash Balance at start up 7,000 
Total Assets 7,500 
Liabilities and Capital 
7 Current Borrowing 0 
8 Long-term Liabilities 0 
9 Accounts Payable (Outstanding Bills) 0 
10 Other Current Liabilities (Interest Free) 0 
Total Liabilities 0 
Capital 
Planed Investment 
11 Zakat 5,000 
12 Sadaqat 2,500 
13 Almsgivings 2,500 
Total Planned Investment 10,000 
14 Loss at Startup (Expenses) (2,500) 
Total Capital 7,500 
Total Capital and Liabilities 7,500 
Total Funding 10,000 
 
 
3 Marketing Analysis Summary 
 The population of the district central Karachi is around 2,200,000 out of which 10% 
are considered poor and qualify for the services of ‘A Poor Friend.’ Those people are 
mostly low income, and deprived people have no physical collateral to get loans from the 
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formal financial institutions. It is estimated that nearly half of the population consists on 
women, so we expect an equal proportion of male: female borrowers.  
 
4 Market Segmentation 
  The population base is 2,200,000 out of which approximately 10% are low income 
poor. This represents around 220,000 residents that are potentially in need of services from 
‘A Poor Friend.’ Children represents 45% of the population therefore, 99,000 are excluded 
from our estimation. This group can be broken down into three segments: 
 
i. Man (60,500)  
ii. Women (60,500) 
iii. Children (99,000) 
 
 Our services are designed to focus the adult borrowers (excluding children) that 
makes approximately 121,000. It is forecasted that the number of borrowers will be 
increased by 10% for next three years.  
 
5 Service Psychographics 
 The typical characteristics of the borrower interest in our services can be described 
as: 
a. Families with male-head works full time but having low income. 
b. Individual works full time or part time to earn day-to-day living. 
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c. The average family size is five i.e. parents with 3 children (average family in 
Pakistan). 
d. The individual ambitious to work but lacks financial resources. 
e. The woman or a group of woman wish to work independently but lack financial 
resources and basic training. 
f. Families with female head being the only bread earner of the family. 
g. The borrowers with good moral character to acquire the services of ‘A Poor 
Friend.’ 
 
6. Service Behaviors  
 A Poor Friend is planning to establish an effective channel of interest free loans for 
poor and deprived people. A number of conventional microfinance service providers have 
been working to eradicate poverty but most of their programs are ineffective due to lack of 
interest by the borrowers. Our program aims to target active entrepreneurs or low income 
poor who wish to play their part in the society. We also provide consumption loans to 
extremely poor, destitute, and deprived.  
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   7 Market Analysis 
Potential 
Customers 
Growth 
(forecast 
%) YEAR 1 YEAR 2 YEAR 3 YEAR 4 YEAR 5 CAGR 
Men 7% 60,500 64,735 69,266 74,115 79,303 7% 
Women 7% 60,500 64,735 69,266 74,115 79,303 7% 
Total - 121,000 129,470 138,533 148,230 158,606 7% 
 
 
8 Target Market Segmentation Strategy 
 The organization strongly believe that the most of its services are for adult, poor, 
and active entrepreneurs (Production Loans). These people can be trained and financed to 
the extent that they can earn not only their own livelihood but can actively participate in 
helping the other poor in the society. The forecast of 5 years exhibits the potential demand 
and subsequent requirement of the funds during the said period. It also urged the efforts to 
27%
28%
45%
Market Analysis 
Men
Women
Children
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generate sufficient fund to meet the potential demand for the funds through Zakat, Sadaqat, 
and Almsgiving. 
 
9 Summary of the Strategic Implementation 
9.1 Procedure Strategy 
 A Poor Friend is focused to create an effective channel of funds redistribution 
among the poor masses of Pakistan. The primary objective is to start interest free 
microfinance loans to poor people. The main strategy to channelize these fund is to make 
the mosque its main office and fund distribution place. Involvement of the Imam (Prayer 
leader) is possibly employed to parse-out the good-borrowers and bad-borrowers. Here the 
term good-borrower specifically describe the borrowers with honest intention of 
repayment, while the bad borrower points the one who doesn’t want to replay loan. 
Secondly, the Imam will also be responsible to classify the applicant category i.e. whether 
he/ she will be appropriate to get consumption loan or production loan on the basis of the 
applicant’s moral character and track record.  
 
9.1 Marketing Strategy 
 The marketing of the project is largely dependent on community channels. Mosque 
based system of microfinance will rely on man-to-man campaign or personal campaign. 
Apart from personal marketing, formal sources will also be used in the later stages after 
the successful scrutiny of the pilot project. Local newspapers, Television channels, and 
social media are some of the marketing channels, the organization intended to use in future.  
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9.2 Funds Accumulation Strategy 
 A Poor Friend will immediately start a fund raising campaign in order to 
accumulate sufficient funds for its startup and initial phases. To achieve this target the 
organization intends to collect funds from a number of sources like personal collection, 
box collection (fund raising box will be placed at mosque), local donors, friend and family 
network, and zakat collection. 
 
9.2.1 Funding Forecast 
 The following are some of the sources the organization target for its funding: 
a). Personal Collection: It includes the personal collection made by the IMFI head 
and other staff through Zakat, Sadaqat, Almsgiving, and Gifts-giving.  
b). Box Collection: The box collection will be acquired by placing a box in the 
mosque for fund-raising. 
c). Local Donors: This includes the collection made by the local community. 
d). Friend and Family Network: The friend and family network will be used to 
accumulate the funds through Zakat, Sadaqat, Almsgiving, and Gifts-giving. 
e). Zakat Collection: The funds will be generated through Zakat by approaching 
the Bait-ul-Maal, Zakat Division that is an official source of Zakat collection and 
redistribution in Pakistan. Besides this, Zakat will also be collected by using friend 
and family sources. 
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FUNDING FORECAST (in US$) 
Source of Collection YEAR 1 YEAR 2 YEAR 3 
Personal  1,000 1,200 1,440 
Box 2,000 2,400 2,880 
Local Donors 2,000 2,400 2,880 
Friend and Family Networks 5,000 6,000 7,200 
Zakat 20,000 24,000 28,000 
Total Funding 30,000 36,000 42,400 
Direct Cost of Funding 
Personal  50 60 72 
Box 100 120 144 
Local Donors 100 120 144 
Friend and Family Networks 250 300 360 
Zakat 1,000 1,200 1,400 
Total Cost 1,500 1,800 2,120 
 
9.3 Operational Strategy   
9.3.1 Borrowing / Collection  
 To accumulate sufficient funds for redistribution, the organization intend to use the 
local community, governmental support like Bait-ul-Mal, Zakat Collection through 
mosque, charitable organization, local and international donor, and friends and family 
networks. 
 
9.3.2 Lending Methodology 
 The organization aims to target poor individual(s) especially women borrowers, 
and group of borrowers. Unlike group-lending methodology, the organization prefers 
individual lending especially for extremely poor and deprived people. The application 
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procedure will be easy for the end users keeping the view that low-income or poor people 
usually have low literacy rate.      
 
  
10 Management Summary  
 A Poor Friend is a mosque-based interest free microfinance service provider. In the 
startup phase, the organization intend to use the existing coordinator or regular community 
volunteers. However, in the second phase, additional staff will be employed on either salary 
basis or commission basis depends upon the financial condition of the organization.  
 
10.1 Personnel Plan 
 The primary phase or in the startup, we use prayer leader and financial experts 
solely on the basis of volunteer work. The following staff will be devised in the project 
initiation phase.  
  
 i. The Head of the Organization ………………………………………01 
 ii. The Imam (Prayer leader)………………………………………….. 01  
 iii.  Financial Experts having banking experience (retired persons)… 02 
iv. Financial Expert (reserved)………………………………………… 01 
v. Accountant (volunteer)… (Part time / full time)……………………01 
 
10.2 Salaries and commissions of Personnel / Volunteers 
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 In the startup phase no salaries to the staff mentioned above are assigned. However, 
upon successful implementation and accumulation of sufficient funds, the salaries of the 
staff can be drawn from the Zakat fund. The main reason for not assigning salaries at the 
startup is the cost consideration e.g. reducing the cost per loan to offset the involvement of 
interest. In the second phase, the organization intends to pay a commission-based salary as 
honorarium to the staff / volunteers except the Imam (who is already getting salary from 
the mosque) and IMFI head. An amount of US$50 per month plus 5% to each financial 
experts and the Accountant is proposed. The amount for the salaries of the staff will be 
obtained from the Zakat fund in order to minimize the leakage of funds and to maintain the 
significant appropriation of inflow and outflow of the funds.  
 
 
Plan of Personnel Salaries and Commission (in US$) 
Staff Description Status Year 1 Year 2 Year 3 
Financial Expert (volunteer 1) Active 600 660 726 
Financial Expert (volunteer 2) Active 600 660 726 
Financial Expert (volunteer 3) Reserve 600 660 726 
Accountant (volunteer 4) Active 600 660 726 
Total Personnel Expenditures - 2,400 2,640 2,904 
 
11 Financial Plan 
11.1 General Financial Forecast 
 A Poor Friend generates fund through a number of donations as stated above and it 
is estimated that the funding will be increased by 20% for next three years. The IMFI’s 
head has given the full authority to monitor, review, and adjust the existing program with 
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due consultation with the Imam, in order to control the deviation from the existing forecast 
(if require).  
  
 The financial plan is proposed with some assumption at the aggregate level as well 
as the organizational level. The assumptions are stated below: 
 i. The pace of economic growth in the economy will be stable. 
ii. An increase in the population growth will be accounted for as a positive 
factor for the organizational goals. 
iii. The fund raising will significantly be increased by 20% without unforeseen 
hurdles.  
iv. The services of Interest Free Microfinance will be continued to help the 
poor without the government intervention. 
 
General Financial Forecast (in %) 
Description Year 1 Year 2 Year 3 
Current Interest Rate* 0% 0% 0% 
Long Term Interest Rate* 0% 0% 0% 
Tax Rate1 0% 0% 0% 
Other Interest 0% 0% 0% 
* Since the operations are based on interest free no interest rate is accounted for 
1 The non-profit organizations are exempted from the taxes. 
 
11.2 Surplus or Deficit Forecast 
 A Poor Friend’s projected surplus or deficit is shown in the following table: 
Surplus / Deficit Forecast (in US$) 
Surplus/ Deficit Year 1 Year 2 Year 3 
Total Funding 30,000 36,000 42,400 
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Total Cost of Funding 1,500 1,800 2,140 
Other Costs  0 0 0 
Gross Surplus (Deficit) 28,500 34,200 40,260 
Surplus (Deficit) (%) 95% 95% 94.95% 
EXPENSES 
Payroll 2,400 2,640 2,904 
Marketing & Advertisement 1,200 1,200 1,200 
Depreciation 0 0 0 
Rent (inside mosque) 0 0 0 
Utilities  1,200 1,200 1,200 
Insurance 0 0 0 
Payroll Taxes 360 396 436 
Total Lending  15,000 18,000 21,000 
Total Operating Expenses 20,160 23,436 26,740 
Surplus (Deficit) before Interest and Taxes 8,340 10,764 13,520 
Earnings before Interest and Taxes after 
Depreciation 
8,340 10,764 13,520 
Interest Expenses 0 0 0 
Taxes incurred 0 0 0 
Net Earnings (Loss) 8,340 10,764 13,520 
 
11.3 Projected Cash Flow 
 A Poor Friend’s projected cash flow is appended below: 
 
Projected Cash Flow (in US$) 
PRO FORMA CASH FLOW 
Cash Received Year 1 Year 2 Year 3 
Cash from operations 30,000 36,000 42,400 
Sub Total Cash from Operations 30,000 36,000 42,400 
Additional Cash Received 
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Refund of Taxes (GST/VAT/WHT) 0 0 0 
New Current borrowings 0 0 0 
New other liabilities 0 0 0 
New long term liabilities 0 0 0 
Sales of other current assets 0 0 0 
Sales of long term assets 0 0 0 
New investment received 0 0 0 
Sub Total Cash Received 30,000 36,000 42,400 
Expenditures 
Expenditures from Operations 
Cash spending 2,400 2,640 2,904 
Bills 19,500 23,400 27,560 
Sub Total spent on Operations 21,900 26,040 30,464 
Additional Spending 0 0 0 
Sub Total Cash Spent 21,900 26,040 30,464 
Net Cash Flow 8,100 9,960 11,936 
 
 
i Later on replaced by the West Pakistan Agriculturists Loan Act of 1958 
                                                 
